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ABSTRACT
The Graduation of Consultation and Education Units of Massachusetts
CMHCs from NIMH Funding: Implications for the Prevention
Mission of the Community Mental Health Center
February, 1985
David J. Armstrong, Jr., B.A., Antioch College
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor David M. Todd
Primary prevention was frequently understood to be a central goal
of the Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) movement. Consultation
and education (C&E) , as one of the mandated services of federally
funded CMHCs, was frequently taken to be the vehicle of this goal.
C&E services suffered, however, from a lack of clear guidelines and a
marginal role in agencies whose chief tasks were those of direct clinical
service delivery. With the elimination of CMHC grants from the
National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) in 1980, CMHCs were faced
with the challenge of having to restructure services in line with
available funding sources.
This research examines the fate of C&E services in the state of
Massachusetts since the elimination of NIMH funding. A history is
presented of prevention, consultation and education starting with the
mental hygiene movement and reviewing CMHC legislation, developments in
vi
NIMH and research on the nature of C&E services and their funding.
The recent fate of C&E services in Massachusetts was studied
through the use of NIMH grant records and a survey of CMHCs
. A
structured interview was conducted with thirty-three respondents in
twenty of the twenty-five former CMHCs in the state. Case studies of
C&E grant programs are presented and compared with survey results
for C&E services across the state. Block grants and state funding for
CMHCs and C&E is reviewed.
Results compare pre-1981 serivces with 1984 services and indicate
that C&E is less frequently offered and has shifted in goal orienta-
tions, activities and target populations toward sources of funding in
the private sector and direct service functions within the CMHCs. The
preventive mission of CMHCs was found to have been minimal. Changes
in funding patterns, do, however, threaten the direct service mission
of CMHCs in restricting funds for services to the working poor. The
future of C&E is mixed, with limited opportunities for work in specialist
areas of training and consultation. The future of prevention may be
less tied to CMHCs, and more dependent on the possibility of
organizing citizen constituencies which will effectively lobby state
legislatures to fund discrete prevention programs.
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CHAPTER I
A HISTORY OF CONSULTATION AND EDUCATION IN
MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAMS
Prevention and the Mental Hygiene and Child
Guidance Clinic Movements
How one feels about the current status of consultation and educa-
tion services in mental health depends on how one interprets history.
And, feelings ranging from optimism to bitterness run strong among the
small cadre of mental health professionals who have specialized in
consultation and education.
The Community Mental Health Centers Act (Title II of the Mental
Retardation Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Construction
Act, P.L. 88-164, 1963) gave birth to Consultation and Education (C&E)
as one of five mandated services to be delivered by federally funded
mental health centers. In his address to congress, President Kennedy
introduced the legislation with a speech which continues to echo in the
writings of consultation, education and prevention professionals 20 years
later. The Community Mental Health Center (CMHC) Act was to introduce a
new era in mental health services where treatment would be available to
all in their communities. Services would be progressive in offering a
range of alternatives to state hospitals and would be delivered by a
new mix of workers, integrating specialist professionals with para-
professionals drawn from the communities served. Most strikingly to
C&E specialists, the CMHCs were to be a vanguard of prevention in the
community, attacking the incidence of disorder at its root.
2If one takes President Kennedy's words on prevention as the
definitive key note of CMHCs
, then the history of C&E is one of a
betrayal of the mission of the community mental health movement. If,
however, as Snow and Newton (1976) suggest, the CMHC Act is seen more
as an Eisenhower-era attempt at fairness in the rights of all to see
the doctor, then the history of C&E is one of an entrepreneural spirit
within CMHCs which served to keep experimentation in service innova-
tion alive in the centers, link the centers to the outside world,
and build collaborative service networks which integrated a variety
of resources and teachings. Heirs of the mental hygiene and child
guidance movement, bom in the era of civil rights activism and social
upheaval, C&E incorporated the contradictions of a value-based
commitment to community change, delivered from a mental health
treatment facility, and measured against public health models of
prevention
.
Consultation and education services may be seen as the most
recent episode in the cycling history of prevention in mental health.
As prevention, C&E is a movement "whose time has come not once, but
many times," as Saul Cooper (1980) punned with the title of NIMH's
hopefully titled book, Primary Prevention : An Idea Whose Time Has
Come (Klein and Goldston, 1977). Spaulding and Balch (1983) provide
striking examples of similar goals, concerns and even phrases cycling
through the twentieth century, linking C&E to earlier mental hygiene
and child guidance movements.
Founded in the outcry following the publication of Clifford Beer's
1908 autobiography of life in state institutions for the insane, the
3National Committee for Mental Hygiene represented professional and
citizen reforms concerned with the promotion of mental health. The found-
ing Connecticut chapter stated in its 1908 proclamation:
The chief purpose of this Society shall be to work
for conservation of mental health: to prevent
nervous and mental defects: to secure and
disseminate reliable information on these subjects...
(Winslow, 1934, cited in Spaulding & Balch, 1983
p. 61).
The proclamation of a movement since discredited (its national
committee changed its name to "Mental Health" in the mid-1950 's to avoid
association with its past) carries a strong similarity to the goal
statements of many C&E units.
Child guidance clinics, based on Dr. Douglas Thom's Boston "habit
clinics," were promoted in the early 1920's by the U.S. Children's Bureau
as a preventive mental health program. Adopted by the Mental Hygiene
movement as a "favorite son" (Spaulding and Balch, 1983), the child
guidance clinic was to intervene with parents, teachers and children
in teaching the proper method of child rearing designed to promote mental
health (much as one might promote good moral character). Indeed, much of
the early child guidance work incorporated the concerns of John Watson
and other pragmatic American behaviorists with "bad habits," their
consequences and prevention in infants.
The early 1900 's were years of great power for the sciences of behavior
and American society turned to its scientists for instruction in rational
child rearing. Lomax, Kagan and Rosenkrantz (1978) offer a fascinating
history of the relationship between science and society in their Science
4and Patterns of Child Care
.
In summarizing "Watson and the American
Tradition," they offer an example of the early health promotion ideal
that framed the mental hygiene movement:
Watson's message could be summarized succinctly to
an American parent in a single one-hour lecture:
reward the behavior that you want your child to
maintain and punish him for the behavior that you do
not want him to maintain; apply that principle
consistently for 10 years and you will have produced
your "dream child." (Lomax, et al
. ,
1978)
Science offered society the rational and proven means of being able
to "produce" a child's fate. Aside from the obvious flavor of capitalist
industrialization, highlighted by the writers, the message was a strong
one: society, through its parents, could produce criminals and juvenile
delinquents or it could produce upstanding magnates of industry. Given
the choice, citizen movements could not help but proclaim their
support for mental health promotion, a cause somewhat broader than the
contemporary prevention of discrete disorders.
While originally reflecting the behaviorist optimism, child guidance
clinics also spearheaded the introduction of analytic theory, with much
of the same fate as that of many prevention efforts in soliciting an
increased demand for direct intervention or treatment. Peaking in
popularity in 1932 with 674 clinics in 34 states, the number had
dropped to 260 by 1946 (Spaulding and Balch, 1983) and by that time
much of their emphasis had shifted to treatment:
Early clinics set as their goals the prevention of
juvenile delinquency and of mental illness. Present
day standards are more modest ... 'outpatient
psychiatric help' is shown not be be an insurance
against future ill health, but an aide to currently
5better functioning. (Lindt, 1950, cited in
Spaulding and Balch, 1983, p. 63.)
It is interesting to note that in Massachusetts the child guidance
clinics were the first non-inpatient settings to receive direct state
support for treatment staff. State professionals were placed in local
clinics at the behest of community parent and mental hygiene
associations, creating the state's "partnership clinic" system. This
"partnership clinic" system, in the wake of the repeal of CMHC
legislation, remains the dominant publically-supported outpatient
resource in the state (Note 1)
.
General health promotion or education was supported by many means
in addition to child guidance clinics. "Scientific" advice has been
offered to parents, in the country for at least the past 80 years,
often in popular magazines and best sellers
. The Children's Bureau
instituted a series of pamphlets entitled. Infant Care (1914 through
1945, as cited in Lomax e_t al .
,
1978). Mrs. Max West, author of the
first edition, emphasizes the vital importance of early education:
It must not be forgotten that the period of infancy
is a period of education often of greater conse-
quence than any other two years of life. Not only
are all the organs and functions given their primary
education, but the faculties of the mind as well
receive those initial impulses that determine very
largely their direction and efficiency through life.
The first nervous impulses which pass through the
baby's eyes, ears, fingers, or mouth to the tender
brain makes a pathway for itself; the next time another
impulse travels over the same path, it deepens the
impression of the first. ( Child Care
,
1914, cited in
Lomax et al.
,
1978.)
6It is tempting to hear echoes of this same concern for promotion/
prevention for infants in Pierre the Pelican a periodic parent guide to
early childhood development distributed currently by C&E units and
pediatric branches of hospitals. The same ferverent respect for the
possibilities of infancy have certainly continued to dominate prevention
and developmental screening efforts, albeit in a much more refined and
focused manner.
The mental hygiene movement supported in principle the usefulness
of education and training, targeting populations later favored by
C&E such as parents, school children, and teachers. Topics discussed
at the First International Mental Hygiene Congress (Washington, DC,
1930) included: "organization of community facilities for prevention,
care and treatment;" "parent and teacher training;" and "marital
relationships" (Spaulding and Balch, 1983). By the early 1950's the
movement had promoted mental health via education in mental hygiene
and sex education classes for school children, parent and teacher
training, human relations classes, mothers' classes for pregnant women,
and marriage clinics (Spaulding and Balch, 1983).
Early Federal Involvement in Mental Health
The rise of the role of the federal government in mental health
care led eventually to the demise of the mental hygiene movement
in the mid-1950 's and plants the seeds of the CMHC legislation , the
major federal action to date in mental health service delivery.
The early precursors to the National Institute of Mental Health offer
7some interesting, if speculative, hints as to the concerns of the federal
government. The Children's Bureau, publisher of Infant Care, and
promoter of child guidance clinics, was actually a division of the
U.S. Department of Labor. Could it be possible that the Children's
Bureau at the turn of the century predates corporate human resource
departments by 70 years in its concern with promoting a productive
workforce? Certainly the Children's Bureau, like many federal offices,
took on a life of its own separate from its host, and industry of character
has long been viewed as a strength of American mental health. NIMH, for
its part, may be traced to a blend of the Departments of Labor,
Treasury and the Public Health Service. The Narcotics Division of the
Treasury Department changed its name in 1930 to the Division of Mental
Hygiene in an explicit attempt to attack criminal behavior at its root
(a tradition which has continued to the present with some C&E units
receiving prevention grants from the Law Enforcement Administration
Assistance program)
.
The Public Health Service, with the Surgeon General as its spokes-
person, had long been a federal branch on the forefront of the war on
disease. Of all the traditions in prevention, perhaps that of public
health has enjoyed the greatest tangible success, hence prestige and
legitimacy. A service branch designed to adminster to the public
welfare at large, the Public Health Service implemented the findings of
medical breakthroughs in nutrition and infectious diseases made in the
late 1800 's and early 1900 's. The advances were startling as epidemic
diseases were controlled through simple sanitation and dietary interven-
8tions even before the discovery of antibiotics in the 1940's. The model
of prevention was straightforward. "Pure" scientific research identi-
fied the metabolic or cellular cause of a disease and then an interven-
tion was designed targeted on the most accessible point in the cycle of
the illness. A highly scientific medical model, the Public Health
Service, benefited from the early wave of optimism where a single
specific treatable cause could be expected to be discovered for an
illness, given time. This ideal of "proven" scientific causality con-,
tinues to weight on psychiatry and mental illness prevention, embodied
in the breakthrough in the treatment of neurosyphillis made by Kraft-Ebing
and others at the turn of the century. Medical prevention, itself, has
long since evolved beyond the single proven credo of causality to far
more complex models where certain conditions are understood to place
populations "at risk" regardless of the specific, as yet undiscovered,
etiological mechanism. The early public health model remains a yard-
stick, however, against which mental illness prevention has often been
measured and found wanting (Bloom, 1979).
The science of public health provided mental health with its
definition of prevention. In public health, primary prevention is a
reduction in the incidence of a disease or condition (it occurs less
often)
. Secondary prevention is the identification of diseased people
for early treatment before much, if any, harm occurs. Tertiary preven-
tion is the curtailing of damage done and rehabilitation of a person.
In mental health, primary prevention is often simply called prevention
,
secondary prevention is often called early identification , and tertiary
prevention may be called treatment , direct service , therapy , or
rehabilitation
.
The range of prevention reflects the success, for
instance, of community clinics, early identification and specialty
hospitals in lowering the incidence of tuberculosis. Early identi-
fication and treatment in mental health have yet to be shown to
lower the incidence of other people going crazy, so primary prevention
is often argued to be the only prevention in mental health (President's
Commission on Mental Health, 1978).
Wars have frequently emphasized to society its own moral and
psychological failings, much to the professional benefit of psychiatry
and psychology. Freud's discovery of the repetition compulsion in
shell-shocked soldiers of World War I is even now being reassessed in
research on Vietnam veterans and post-traumatic stress disorders
(Van der Koke and others, suggesting a possible addiction cycle to
endogenous opiates, Note 2). Of greater concern to society at large
was the 12.5% rejection rate on psychiatric grounds of inductees for the
American armed forces during World War II. This concern led to the
passage in 1946 of the National Mental Health Act, amending the Public
Health Act of 1944, and creating the National Institute of Mental Health
(Snow and Newton, 1976) . Testimony by representatives of the Division
of Mental Hygiene, Children's Bureau and the Office of the Surgeon
General before Senate subcommittees made it clear that the pressing
national needs were ones of research and prevention in mental illness
(Spaulding and Balch, 1983) . Placed under the National Institutes of
Health, a branch of the Public Health Service, NIMH became the new
focus of national initiatives in mental health. The Division of Mental
Hygiene was disbanded by 1949.
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Research and public interest in the causes of emotional disorder
continued to exert considerable influence during the 1950 's on prevention
and social policy. Following the Coconut Grove tragedy of the late
1940 's (where hundreds of patrons died in a dance club fire), research
by Erich Lindeman on grief and adjustment led to his crises theory of
adjustment and disorder. He founded the Wellesly Human Relations
Service as a community mental health program for his prevention services.
(Thirty years later the Erich Lindeman Center in Boston is one of the
largest state-owned mental health facilities, devoted mostly to the
remedial treatment of the poor and chronic populations.) Research on
social structure and causes of mental disorder (such as Hollingshead and
Redlich's Social Class and Mental Diseases
, 1958 and Scole, Langer,
Michael, Opler and Rennie's 1962 Midtown Manhattan Study reflected an
increasingly more sophisticated appreciation of "the effects of poverty,
racism, and increasing urbanization and the relationships between social
class and other social factors and mental illness (Snow and Newton, 1976,
p. 585)." Research on the psychological effects of racism was taken
into consideration in the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling on desegregation.
Perhaps the Supreme Court decision and the civil rights movement
in general framed the later C&E endeavor more than is generally
acknowledged. Here a major national movement pursued fundamental societal
change on an ethical, principled basis. The movement provided galvanizing
ges of tragedy, confrontation and victory and drew on the methods of
ommunity organization and development to build the coalitions which
ould act on society. There was the conviction that society had to change
ima
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for the betterment of its individual members and that such change would
be brought about not by medical specialists using public health tech-
niques, but by citizens and community leaders organizing for legal and
political power. It is perhaps this movement more than any other that
contributed to the value conflicts of C&E professionals, subtly shaping
their sense of mission with an invisible heritage quite different from
that of their professional roles and the treatment facilities in which
th6y worked.
The Joint Commission on Mental Health
The National Institute of Mental Health, created with a public health
mandate (Snow and Newton, 1976), served chiefly to coordinate the
expansion of research and training during the early 1950 's. The Veteran's
Administration greatly expanded its psychiatric facilities and with the
major increases in funding made available by NIMH and the VA, graduate and
medical students moved in large numbers into clinical training, swelling
the national ranks of clinical-treatment oriented professionals. When
Congress mandated in 1955 that a national study of mental health be
undertaken (Mental Health Study Act) , NIMH was given the responsibility
of designating a nongovernmental, interdisciplinary study group. NIMH
chose the Joint Commission on Mental Health, a study group formed earlier
that year by the American Medical and American Psychiatric Associstions
.
Comprised at it was of 25 M.D.s (out of 45 members)jthe Commission's
findings were largely treatment-oriented
.
Submitted to President Kennedy in 1961 (Action for Mental Health )
,
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the Commission's report states:
A national mental health program should recognizethat major mental illness is the core problem and
unfinished business of the mental health move-
ment, and that intensive treatment of patients
with critical and prolonged mental breakdowns
should have first call on fully-trained members ofthe mental health professions, (p. xiv)
The conclusions were clearly not a mandate for the prevention of
mental illness. In fact, the report was highly critical of the mental
hygiene movement as having been premature, unscientific and ineffectual.
In support of this view, the Commission cited Robert Hunt, from his
1956 presentation to the Milbank Memorial Fund: "Our hopes of pre-
venting mental illness by mental health education and child guidance
clinics have been disappointed and there is no convincing evidence that
anyone has ever been kept out of the state hospital by such measures"
(p. 9).
The Commission's own research (Americans View their Mental Health,
Gurin, Veroff and Feld, 1960), had indicated that the vast majority of
citizens turn to neighbors, family, clergy and family doctors for help,
rather than to mental health professionals. As Snow and Newton (1976)
note, however, these results did little to shape the Commission's
recommendations
:
Yet in the Commission's final report, little
emphasis was placed on secondary preventive
approaches. There was scant discussion of the
need for educational and consultative approaches
to community service agents as a response to the
manpower problem and as a means of developing a
service network for people in need. (p. 587)
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The report was met by an outcry of protest by prevention advocates,
not the least of which was Gerald Caplan. Soon to publish his seminal
work, Principles of Preventive Psychiatry (1964), Caplan had specialized
in the late 1950 's in the study of the process of consultation to parents,
teachers, and service providers. Spaulding and Balch (1983) note that
Caplan, himself, had been critical of child guidance clinics for their
drift toward direct service and away from prevention (Caplan, 1961).
For his part, Caplan was reportedly assured that prevention was again
placed in the spotlight by President Kennedy's address to Congress in
February, 1963, calling for legislation (Caplan, 1965; Spaulding and
Balch, 1983). Historical analysis suggests, however, that what changes
were made were due less to popular opinion and more to internal polit-
ical maneuvers within the Executive Branch (Chu and Trotter, 1974;
Musto, 1975; Snow and Newton, 1976).
The Joint Commission was not the only agency to submit a report with
recommendations to the President in 1961. A power struggle had developed
between the Public Health Service (responsible for service delivery) and
the National Institutes of Health (previously responsible in large
part for research). The Surgeon General, representing the PHS , sub-
mitted a plan which would chiefly have served to strengthen the state
mental hospital system. A planning group of NIMH, representing NIH,
submitted an opposing viewpoint, arguing that monies should go directly
to localities and not to state departments of mental health (and by
extension, state hospitals). The President appointed a Cabinet level
committee, chaired by HEW Secretary, Anthony Celebrezze, to study the
14
plans and make recommendations. The committee chose, as its working
staff, professionals from NIMH. The subsequent legislation passed by
Congress in 1963 authorized monies to go directly to localities and
appointed NIMH to administer the grants. It is something of an irony
that many of the former NIMH staff who administered the CMHC service
program during the 1970 's may not be found under the employ of PHS
regional offices, as NIMH returns more to a research role after 20 years.
This was a power struggle that was won only for the moment.
The CMHC Act; Did It Promise Prevention in C&E?
In 1963, Congress passed Public Law 88-164, the Mental Retardation
Facilities and Community Mental Health Centers Cbnsttuction Act. Title II,
the Community Mental Health Centers Act, provided federal monies
to qualifying applicants for the construction of Community Mental Health
Centers. Applicants were to be local private nonprofit agencies or
collaboratives serving populations of 75,000 to 200,000 residents as
designated by a state approved geographical "catchment area" service plan.
Applicants also had to provide five mandated services, which included:
(1) emergency services; (2) outpatient services; (3) partial
hospitalization; (4) inpatient services; and (5) consultation and
education.
What exactly was meant by consultation and education services and
what the concrete task of C&E was to be has never been clear. Many
writers agree that prevention was to be inferred as a goal of the CMHC
movement in general and of C&E services in particular:
15
Primary prevention per se was not listed as one of
the five essential services (perhaps in partial
response to the attitude of the Joint Commission)
but preventive interests were to be served to some
degree under the requirement to include consulta-
tion and education services and later under the
added services of research and evaluation (Spauldine
and Balch, 1983, p. 71) . ^
&
Saul Cooper comments that, "the federal mandate for consultation and
education was meant to assure prevention programming" (1980, p. 253)
and Backer, Levine and Erchul, in their NIMH-funded evaluation of C&E
activities (1983) conclude that, "C&E services from the beginning have
been seen as largely preventive in nature" (p. 3).
This role was, however, clearly a "challenge" both to the C&E
unit (Raber, 1983) and to the center as a whole (Steve Goldston,
former Director of Prevention at NIMH, 1969; cited by Raber, 1983).
As the only indirect service of the five, C&E could be assumed to have
a wide range of responsibilities for those tasks left unaddressed by
the other four direct services. Gabbert (1980) suggests four tasks of
C&E: (1) responsibility for continuity of client care through systems
consultation with other area providers (often termed "networking")
;
(2) training of caregivers to help shift personnel to community-based
descriptions, increase the use of local paraprofessionals reflective
of community norms and values, and increase dissemination of innovation;
(3) early identification or secondary prevention through case consultation
to non-mental health providers; and (4) primary prevention in education
and community development projects for high risk populations. This list
of tasks suggests that primary prevention was in fact only one of four
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C&E tasks and stands in contrast to the characterization of C&E units
offered in the Backer, Levine and Erchul evaluation of C&E activities
(1983). Their report suggests that primary prevention was central::
f^^^'^iJf ^""T
^^^^"^ definition of C&E given inthe 1963 enabling legislation for conununity mentalhealth centers, several basic orientations of
these services became clear: first, that C&E is an
outreach function more likely to be community-based
than CMHC-based. Second, that prevention of mentalillness is the major emphasis of these programs.
Third, that both educational efforts and consultation
with programs that provide direct or indirect
mental health services are included under this rubric —
services that ideally have a "ripple effect" /in
spreading impacts to
_numerous people not directly seenby C&E professionals_7 (p. 5).
This suggests a fairly clearly defined legislated role for C&E and
prevention in the CMHC movement. Retrospective research indicates,
however, that C&E units typically represented only 4% of the work force
and 2% to 5% of the total staff hours of CMHCs (Bass and Rosenstein, 1978;
Ketterer &Bader, 1977; Hassler, 1979; Backer et al.
,
1983). C&E directors
often occupied lower positions organizationally than other program
directors (Ketterer & Bader, 1977). In fact, it seems from writings in
the field and the history of C&E in Massachusetts compiled in this
research that C&E units were not in many cases even created until 1976,
13 years after the passage of the CMHC Act.
A central contributor to the confusion is to be found in the vague
and ambiguous guidelines for C&E promulgated by NIMH. Published first
in 1966 (NIMH, 1966) and later revised in the 1971 Policy and Standards
Manual
,
CMHC Program Handbook
,
Part I (NIMH, 1971), the guidelines
assigned the following two tasks:
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(1) Consultation with key community caregivers to
enhance their skills in addressing the mental healthproblems of their clients and in developing mentalhealth programs within their own community organi-
zations and (2) the provision of educational
programs to make the CMHC more accessible for all
residents of the catchment area and to promote
mental health and prevent emotional disturbance
through dissemination of relevant mental health
knowledge (NIMH, 1977
, p23).
While clear enough as paragraphs go, this particular paragraph was
assumedly meant to be the basis for evaluating one-fifth of the perfor-
mance of a multi-million dollar mental health center, part of a movement
with prevention as a core goal. Snow and Newton (1976) characterize the
first task as, "a rather conservative mandate, and one that is
basically clinical in nature" (p. 589). They point out that the second
task is the only mention in the entire manual of "a beginning of a
discussion on primary prevention" (p. 589). As a basis of evaluation,
notes from the 1966 manual are even more clearly ambiguous:
What proportion of the mental health staff should be
concerned with consultation? How much time should be
dovoted to it? Where should it take place? No absolute
guidelines apply to these questions. (NIMH, 1966, p.
25)
And no absolute guidelines were applied. Seven years after his first
review, David Snow returned to summarize the guidelines in an article
written with Thomas Wolff (1983). They conclude that the guidelines
never adequately represented the assumed promise of prevention contained
in the CMHC Act:
Fairly traditional views of C&E were contained in
these documents and little attention was given to
prevention, even though prevention was presumedly
to be a major thrust of community mental health
centers. (p. 40)
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While the spirit of the CMHC Act was taken by many as a significant
programmatic commitment to prevention in the form of C&E services,
NIMH regulations which defined the letter of the law failed to reflect
such a spirit
.
The issue of NIMH regulations is central to the history of C&E
services in several respects. A discrete service entity commonly
referred to as "consultation and education" had not existed before the
legislation. Now it did and, conceptually at least, as one of five
mandated services it could be assumed to represent one-fifth of a
center's resources (Snow and Newton, 1976; Backer et_ al., 1983).
Apparently the concept was a compromise mixture of indirect services,
integrating mental health education with consultive services which could
involve individual education, clinical training, case outreach and
identification and direct clinical interventions mediated through a
third party. Caplan's work in preventive psychiatry and consultation
(Theory and Practice of Consultation
,
1970), while influential, was
certainly not definitive or accepted widely enough to assume that it
represented C&E. Without a formal, external definition, C&E as a
service unit lacked any practical unity. D'Augelli (1980) charac-
terized C&E as a "service in search of a technology, an ideological
stance in search of a professional identity" (p. 5). This dilemma was
one that C&E shared with its parent movement, prevention:
Primary prevention must overcome conceptual
organizational and professional threats to its exis-
tence. This is equally true of C&E as the prime
operationalization of primary prevention in mental
health (D'Augelli, 1980, p. 17).
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Prevention and C&E were, perhaps, more of a cause than a profession
or an agreed upon technique at the time of the CMHC Act.
As a service unit without definition placed in an organization which
faced pressing demands for service, C&E staff activities could be
expected to be pulled into more clearly defined administrative or
clinical roles. Even as late as 1977
, Ketterer and aader found that C&E
staff spent less than half their time delivering consultive or
educational services to the community. As a consequence of the lack
of definition, C&E took on many identities ranging from public relations
for the CMHC, to grant development for other center programs, to
implementation of community and social change efforts (Snow and Wolff,
1983, p. 39). The press for direct service and the daily administra-
tive business of delivering that service exerted a powerful distorting
influence on C&E from the beginning, at least as far as primary prevention
was concerned.
Along with current controversies of prevention, the C&E mandate inher-
ited an organizational contradiction of need and demand. While,
all CMHC activities were to be based on local and state-wide needs
assessments, the centers responded most naturally to service demand.
In contemporary American society there has rarely been a demand for
prevention services. For C&E this was often, in fact, a contradiction.
Many of the at-risk constituencies. identified by C&E needs assessments were
unorganized, disempowered minorities who frequently were not organized
or coherent enough to demand direct or indirect services. School
children at risk of incest, acquaintence rape or alcohol related deaths
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are not likely to come to the executive director of a center and demand
a preventive program. At times their parents or teachers would, but
more often, once sensitized by C&E services to the issues at hand, such
representatives would request direct clinical services for those
people (or cases from the service perspective) that they were worried
about. The complaint that prevention had never demonstrated a
reduction in demand for state hospital beds cited by the Joint Commission
would haunt C&E. C&E services by their nature tended to mix early
identification with primary prevention, increasing demand for the direct
clinical services they were not mandated to provide (Gottlieb and Hall,
1980). Clinically-oriented case consultation is often a useful and
necessary step in establishing credibility and gaining entry to a community
or agency, permitting later program consultation or system change.
Unfortunately, the generalist model of C&E, when placed in the context
of a major direct service agency, was easily pressed into the reactive
case-consultation end of this spectrum. As one executive director put
it, "We can't give prevention away. The teachers want us to take a
look at the kid!" (Note 3). Fifteen years after the legislation, and
well into the first wave of "graduate-CMHCs" (those centers who have
graduated from federal funding), Ketterer ^ind Bader (1977) would note that
C&E had long suffered under the "press for direct services." They
predicted C&E would be the first units to disappear because of such a
press. Snow and Newton conclude:
It is in the nature of the clinical case task that
it tends to overwhelm and heavily subordinate all
other tasks unless strenuous efforts are made to
protect the others (p. 588).
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Snow and Newton introduce the concepts of social task, structure and
process (Newton, 1973; Levinson, 1973) to explain the popular misunder-
standings surrounding the CMHC Act and its prevention mission. The
social task is that endeavor which is superordinate over all others
in an organization's mission, its reason for existence. Structure
within the organization reflects this primary task. Social process is
the process of fantasy, ideology or imagery which surrounds the organi-
zation. Snow and Newton argue that social process, arising from
desegration and anti-Vietnam war era protests, characterized the CMHC
movement as a radical task of social change. C&E and prevention
services were taken as the structural representatives of such a mission.
The fantasies of a radical mission were further augmented by writings
in the field of academic community psychology which characterized
the CMHC legislation as a movement. The primary task as reflected by
the enacted structure of CMHCs was not one of prevention, however, but
that of the extension of direct service:
It is clear that to an overwhelming extent, the
primary task (of CMHCs) was to extend direct
clinical service and that the task of indirect
service ran well behind. (Snow and Newton,
1976, p. 589)
They note that in its primary task the CMHC Act may be judged as
something of a success, in contrast to the reactions of disillusionment
and loss concerning the failure-to-thrive syndrome of its C&E component.
While the passage of the CMHC Act was greeted by many as a new
commitment to prevention, it was the ideology of prevention more than the
work of prevention which gained the greatest strength.
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In their history of prevention, Spaulding and Balch suggest that
as a prevention movement, the CMHC structure, like that of the earlier
child guidance clinic, precluded the success of prevention activity:
Our reading of this literature suggest that two of
the major preventive movements (i.e., the child
guidance clinic movement and the comprehensive mental
health center movement) have been ill-fated as they
have found themselves too entrenched in service delivery
issues and settings. (1983, p. 76).
Much of the consequent history of prevention and C&E (abbreviated in
recent writings as P, C&E) is that of advances in technology and sophis-
tication of delivery, surprising in light of the barriers faced by this
service
.
Legislative History of the CMHC Act and
Subsequent Bills
The legislative history of the CMHC Act is one of frequent amend-
ments, a continuous expansion of required services and repeated
crises over the expiration deadlines for federal funding. The conse-
quences of this history include ever-increasing red tape in reporting
procedures, expansion of clinical service staff and programs, largely
dependent on direct federal funds, and an enduring barrier to long-term
fiscal planning by the centers. Histories of this legislation may be
found in Chu and Trotter, 1974; Morrison, 1977; Sharfstein and Wolfe,
1979; Gabbert, 1980; NIMH, 1981; and Backer et al.
,
1983).
The 1963 Community Mental Health Centers Act (P.L. 88-164) originally
authorized money only for the construction of physical plants. The
Act was ammended in 1965 (P.L. 89-105) to provide funds for personnel
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in the form of staffing grants. Centers were to be eligible for
staffing grants for 51 months on a decreasing scale from 75% to 30% of
the staff costs for the center overall. This declining scale was
known as the seed funding concept and carried in it the seeds of
contradiction. Seed funding was designed to help create local treatment
centers which would reflect the mission of comprehensive services
expressed in the federal legislation. The service design of compre-
hensive services would offer a balance to state mental health services
which were mostly oriented toward chronic, inpatient mental health and
retardation populations. After independent creation by the federal
government, however, the centers were expected to successfully solicit
state, local and private funds, thereby eventually "graduating" to
self-sufficiency. The legislation, in part, represented an attempt
to influence public priorities for service funding on the state level
through creating a lobby of agencies and a public expectation of services
on the local level. In reality, the centers remained largely dependent
on federal funds. As Gabbert states, "once begun, no one expected
Congress to abandon CMHCs if they ran into trouble" (1980, p. 25).
The legislation was amended 13 times between 1963 and 1980, when
it was replaced by the Mental Health Systems Act. Following the
creation of staffing grants in 1965, the Act was amended in 1967
(P.L. 90-31) to extend funding to 1970. The Act was amended in 1968
(P.L. 90-574) to extend services to substance abusers. Amendments
in 1970 (P.L. 91-211, 91-513, 91-515 and 91-616) extended funding until
1973. Staff grants were extended in duration to eight years for each
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center and the scale was modified for poverty areas. Additional
staffing monies were made available for consultation and new categorical
grants for children's services were added. Funds were extended for
drug treatment and prevention and treatment of alcoholism. Additional
drug service provisions were added in 1972 (P.L. 92-225) and in 1973
funding for staffing, construction, children's and substance abuse
grants were extended one year, to 1974.
The short extensions of funding and the frequent amendments in
the early 70 's reflect the change in attitude of the President. Presi-
dent Nixon impounded funds in 1970, leading to staff reductions in
centers and at NIMH. Battles for renewal of funding met stiff
resistance in Congress, leading to the single year extension of funding
in 1973. NIMH was placed under a newly created Alcohol, Drug Abuse,
and Mental Health Administration. (The bureaucratic chain of command
now ran from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, to the
Public Health Service, to ADAMHA, to NIMH, to the Division of Mental
Health Service Programs, a division of an institute of an administration
of a service of a department.) The National Council of Community Mental
Health Centers was formed in 1974 during a bitter struggle for funding
in which Congress met two presidential vetoes before finally passing
amendment P.L. 94-63 in 1975.
The struggle to overcome presidential vetoes entailed a considerable
amount of pork barrelling in Congress with a number of changes added
to the CMHC Act as a result. The five mandated services were expanded
to twelve, with the addition of children, elders, screening, follow-up
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care, transitional living, alcohol, and drug abuse services.
In Massachusetts, it is interesting to note that this legislation led
several general hospitals to surrender fiscal authority over their
CMHC grants. The earlier grants could easily be used to construct and
staff inpatient units, while subcontracting some funds to area vendors
of outpatient services. The additional services and reporting
requirements apparently made under this arrangement les^ feasible
. In some
ways, this amendment created a second wave of CMHCs which were younger,
more outpatient-oriented, and yet, middle-aged in terms of their CMHC
funding cycle. A number of grant changes were included in the amend-
ment to facilitate transitions. Staffing grants were changed to
operation grants to permit support of administrative personnel. Con-
version grants were instituted to help start up new mandated services
and distress grants were added to assist those early CMHCs which were
now completing their eight-year cycle and facing a graduation crisis.
A new sliding scale was created and planning grants were added to help
communities organize for a full CMHC application, thereby encouraging
an expansion in new centers. And, of course, funding for the CMHC Act
was extended three years. In all, the 1975 amendment represented a
forceful, if complex, reaffirmation of federal involvement in service
delivery, with increased "monitoring of the performance of all federally
funded centers to insure their responsiveness to community needs and
national goals relating to community mental health care" (NIMH, 1981).
Perhaps of greatest import to C&E, the 1975 amendments created a
new categorical grant for C&E services. The funding was placed on a
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three-year declining scale, but would bottom-out at a base rate which
would then continue. Centers receiving both C&E and operations grant,
were required to have a full-time C&E director with direct line access
to the executive director of the center. This legislation was
designed to address the previous neglect of C&E services, placing a
financial and organizational floor beneath the C&E service mandate
(Snow and Newton, 1976; Gabbert, 1980).
Public Law 95-83 (1977) allowed for a three year phase-in of the
new services. In 1978, P.L. 95-622 extended distress grants and allowed
centers to retain up to five percent of their grant funds from one
year to another. This, for the first time, allowed centers to accumu-
late a cash reserve, allowing for longer range planning and alleviating
the cash-flow crisis which plagued many centers (Gabbert, 1980).
Funding was again extended for the Act, this time until 1980, when new,
comprehensive legislation was expected. A final amendment in 1979,
P.L. 96-32, changed accounting procedures.
In all, funding provisions were amended 12 times, in the end allowing
a center to receive one planning grant, eight operation grants and three
distress grants, for a total of 12 continuous years of funding. Chil-
dren's substance abuse and C&E grants could be received over many of
these same years. By September, 1980, 789 CMHCs had received 2.659
billion dollars and served catchment areas representing 55% of the na-
tional population (NIMH, 1982; Backer et al.
,
1983) . C&E grants totaled
40.9 million dollars or approximately 1.5% of all CMHC grant monies.
The Community Mental Health Centers Act was rescinded in 1980 with
the passage of P.L. 96-398, the Mental Health Systems Act. President
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Carter had appointed a President's Commission on Mental Health in 1977
to study mental health needs and make recommendations for change. The
Committee issues its report in 1978, which included a report from the
Task Panel on Prevention. The Commission identified four areas where
change was needed, including the following: (1) failure to serve the
neediest populations, including children, elders and chronically
disabled; (2) failure to adequately involve states in funding or
planning; (3) failure to connect with medical settings; and (4) a need to
expand prevention activities. Critics of the report complained that it
downplayed CMHCs and the comprehensive service model in favor of
increased state control and emphasis on priority populations like the
deinstitutionalized (Gabbert
,
1980). Research with graduate centers
had already indicated that increased reliance on state funding led to
an elimination of the comprehensive service profile and of indirect
services such as prevention (Naierman et^ al., 1978).
The Mental Health Systems Act increased the authority of states to
coordinate the priorities and distribution of funds. At the same time,
the Act continued funding of C&E, planning, financial distress and initial
operations grants to CMHCs for one more year. A non-revenue producing
services grant was to provide additional funding for services that could
not be billed as direct clinical costs, including case management,
evaluation research and, to some extent, C&E. Prevention was separated
from C&E in the legislation, "undoubtedly contributing to further confu-
sion in actually implementing (C&E) services" (Raber, 1983, p. 32).
A prevention center was to be created under NIMH with $6 million to
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fund prevention activities. It was felt that, with the expiration of
C&E grants in 1981, indirect services grants, prevention grants, and
possibly even special population treatment grants could be applied
for by existing C&E units (Wolff, Note 4).
The Mental Health Systems Act is not studied widely as a legislative
entity because it lasted less than a year. Without the benefit of a
national study commission, the Reagan administration effectively
introduced into Congress, lobbied for and signed into law, P.L. 97-35,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, known more simply as
"Block Grants." The block grants did three things: (1) cut total
funding; (2) collapsed ten categorical grants under AMAHMA into a
single block grant; and (3) awarded these grants directly to state
governments (GAO, 1984).
The precise amount of reduction varies according to the reporting
service. General estimates by the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health (DMH, 1984) and anecdotal reports by CMHC directors in the
state, place the cut in mental health dollars to around 25%. Federal
figures from GAO obscure the impact somewhat by combining all ADAMHA
funds together and frequently reporting them incompletely within the
combined federal, state, and private funds, which have risen. According
to GAO figures, total federal dollars for alcohol, drug abuse, and
mental health services were cut 21% between 1981 and 1982. They note that
many of these cuts were not felt at the service level immediately because
categorical grants awarded under the old system continued well into
1982. (In Massachusetts, 84% of all federal funds in 1982 were still in
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the form of categorical grants.) The trend is clear, however. Total
federal dollars for ADAMHA services between 1980 and 1984 were cut
26%. at least 37% when adjusted for inflation, which is the connnon
budgetary practice (GAO, 1984).
The ten categorical grants combined in the Alcohol, Drug Abuse
and Mental Health (ADM) block grants were taken from the categorical
grant programs of NIMH, NIAAA (National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and
Addiction) and NIDA (National Institute for Drug Abuse)
. The three
institutes had previously awarded grants in various ways. NIDA had been
issuing state contracts (block grants) since the mid-70 's. NIAAA
awarded some grants to states and some to agencies and individuals.
NIMH had, of course, awarded monies directly to agencies, preferring
private non-profit corporations.
The stated goals of P.L. 97-35 provided for comprehensive and
preventive services for substance abuse, but placed greatest importance
in mental health on the chronically mentally ill, already a traditional
priority to states. The provisions of the law required, first, that
20% of federal substance abuse funds go to prevention. Second, all
CMHCs were to continue fionding for those years they would have been
eligible for CMHC funding (at reduced rates, according to a state
formula). In Massachusetts, 9 of 25 CMHCs funded by NIMH in 1981
received sole source block grant awards in 1984. Finally, all CMHCs
receiving sole source awards had to maintain the five original services
(at what level and by what definition was unspecified)
.
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The original legal, financial and organizational mandate for C&E
units ended with the termination of C&E and operations grants from NIMH.
In Massachusetts, most, if not all, of these grants ended in September.
1982. On a national level, the NIMH Center for Prevention Research
(now the Prevention Research Branch) survived miraculously with its
$6 million annual budget, funding only research, mostly university or
medical school based. NIMH, itself, shrank enormously as it returned
to a research mandate, withdrawing from its roles in community services
and training almost entirely.
Seed Funding and CMHC
While the original CMHC legislation is now gone, the CMHCs and
many C&E units are not. To understand the present environment in which
C&E services may (or may not) continue, it is necessary to examine the
effects of "graduation" of CMHCs from federal funding. As is clear
from the above history of legislation, the end result of graduation
was always an anticipated (if ambivalently) goal of the legislation. The
process and consequences of graduation were studied for at least ten
years before the repeal of the CMHC Act. Issues of graduation are
reviewed in detail by a number of writers (Morrison, 1977; Naierman
et al
. ,
1978; Sharfstein and Wolfe, 1978; Wasserman et al.
,
1980;
Gabbert, 1980; Woy and Mazade, 1982). A brief review of these reports
in chronological order provides a progressively detailed description of
the consequences of graduation even as the CMHCs were graduating in
increasing numbers.
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The Stanford Research Institutes reported in 1970 (Harvey, 1970)
that less than half of CMHCs received greater than 20% of their funding
from states. While individual profiles varied greatly, fees and
insurance rarely covered more than 20% of the budget. Other sources
were negligible. The Stanford study, like those that followed, focused
on sources of funding because in large part the nature and sources of
funding determined what services the CMHC would deliver. A study by
Macro Systems, Inc. (MSI, 1973) confirmed the Stanford study results,
noting a wide variability in centers' success in getting funds other than
CMHC grants and noted a general lack of long term planning in the
management of CMHCs.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) (GAO, 1974) surveyed the
financial status of CMHCs and reported that third-party payments were
too limited in availability and rates to offer a viable replacement of
federal funds. Fee-for-service was noted as inappropriate for many of
the lower income and poor populations that were to be reached by CMHCs.
It also commented on the poor quality of CMHC management and
accounting procedures. In 1975, the National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers (NCCMHC) reported that 60% of centers graduating
from staffing grants were forced to reduce staff significantly and
realign their service priorities with the goal of acquiring funds. They
noted a shift away from CMHC comprehensiveness and towards more medical
model /inpatient emphasis. Landsberg and Hammer (1977) express similar
concerns that graduate CMHCs might be turned into outpatient and
intake screening branches of state hospitals.
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Naierman, Raskins and Robinson reported one of the most thorough
studies to date in their book, Community
^
Decade Later (1977). They surveyed all centers which had graduated
at that time (99) and categorized them by their age. Centers between
5 and 8 years old evidenced some ability to replace declining federal
dollars with fee-for-service and third-party sources. By the 10th year,
however, these sources had reached a maximum plateau of utility. State
and local dollars were either unavailable or carried new restrictions
and priorities in service population (such as emphasis on chronic
inpatient and deinstitutionalized clients). In general, graduate
centers evidenced some tendency to "retrench" their services, moving
away from C&E, prevention and even outpatient programs in favor of
service for the more severely disabled. They note that fiscal viability
for these centers stands almost at odds vrLth the CMHC ideology.
NIMH entered the scene in 1979, when some form of massive graduation
could be expected from upcoming legislation, with a series of studies.
Weiner, Woy, Sharfstein and Bass (1979) noted that graduate centers
could be divided into "true" and "quasi" graduates. True graduates were
those centers that did not take advantage of distress grants and conversion
grants to delay the inevitable, but rather assumed total independence
from federal funding. Quasi graduates did extend federal funding as
long as possible. True graduates were found to be more assertive in
seeking funding, but also had moved further away from the CMHC mission
of comprehensive services for all. Quasi graduates retained more of
this mission. The authors challenged the seed funding concept and
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concluded that some floor-level funding was necessary to continue
the CMHC-like center.
Wasserman, Woy, and Weiner-Pomerantz (1980) confirm these
findings, noting a wide variability in center profile, but a general
shift along the lines described earlier. They argued in their
sunnnary for continued funding, especially for non-reimbursable services
such as C&E.
Reporting on a NIMH-sponsored "National Conference on Graduate
Mental Health Centers" held in 1980, Woy and Mazade (1982) summarize
the conclusions of executive directors of CMHCs and state, local and
federal experts assembled by the Conference as a working task force.
Participants saw the "original CMHC ideology and template of mandated
services as disappearing" (p. 214). Indirect services declined as a
"high clinical," "medical" orientation prevailed. Participants
reported pressures from state departments of mental health to focus
more on chronic populations and state officials saw services declining
overall, with little prospect of increased state funding. Attention
was focused on management, planning, reimbursement and private practice
models for survival. The authors conclude with four core recommen-
dations, the second of which called for "ongoing 'floor funding' by
the federal government for CMHC service not readily reimbursable from
other funding sources" (p. 222).
To say that the seed funding approach failed would be simplistic.
Clearly the approach allowed for the creation of a number of mental
health centers and probably exerted an enduring impact on the profile of
available mental health services in America. The full impact of the CMHC
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movement has yet to be evaluated and it may be many years before
objective assessment can be made. The research reviewed documents,
however, that state, local and third-party funds failed to support
the service profile or "mission" of CMHCs as conceived by federal
legislation. The precise cause of this failure is unclear and involves
far too many variables for this review. Overall, it can be concluded
that the seed-funding concept entailed an inherent contradiction, that
of expecting centers to successfully market not only their clinical
products, but also their ideological basis. Naierman and others in
1978 had observed that fiscal viability and continued CMHC-like
structure often appeared to be at odds. Backer and others (1983),
in evaluating C&E services for NIMH concluded that centers which
failed to solicit new funding sources often suffered from the mixed
message of the seed funding concept
:
Thus, CMHCs were not remiss in going after payments
for services, but rather were following the ideology
of the movement along with the unresolved issues
of the reality of seed money funding." (p. 4)
Reviewers such as Gabbert (1980) and Sodano (1982) point out a
number of barriers to self-sufficiency inherent in the CMHC legislation
and its enactment by NIMH. The failure to involve state departments of
mental health in the development of a CMHC philosophy is central to
understanding the current situations of CMHCs, and by extension, of C&E.
As reviewed earlier, the original CMHC Act represented a victory of
sorts by NIMH in its attempt to prevent monies from being used for the
state hospital systems. In rejecting the state hospital system (the
35
dominant force in many state departments of mental health)
, the
legislation paved the road for the later dilemma of CMHCs. States
were given merely a "tangential" role by NIMH (Sodano, 1982). While
there was great variability in state's relationships with CMHCs,
in many cases the structure and priorities of service delivery by state
governments were unaffected by the CMHC movement (Naierman et al
. , 1978;
Gabbert, 1980).
Exceptions were noted in which decentralized state departments of
mental health (DMHs) designated CMHCs as their service representatives
and continue to this day to reflect much of the CMHC orientation
(Naierman et al.
,
1978). In many cases, however, NIMH and CMHCs
maintained antagonistic or neutral relations with state DMHs (Gabbert,
1980)
.
The subsequent budget crises of many state and local govern-
ments has served to exacerbate the resistance of states to underwrite
CMHCs. Robert Okin
,
then Commissioner of Mental Health in Massachusetts,
described a variety of barriers to the development of a comprehensive
service profile in the state (Okin, 1978). The largest portion of
DMH resources were devoted to inpatient services, despite an ongoing
process of deinstitutionalization which lowered the average daily
inpatient census from more than 20,000 in 1960 to approximately 1,800
in 1983 (DMH, 1984). Okin noted that the first patients to leave state
hospitals actually represented a hospital work force which had to be
replaced by hired staff. Increasing demands for treatment over
custodial services also contributed to escalating costs with a decreasing
census. Okin noted also the conservative resistance of public employee
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unions and local connnunities which relied on the hospitals for
employment. In all, the priorities of a focus on the neediest, chronic
population, the increasing costs of inpatient care, and the neutral or
antagonistic relationships established with NIMH all contributed to
resistance by many state DMHs to adopting the CMHC program wholesale.
As noted by several researchers above, the graduation of CMHCs
typically placed indirect services in jeopardy first. As non-
reimbursable services, much of program evaluation, C&E and staff training
functions were not covered by highly restrictive medicaid or insurance
plans. A variety of "survival" plans were offered to CMHCs during the
forced graduation of 1981 (conference participants often termed it
"abandonment" ^oy and Mazade, 1982J), plans which frequently
recommended the reassessment and possible elimination of non-fund
producing programs. Illustrative of such advice are the "77 Action
Strategies for Survival" published by the Council of Management of
the NCCMHC (Goplerud et al., 1983). The second strategy recommends that
directors "reduce or eliminate services that do not produce revenues"
(p. 65). Other suggestions included the following: "allow the govern-
ment to support its own priorities"; "focus on core mental health
services"; "cultivate middle and upper class clientele"; and "prioritize
non-billable services for cutbacks by their contributions to securing
revenue." The author's conclusions predict significant elimination and
replacement of programs based chiefly on the income value of the service,
suggesting that executive directors:
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...review organizational missions and prioritiesTo remain viable, centers may have to lea^e tlllr
taff and
^'^'^^^ ^"'^ ^^^^ di^ferens programs. To make these changes
centers may have to lay off staff in oif
of- .
S rr ld programsat the same time new programs are beingdeveloped. (p. 72) ^
Needless to say. staff morale in many CMHCs suffered during the
early 1980s, with severe cutbacks in staff, elimination of entire pro-
grams, the introduction of production quotas and a preference for
fee-for-service staff positions. The contradictions inherent in the
seed funding concept left C&E the most vulnerable of the five
.
mandated services. Frequently producing a minimum of monies (an
average of 1% of CMHC revenue in 1975 /Bass and Rosenstein, 19787 )
.
C&E was often defined as administrative overhead, an overhead which
had to be cut for suvival in the 1980s.
Developments in Prevention, Consultation ;,nH Education
Technology. 1960-1980: A Struggle of Paradigms
The practice and theory of consultation, education and prevention
had continued to develop during the 1960s and 1970s, benefiting from
popular ideology of community mental health. Something of a history
of developments is suggested in the series of titles published by Gerald
Caplan and Ruth Caplan during this time: Principles of Preventive
Psychiatry (G
.
Caplan, 1964); The Theory and Practice of Consultation
(G. Caplan, 1970)
; Helping the Helpers to Help (R. Caplan, 1972);
Support Systems and Community Mental Health (G. Caplan, 1974); and
Support Systems and Mutual Hel£ (G. Caplan and M. Killilea, 1976).
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care-
The consultee target population evolved fro. case consultation
With professionals to an ever widening range of fonnal and informal
givers, including clergy, teachers, police and active neighbors or co^un-
ity "gatekeepers." D'Augelli (1980) sketches a useful history of
developments in consultation and education, noting the increasing emphasis
placed on reaching the consultee closest to the case in the day to day
life of the coHMunity. Natural helpers and qualitatively different styles
of informal caregiving and social networks were more fully explored.
(Collins and Pancoast
,
1976 ; Fr^_tod et al .
, 1980). The psychological
basis of community was reviewed by community psychologists such as
Seymour Sarason in his, The Ps^^cholo^ical (1977a).
With the shift in populations came a shift in target activity, with
consultation goals moving from individual client improvement to general
systems change in organizations or communities. As such, consultation
began to include more education and group training (D'Augelli, 1980),
and to include community development activities such as coalition
building and linking between resource groups. Theories of social networks
and social support gained credibility with research results correlating
psychological well-being and even raw mortality rates with structure and
frequency of personal social contact (Berkman and Syme
,
1979). Mutual
help and self help increasingly were favored as goals of community
interventions (Caplan and Killilea, 1976). Network consultation frequently
integrated case-oriented consultation with natural caregivers with
community development, linking education and the promotion of mutual
help networks or organizations. As such, issues such as individual change
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as opposed to systems change and primary prevention as opposed to early
Identification and treatment gradually began to blur In a somewhat fluid
community practice. It is perhaps this generalist quality which most
Characterized much of C&E activity.
Mental health education ranged in development from center public
relations and inservice trainings for CMHC staff, to workshops and con-
ferences for a wide range of formal helpers, to seminars in self-help,
health promotion and wellness for the general public. Mass media was
enlisted as a direct vehicle for primary prevention, most notably in the
field of alcoholism, spearheaded by NIAAA and National Highway Safety
adds. Despite criticisms that mental health educators had "little or
nothing specific and practical to tell the public" (Davis, 1965),
national interest had continued to grow (D'Augelli, 1980). The National
Committee of Mental Health Education published guidelines in 1977 which
provided a concrete definition of mental health education targeted at
three populations: the general public; "non-client", "non-patient"
populations at risk; and clients, patients and significant others (NCMHE,
1977). D'Augelli cites the last two NCMHE objectives under the third
target population as examples of how consultation and education
practices had begin to "intertwine":
4. Education to those in the community who are
in a key position to effect the lives of others.
5. Education of those who are in a position of
influencing and effecting public policy.
(NCMHE, 1977, p. 3)
Not all consultation and education was prevention and not all prevention
was C&E, but the boundaries were quite overlapped by the later 1970s.
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The scientific legitimacy of .ental illne.s prevention had also gained
scewhat in stature, furthered considerably by the annual Vermont
Conference on Primary Prevention organized by George Albee and others,
starting in 1975. The conference published an annual book of proceed-
ings and papers organized around yearly topics such as psychopathology
,
Children and socio-political interventions. Reviewers of literature noted
the growing evidence of the efficacy of primary prevention (Munoz
,
1976)
despite difficulties in evaluation research design (Bloom, 1979}.
NIMH entered the fields on a major level in 1976 with a Pilot
Conference in Primary Prevention. Editions of the published proceedings,
Primary Prevention
: An Idea Whose Time Has Come
,
(Klein and Goldstein,
1977)
,
advocated the importance of preventive interventions while
criticizing the methodological inadequacies of many prevention projects,
particularly in the specification and measurement of effects or outcomes.
C&E activities were criticized specifically by the authors as being
vague and imprecise to the point of not actually practicing prevention:
...consultation and education, although a
required service, has become a term without
precise meaning used to encompass and legitmize
a variety of activities usually regarded to be
of minor significance among CMHC top leader-
ship. The term 'prevention' is used frequently
in the same vague way to gain acceptance for a
range of popular activities having little or
no demonstrably significant preventive
impact. (pgs. vi-vii)
This sharp criticism reflected both the nebulous definition of C&E services
and the perspective of a particular group within the prevention movement
which adhered to the public health model of medical research. Prevention
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fro. this perspective could only be Justified as rigorous experimental
field research using precise measurement techniques to test hypothesis.
Unfortunately, debates over the nature of true prevention frequently
seemed to be more of a foil for time-honored debates over what is true
science, and true research technique. C&E units, representing the
small portion of CMHC resources that they did and based in service
delivery settings, were not ideal sponsors of prevention research.
As with the Joint Commission in the 1950s, the histories of preven-
tion science and mental health legislation again overlapped in a national
study. The President's Commission on Mental Health (1978). The Commis-
sion's Task Panel on Prevention assembled a configuration of profes-
sionals different from that of the earlier Joint Commission. The task
panel membership included: six Ph.D. psychologists, two M.D.s (one with
a specialty in public health), an M.S.W.. a lawyer, and an executive
director of a CMHC. National advocates of the prevention movement were
represented, including Emory Cowen, Bernard Bloom and George Albee
.
The report of the Task Panel on Prevention (President's Commission
on Mental Health, 1978) represented a forceful reaffirmation of the
legitimacy and need for prevention in mental health services. Prevention
was characterized as the fourth "revolution" in mental health service
(following Pinel, Freud and CMHCs)
. Arguments offered in support of
prevention maintained that there would never be "enough" direct clinical
service available, that no disorders had yet been reduced in incidence
by direct treatment alone, and that, in light of the proven efficacy of
prevention technology, society was forced by economic, moral and ethical
imperatives to .ove toward a preventive practice in .ental health
services. Barrington Moore is cited In support of this view:
'•Uu^^.n
society ought to be organized in such a way as to eliminate useless
suffering" (President's Coinmission
, 1978, p. 1828).
The Task Panel took clear and definitive stands on a number of
issues, not the least of which was the definition of primary pre-
vention, in which they linked lowered incidence of Illness with health
promotion:
Primary prevention means lowering the incidence of
emotional disorder (1) by reducing stress andby promoting conditions that increase compe-tence and coping skills. It is proactive — it
often seeks to build adaptive strengths through
education and reduce stress through social
engineering (p. 1825) .
This definition was illustrated by Albee (1981) as a formula:
incidence of
emotional distress
organic factors and stress
Competence(skills) + Self-esteem +
Social-support
Interventions diagnosed to "prevent" the numerator or to "promote" the
denominator would both lower the incidence rate.
The Panel observed in its summary that models of prevention in
public health had made an important shift in paradigm, ^avoring high
risk concepts of etiology rather than, "the futility of searching for
a unique cause for every emotional disorder" (p. 1826). As such, in
response to the academic debate on true science and prevention, they
argued for the moderate-left position that "successful efforts at
the prevention of a wide variety of disorders can occur without a theory
of disorder-specific positive causal mechanisms" (p. 1826).
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As part of their mandate, the panel Identified barriers to the
development of prevention, barriers which take on added slsniflcance
in light of the subsequent repeal of the legislation this report
supported. Barriers Included the following: (1) a crises orlentat
in society which deprived prevention of any "constituency or
political clout"; (2) a history of motivation, training and identity
in mental health professionals which valued direct clinical service;
(3) the sensitive and "threatening" nature of prevention as "social
and environmental change"; and (4) the competition with clinical service
demand for scarce resource dollars.
A final list of "Catch 22" barriers reflected in many cases the
limits and failings of CMHCs and C&E units. Many of the conditions
listed below may be taken as direct references to the plight of C&E
units as agents of prevention:
(a) Fiscal allocations for primary prevention
dollars rarely exist, or at best are
pitifully small.
(b) We lack appropriate administrative structures
charged with the responsibility of promoting
the development of primary prevention.
(c) Personnel trained in the ways of primary
prevention are in extremely short supply.
Moreover, they tend to be the last hired
and the first fired.
(d) Few professionals are assigned to primary
mental health activities on a sustained
full-time basis.
(e) Activities that are labelled primary
prevention often, in fact, are not that
at all.
(p. 1836)
While not restricted to C&E services alone, the Panel's remarks did
appear to refer directly to the financial, organizationa,!; personhfl.
and progra^Mng difficulties encountered by C.E units vrithln their host
CMHCs.
A power struggle in the Commission developed subsequently over the
Panel's positions and recommendations, a struggle which reflected many of
the barriers listed above (Albee
.
1981; Spaulding and Balch, 1983). The
Commission's report did. however, in the end include a strong recommen-
dation for prevention services. In turn, this recommendation encountered
resistance from an HEW Task Force charged with proposing specific •
legislation (HEW Task Force. 1978). The concerns of the Task Force
seemed "well worn" at this point, echoing concerns that seemed to
recycle "in many guises over the decades" (Spaulding and Balch, 1983).
Critics noted that a specific cause of mental illness had yet to be
proven and that without such proof, no prevention program could be
shown to actually "innoculate" a specific individual (HEW Task Panel,
1978).
The perseveraa:ive: quality of scientific criticisms of prevention
services deserves comment. Spaulding and Balch (1983) note the
similarities in language and argument of the HEW Task Panel's report
to those of critics of the mental hygiene movement. The criticisms and
reservations concerning prevention in mental health mirror those of
tobacco industry experts concerning lung cancer. While the Surgeon
General laments that smoking has yet to be banned, considerable
investments have been made in prevention messages on cigarette
packages. These investments were made before the precise biological
mechanism of lung cancer has been discovered and even before strong proof
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:ive
existed that messages on the cigarette package would be an effect
prevention intervention. A similar federal and legislative attitude
has not existed in mental health prevention. If anything, the
perseverative quality of the stock arguments pro and con (already
phrased with great accuracy by Munoz in 1976) reflects a conflict of
fundamental "paradigms" in society and the professional sciences of
service technology. As such, the history of prevention and C&E is not
so much one of developing technology or scientific research, as it is a
professional guild issue of ideology, legitimization and world view
(Kuhn, 1978; Habermas
,
1973; Fay, 1975; Jacoby
,
1975).
It is perhaps a dawning appreciation of this fact, in the context
of historical frustration, which led to a trend in the writings of
prevention advocates during the later 1970s toward social commentary.
This trend combined a new social realism with an impatience with the
traditional approaches and goals of prevention technology. Snow and
Newton (1976), reviewed above, pointed out with stark clarity that the
source of disillusionment felt with the CMHC movement was fed by fanta-
sies of a new prevention mandate which was never really encoded
in the actual legislation. Albee, in his "Politics, Power,
Prevention and Social Change" (1979) and "Preventing Prevention
in CMHCs"(1981) continued this realism by pointing out the failings of
CMHCs and emphasizing political power and social changes as keys to the
fate of prevention services in this society. Others, such as Seymour
Sarason ("Community Psychology and the Anarchist Insight ," 1977b)
,
and
Julian Rappaport ( 'In Praise of Paradox :t Social Policy of Empowerment
Over Prevention ," 1981) pointed out the contradiction of seeking social
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change through the sponsorship of government agencies (CMHCs)
. Indeed,
social change itself was now suggested as the most appropriate goal
of prevention. The Fifth Annual Vermont Conference on Primary Prevention
(1979) had as its theme prevention through political and social change.
The growth of this perspective reflected both the realities of the
struggle for survival faced by C&E in the CMHC legislation as well as
a growing realization that the argument of legitimization for prevention
was one that had to be made to society at large, outside of the rules
and practices of "normal" science (Kuhn, 1978).
Realities of Time, Structure and Practice
in C&E Units
Concerns about the lack of definition for C&E services in the CMHC
Act and NIMH guidelines (reviewed above) were reinforced in the early
1970s by indications that C&E services were not being delivered in any
consistent form by CMHCs. Legislation amending the CMHC Act in 1975
sought to provide "floor" funding for C&E services in acknowledgement of
"the fact that a significant portion of such efforts constitute a
public service for which reimbursement was not readily available"
(Backer et_ al
. , 1983, p. 7 and Pomerantz and Stockdill, 1983, p. 23).
New regulations for both CMHC operation grants and C&E grants required
that an identifiable C&E unit be headed by a full-time director with
direct line access to the center's executive director (that is, on a
par with other service heads). In all, the legislation was designed
to provide special support for the "often misunderstood and neglected
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CE service- (Gabbert, 1980. p. 13). The legislation was successful
to some degree in creating
.ore specialists and specialized C.E programs
during the second half of the 1970s (Schelkin et al.
, 1980).
Little data had been collected up to this time concerning what
C&E services were and how they functioned within centers. Rough measures
had suggested that C&E hours had peaked in 1973 at 4.8% to 5.5% of total
staff hours in CMHCs
.
dropping by 1977 to 3% of total staff hours
(Bloom, 1977; Hassler, 1979). Backer and others (1983) cite NIMH
records which indicate an average in the mid 1970s of C&E hours at
4.1%. Bass and Rosenstein (NIMH, 1978) offer a detailed analysis of
1975 government figures in which C&E is combined with "public infor-
mation" and "public education" functions (suggesting an enduring
confusion over the definition of C&E, which supposedly already included
the latter functions)
.
Out of an average of 94 full-time staff
equivalent positions (PTE's) in CMHCs, 3 FTEs were devoted to C&E and
one FTE was devoted to PE/PI , for an average of 4% of total staff
hours. It was noted that children, as a target population, received
about half of C&E service time and that C&E staff hours were divided
overall in approximately one-half case consultation, one-third program
consutlation, and one-fifth staff development or continuing education
activities
.
The authors examined C&E time by age of the center and found
a trend in decreasing C&E hours as a fraction of total staff hours, a
decrease which reflected the diminishing federal support in seed
funding as CMHCs approached graduation.
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Ketterer and Bader (1977) noted slightly different trends in activity
tl.e using a .ore detailed case analysis of four C.E units in Michigan.
They noted that C.E staff devoted only 49.6% of their ti.e to actual
co^unity activities, with 22% of C.E ti.e devoted to administrative and
training services within the host CMHC and 28.5% of time connnitted to
C&E planning and maintenance. In fact, C.E staff typically spent a
fair amount of time attempting to legitimize and justify their own
existence to the host center (D'Augelli, 1980). These concerns were
reflected in C&E goal statements which frequently targeted the host
center itself for education in an attempt to increase the C&E unit's
standing (Ketterer and Bader, 1977). The overall decline over time of
staff hours devoted to C&E was understood to reflect the low priority
of C&E services as federal monies decreased and centers placed a greater
emphasis on reimbursable services (Backer et al.
,
1983)
.
The actual organization of C&E units within CMHCs took several
different forms. Ketterer and Bader (1977) proposed a list of three
types of C&E units, including: the specialist unit; the generalist
model; and the mixed type. The specialist unit consisted of staff
designated for more than 50% of their time as C&E specialists.
They typically worked together as a team. Bergner (1981) notes that
specialist units tended to have higher levels of expertise in P, C&E
activities, tended to protect C&E projects from encroachment by demands
for direct service, and often became well known to the community as a
discrete entity having a reputation of its own. Specialist units were
also more isolated from the rest of the center, contributing to a
limited appreciation of the value of C&E by other center staff.
Specialist C&E units were easier targets than generalist models for lay-
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offs during ti.es of fiscal crises in the centers (Backet et al.
.
1983).
Specialist units probably also produced the most prevention-like
activities of the three C&E unit types.
Generalist models coordinated C&E activities as a small fraction
(5% to 30%) of direct service staff positions. As such, generalist
models tended to integrate C&E as one technique or orientation within
clinical programs. Generalist C&E activities reflected the concerns
of these programs, often without a unified center goal or philosophy
concerning C&E. While generalist models promoted a greater appre-
ciation of the value of C&E throughout the center, the model had distinct
weaknesses. Chemiss (1977) portrayed these vulnerabilities most
clearly in his case study of a generalist model C&E unit in one CMHC.
C&E projects, carried out as a fraction of clinicians' time, were
wiped out at a crucial point of development when a service "crunch"
occurred which demanded all of the clinicians' time. Integrated
generalist models had little visibility as discrete services in the
community, and low priority under treatment pressures, allowing poorly
defined projects to "erode" and disappear (Schelkin e^ al
. ,
1980).
Mixed models incorporated the strengths and weaknesses of
both structures with a core specialist team responsible for coordi-
nating some percentage of generalist staff time scattered throughout the
center. Anecdotal reports suggest that mixed types frequently did not
integrate specialist an'd gereralist models so much as allow them to exist
side by side, with specialist staff pursuing C&E projects and
clinical staff doing case management, case conferences with other
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agencies and schools and service networking on a case by case basis as
perMtted by progra. directors. Although few. If any, measures
are available. It could be argued that .ost clinical staff did so.,e for.
Of C&E of the case maHagement variety.
Mixed and generalist models both depended to a greater extent
than specialist units on Institutional support to protect and define
C&E activities. As such, C&E activities within these models frequently
reflected the philosophy of the center's executive director and
his or her investment in prevention
, conmlt at ion and education goals.
Bergner (1981) recommends that centers without a P. C&E "ideology-
create specialist units to protect the integrity of the service. She
also usefully notes that generalist models actually enjoyed some
success in smaller centers (with greater staff cohesion around a
unified center identity) and in rural centers where generalist roles
in mental health often proved more effective across programs.
Innovations in structure and monitoring were proposed during the
later years of 1970, due in part to the need to protect C&E services
and make them cost-effective during center graduation from federal funds.
A "matrix" model of management created C&E project teams which
integrated specialist and generalist staff and rotated leadership of
project teams based on the task at hand and the strengths of the
team members (Schelkin et al
. ,
1980). Of particular Interest were MIS
systems which allowed C&E directors to contract for and track the deliv-
ery of generalist C&E service time scattered throughout the center staff
(Kaghey, 1981). It was hoped that such systems would allow C&E units
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to document their value and take financial credit for work and
income produced by generalist C&E activity.
The frequency of the three C&E unit types has not been measured.
It appears that specialist units were more common in those CMHCs
which received categorical C&E grants (149 of 789 or 19% of CMHCs).
The actual formation of a C&E unit was frequently, however, a fiction
of record-keeping designed to protect the center's eligibility for
operation grants. This condition is mentioned by Backer and
others in their 1983 evaluation of C&E activities:
Most CMHCs have tended to develop "separate
C&E units" in name only, because of previous
federal funding requirements, and in actuality
have conducted C&E activities with part-time
personnel in conjunction with direct service
and administrative programs of the aeencv "
(p. 8)
They comment that this arrangement worked well in many cases, "since many
successful C&E activities include a direct service component" (Backer et a
1983. p. 8). A "successful C&E activity" in Backer's study meant that it
had continued to survive, at least to the time of their survey in January
of 1983. It may be concluded that while generalist model, clinically
oriented C&E activity probably survived fiscal crises more easily than
the other models, such activities represented C&E more in name than
otherwise and accounted in part for the frequent criticism that C&E
activities were not prevention.
The nature of C&E goals and activities varied greatly and probably
to some degree in relation to the type of organizational structure.
Specialist units were more likely than other types to have written
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and
lies
.
goals, distinct C&E proiects and a T-=.nr.o ^ • ij range of daily activities different
from that of the clinical staff. The case research by Ketterer
Bader offered one of the few summaries of C&E goals and activiti
They found that there were typically three groups of goals (Table 1)
including service goals for the community (82% of all goals)
. service
goals toward the host QfflC (4%) and C&E survlyal/maintenance goals
(14%). Major service goals for the community included general mental
health education, promotion of program development in the community,
increasing the skills of community caregivers and responding to
"grass roots" needs (representing a combined total of 66% of all
goals)
.
Less frequent service goals included coordinating mental
health programs in the community, providing program/administrative
consultation, increasing the skills of high-risk and normal populations,
identifying high-risk populations for prevention action and promoting
system change through social action (representing 16% of the total
goals)
.
The goals emphasize a mission of both prevention and more
efficient identification and treatment on natural and formal levels of
service delivery. C&E based on such goals represents a general commit-
ment to indirect service as a favored mechanism in the pursuit of
CMHC objectives of treatment, early identification, and prevention.
Ketterer and Bader also categorized the kinds of daily activities
performed by C&E staff, organized by goal type. Table 2 lists the
"services to community" activities in descending order of average
time devoted to each. Mental health education and training and
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Table 1
Stated and Unstated C&E Goals
Goal Category
Total Stated
and Unstated
Number Percent
^' Service goals directed toward the community
To disseminate information about CMHC
services and to educate community groups
about general mental health issues.
To promote the development of formal andinformal social and mental health programs.
To increase the skills of community care-
givers through consultation and training
To take grass roots community needs into
account in developing C&E programs
To coordinate social and mental health
programs in the community
To provide program and administrative
consultation
To increase the knowledge and skills of
high-risk and normal populations through
in-depth educational programs
To identify high-risk individuals and groups
for prevention and treatment programming
To promote systems change through social
action programming
Service goals directed toward the CMHC
1. To provide services to larger CMHC systems
22
16
15
11
79
_4
5
22.9
16.7
15.6
11.5
5.2
4.2
3.1
2.1
1.0
82.3
4.2
4.2
Table 1 (continued)
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Total Stated
Tool r^t-^ and Uns tatedJjoal Cateeorv t;;^—r —
— ^
—
.
.
Number Percent
C&E survival/maintenance goals
1. To insure survival of C&E through
adherence to federal guidelines
5 5.2
To improve C&E's functioning through 4documentation and self
-evaluation
To enhance C&E's position vis-a-vis l
a variety of external groups through
educational strategies
To improve C&E staff knowledge and l
skills through inservice training
4.2
To improve C&E's relative status/ 2 2 1
resources within the CMHC through
clarification of C&E's role
1.0
1.0
13 13TJ
96 100.0
Note
:
From Issues in the Development of Consultation and Education
Services in Community Mental Health Centers by R.F. Ketterer and B.C.
Bader. Final Report of the Detroit-Wayne County Consultation and
Education Project. Submitted to the Michigan Department of Mental
Health, Planning and Evaluation Unit, December, 1977.
Table 2
Service Activities of C&E Staff, listed idescending order of staff t
n
ime
Service Activity
1. Public mental health education
2. Caregiver consultation training
3. Network/coalition building
4. Program and administrative consultation
5. Competence training
6. Grass roots consultation
7. Community crises intervention
8. Client advocacy
9. Case consultation
Note
:
^
From Isues in the Development of Consultation andEducation Services in Community Mental Health Centers"b7
R.F. Ketterer and B.C. Bader. Final Report of~thi
Detroit-Wayne County Consultation and Education ProjectSubmitted to the Michigan Department of Mental Health
Planning and Education Unit, December, 1977.
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systems-oriented consultation activities are favored much more than
case consultation. This suggests a greater frequency of prevention-like
activity than of direct treatment
-like activity.
As mentioned above, Ketterer and Bader documented the significant
amount of time in daily activity devoted by C&E staff to the CMHC
(22%)
.
They reported that at least half of all C&E staff surveyed
were involved in the following five services during the preceeding year:
"(1) information dissemination to CMHC; (2) CMHC staff development;
(3) needs assessment; (4) miscellaneous tasks with CMHC (such as
grant writing for other programs) ; and (5) CMHC board consultation"
(p. 25). They note the discrepancy between the low frequency of CMHC
goals (only 4.2% of all goals) and the moderate frequency of CMHC-
oriented activity. Ketterer and Bader suggest that most of the C&E
units performed similar chores for their host centers, but under-
represented these activities in their goals because they were not
considered to be "legitimate" C&E services. As such, this discrepancy
illustrates the degree to which C&E staff performed activities outside
of their own preferred definition of what C&E "should be."
It is possible that C&E, as described by Ketterer and Bader, repre-
sented a more developed ideal of diversity as found in some specialist
units and did not represent C&E as it was found in many centers, partic-
ularly those CMHCs that did not receive C&E grants. Backer and his
associates (1983) have suggested not only that many C&E units existed
"in name only," but also that most C&E units did not reach special or
unusual populations using exotic prevention techniques:
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Most CiE programs continue to serve a falrlvlimited range of clients, mostly human servLeagencies and schools, providing case consul-tation on mental health Issues, (p. 8)
It is likely that a majority of what was labelled C.E across the 789
CMHCs was case consultation and some training and program networking
performed with schools and human service agencies with whom the center
shared clients, delivered by clinicians as a part-time second role
pursued when the opportunity arose and time permitted. m,lle, as Backer
and others suggest, this activity Is useful and important to compre-
hensive client care. It is suggested here that such activity does not
represent CSE as a service technology, nor does It capture more than
a glimmer of the C&E philosophy.
Ah, and was there a C&E philosophy, a C&E code? Surprisingly there
seems to have been a strong and distinct value base shared by staff who
specialized in C&E. Ketterer and Bader identified an ideological
concensus among C&E specialists expressed in a commitment to five
values; (1) citizen involvement in CMHC activities; (2) development
of community resources and social supports; (3) prevention; (4) a
view of problems as arising from individual
-environment interaction; and
(5) an active (seeking) mode of delivery" (p. 18). A similar ideological
concensus was noted also by D'Augelli (1980) and by Raber (1981) in his
dissertation on the essential skills and qualities of C&E specialists.
These values, perhaps more than anything else, offer a definition of
the "ideal" C&E role. The values also place emphasis on community em-
powerment as one of the preferred orientations to prevention.
If the history of prevention as opposed to direct service is a
history of struggles in conflicting ideologies or paradigms, then the role
Bergner (1981) no.es a number of Issues of seaff
".esistanca" to
prevention activities, resistances which highlight the differences in
professional identity and values between clinicians and prevention-
oriented C.E staff. While not necessarily contradictory, the values of
the two are in different dialects. Bergner notes as an example that
both share the value of "helping people," but clinicians frequently
experience an Indirect service role as depriving the client of service.
C^E prevention staff maintain a sense that their co^unity interventions
promote health and helping resources even though they .ay have to wait
several years and take quiet credit for far removed "ripple" effects
(Todd and Armstrong, 1984). As different ideologies it is easy to
imagine the barriers which existed to a full acceptance or even under-
standing of the C5E approach by direct treatment-oriented CMHCs.
Late Developments in C&E: 1978-198 3
Even as C&E was the youngest child of the CMHC services, frequently
bom after the 1974 amendments, host CMHCs were rapidly aging in their
seed funding cycles: many graduated before 1981 and most could read
the writing on the wall. C&E itself developed rapidly and appeared
to reach for a new level of sophistication just as the CMHC Act itself
was being repealed. The Staff College of NIMH initiated technical
assistance workshops for C&E development, offered in cities around
the nation starting in 1978. The technical assistance was designed to
offer training and sharing of resources to executive directors and
C&E directors and staff. NIMH had begun to exert a more thorough
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influ.„ce th.o.gh its annual sUe visits to the teciplents of C.E grants
(illustrated in the data of this wot.). A Prevention Council (now the
Executive Council of the Prevention Section) was forbad in the National
Council of Co^nlty Mental Health Centers (NCCMHC)
, fostering further
self-l„prove^nt and innovation by CSE staff In prevention activities.
In 1979, NIMH convened the firfet National rx.p ^ij-rs iNacionai C&E Conference, allowing C&E
staff to "network- with, train and empower themselves. The field had
developed a distinct professional identity which, while diverse, was
maturing rapidly.
Despite the developing sophistication of C&E units, agreed upon
definitions or guidelines for C&E within service agencies remained
vague at best. The NIMH guidelines offered little basis for evaluation
of C&E activities, nor could a center's commitment to C&E services be
judged with any consistency. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals issued its "Principles for Accreditation of Community
Mental Health Service Programs" in 1973 (later revised, 1981). The
JCAH accreditation was considered useful in qualifying for some
third-party payment plans and included C&E-like activities under its
Service Function Area (i.e., prevention) and its Citizen Participation
and Research and Evaluation Areas. Scrutiny of the actual conditions of
accreditation, however, revealed extremely minimal or optional stand-
ards which would be met in almost any catchment area (JCAH, 1981).
As David Snow and Tom Wolff suggested, these guidelines once again indi-
cated that prevention was not the task of mental health service providers
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These patterns seem to stem from continuing
ambxvalence about whether programs of mentfl
aJe to hrri'^'i°" ""'^ prevention
^Jn^ ? I f^""^^ essential components of
"ss! p 39)' «
Negotiations were being conducted at that time with NIMH by C&E
directors who sought new C.E guidelines and a definition of C.E within
the upcoming Mental Health Systems Act of 1980 (Snow and Wolff, 1983).
Tom Wolff, then Chair of the Council on Prevention, directed a Task Force
and Subcommittee in the development of NCCMHC guidelines for C&E
services in CMHCs. The effort represented an attempt by C.E specialists
to define themselves in the absence of appropriate action by NIMH.
The process of drafting the guidelines in itself illustrated the maturing
professional identity in the field. Published first under separate
cover in 1982 (Snow and Swift, 1981) and later in the NIMH-funded
journal. Consultation (Snow and Wolff, 1983), the "Recommended Policies
and Procedures for C&E Services" provided definition along five
dimensions: (1) mission, goals and service domain; (2) organization;
(3) program planning; (4) fiscal and contract management; and (5)
ethical principles.
The primary mission and goal of C&E services id identified by the
authors as "primary prevention and the promotion of individual and
system development" (Snow and Swift, 1981, p. 3). Service
dimensions are organized in three categories: (1) training and
education; (2) consultation; and (3) community network development.
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organizationally the C.E unit is to have a budget (or fiscal cost center
within the center budget)
.
Staff structure can be specialist or
generalist, but is to be specified in designated portions of FTEs
within the center's budget. The director is to be a specialist (and
full time if possible) with equal organizational standing to that of
other program directors. The C&E cost center should document billing
and accounting procedures which protect C&E fees and grant dollars
from being diverted to other programs (a standing problem with some of
the ghost budgets submitted by centers to NIMH)
. Perhaps most prophet-
ically the "Policies" recommends a permanent subsidy by the center for
C&E services, to permit a stable core of C&E staff to offer some minimum
of services regardless of the ability of clients to pay fees.
This final provision is most illuminating in "Policies" which
were published the same year that all remaining C&E grants were expiring.
It suggests that the authors believed that a C&E philosophy of service
could not exist on a strict fee-for-service basis. It remains to
be seen what kind of enduring influence the "Policies" may have on
the course of C&E.
It has already been observed that C&E was often one of the first
services to be reduced or cut with the graduation of the center from
federal funding (Naierman et al.
,
1978). In their article, "Leadership
Strategies and Values in Times of Scarcity " (1982), Kraft and Kraft
note that values shift with necessity. In times of relative prosperity
organizational leaders manage on the basis of questions such as, "Why
are we doing this? and Ought we to be doing this?" (p. 179). During
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ti.es Of scarcity and shrinking resources, however, the questions
change to. "How can we survive? and What can we afford (in dollars)?-
(p. 178). While such a shift in concern was true for centers overall,
it was particularly true for the question of C.E. its mission, and its
survival. In n.any cases the C&E activity which survived the gradua-
tion of CMHCs fro. federal dollars revealed an orientation or goal
structure
.ore attuned to survival than to previous C.E values. Perhaps
what is most surprising is the degree to which C&E services preserved
significant vestiges of the previous ideology.
The plight of C&E was predicted to be a dire one. In their review
of conference participants in the NIMH Graduation Conference. Woy and
Mazade (1982) cite the prediction of federal experts that, "there will
be an immediate cessation of indirect services such as consultation/
education" (p.357). The exceptional vulnerability of C&E to cuts is
explained in part by the observation that indirect services were never
the central task of CMHCs (Snow and Newton. 1976). Retrospectively.
Backer and his associates (1983) suggest three particular vulnerabilities
of C&E. First, they note that C&E was tied closely to the field of
prevention and shared in "the numerous peaks and valleys of the preven-
tion movement." Despite the Task Panel on Prevention and its conclusions
in 1978, there was no more of an observable national mandate then for pre-
vention services than in 1963). Second
, the long range, indirect goals of
C&E made it difficult to evaluate, measure or document its impact. It
was hard to see its worth in the same light as a therapy session with
a troubled family. Third, they observed that C&E was largely action
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oriented, failing to develop
.uch of a body of literature, especially
in the establishment of scientific press. As To. Wolff observed,
"connnunity consultants don't write" (Armstrong, 1981).
Bergner (1981) suggested that one of the sources of vulnerability
for C&E was that center directors did not know how to manage the
function in such a way as to preserve it. She notes additional
vulnerabilities including: (1) lack of definition in the original
legislation; (2) the moral press and practical imperative of demand for
direct service; and (3) a lack of competent C&E specialists. Bergner
suggests that the four most common reasons for C&E "failure" (elimi-
nation) were financial instability, lack of community support,
lack of program evaluation, and a lack of institutional protection. She
concludes that "the most common reason for the collapse of consultation
programs is their reliance on federal monies" (p. 244). While prag-
matically true, such observations fail to note that "C&E" was created
by federal monies and that its original mission frequently reflected
its role as a public service.
Many survival tips were offered to C&E directors. The NCCMHC study
on "Action Strategies for Survival" (Goplerud et al
. ,
1983) suggested
that C&E units teach other people in the community to do their own
C&E. Centers might "transfer" C&E that didn't make money to other
agencies and examine any C&E given away for free strictly on the basis
of its dollar worth as advertising. C&E that survived was going to
have to change its techniques and target populations in "directing
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Lans
services toward paying markets" such as employee assistance pi.
(EAPs) With companies. Health promotion, organizational consulting and
behavioral courses such as stress
.anage.ent and parent training
were to be targeted at those with the .oney and interest to pay for the
services. "Needs assessment" changed to "marketing." Survival could
be enhanced through the separation of C.E fro. the
.ental health center,
which was now increasingly associated with the chronic, deinstitution-
'
alized patient, a group with which many of the potential C&E clients
would not want to be associated. In establishing separate and more plush
professional offices, the C.E unit could become the marketing arm of the
mental health center to business, industry, and middle and upper class
clientele. Raber (1983) offers the successful marketing of his
"Growth Associates" in Kansas as a model for survival of C&E as "a
department of personal and professional growth services." He notes
that "traditional C&E" represents only a small part of the overall
unit activities, which range from management training and organizational
development to inpatient hospitalization under the auspices of their
EAP
EAPs were widely touted early on as one of the keys to C&E survival.
Sodano and Woy surveyed a number of centers and C&E directors to
examine the role of EAPs in supporting and altering C&E activities.
They note that the new initiatives with industry were not likely to
replace lost federal revenues and threatened to divert dollars
and attention from "the values of educating and developing the
community at large" (Sodano and Woy, 1983, p. 82).
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These concerns reflect the terrible dile^na faced by C&E direct,
and staff. While many saw the situation as an exciting challenge, the
propensity of C&E staff toward optimism verging on denial had been
observed (Backer et al.
,
1983). D'Augelli (1980) noted that survival
would force a change in some of the defining techniques and target
populations and goals of C&E. He predicted that C&E would become an
increasingly more center-based service to the "YAVIS" population
that had money. Poor or hard-to-reach populations, as well as favored
C&E activities such as community organizing, social action or
consultation to natural caregivers, wo^ld all disappear. He summarized
the dilemma as this: "How to maintain a focus on the underserved while
seeking third-party payments?" (p. 19). Key informants in the survey
on EAP's by Sodano and Woy (1983) spoke of serving "two cultures" and
"selling our souls." There was considerable angst in the C&E move-
ment. Survival and even properity could be had, but only at the price
of change
.
As perhaps its last service to C&E, NIMH conducted a national
evaluation of tonsultation and education services in mental health
programs through the Human Interaction Research Institute in Los
Angeles (Backer et al
.
, 1983 .). The survey was conducted in January
of 1983, approximately five months after the last of the C&E grants
had expired. The "Final Report," issued in August of 1983, focuses on
survival strategies for C&E. The report offers the most thorough
information to date on the state of C&E services after graduation from
federal monies.
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The subject pool consisted c£ the cream o£ the crop of CMHCs
with regard to C6E. Recipients of «E grants (149). which could
be expected to have more developed C£,E services than other CMHCs,
were surveyed along with centers recommended to the researchers for their
exceptional CSE units. A response rate of 51% provided 91 useable
questionnaires. The data Indicated only a 4% "failure" rate among C4E
units, although the fate of the other half of surveyed units that never
responded left this figure open to considerable debate. As Tom Wolff
comments In an editorial, it's a bit like mailing out a questionnaire
that asks if you are homeless ("1984) T
Among those centers that continued to offer C&E services, 24% no
longer had separate C&E units. Backer and his associates comment that
this may not represent a significant change:
...since there is considerable anecdotal evidence
to suggest that many local agencies from the be-
ginning did not really consider their C&E projects
to be a separate part of the agency but had to
report them that way because of federal funding
requirements, which now have been eliminated" (p. 80-
81)
.
Perhaps more revealing was the fact that 41% of surviving C&E units
anticipated changing their name in the near future, assumedly to reflect
more accurately their altered roles based on new sources of income.
The data describes the parameters of C&E services in those centers
where it continued to be offered. Organizationally, 21% of the centers
had specialist units, 26% used a generalist model and 56% reported
mixed structures. Approximately 60% had full-time C&E directors, with
only 20% reporting quarter-time or less for the director's position.
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Most CM services had considerable overlap „Uh clinical programs and
showed some Influence of marketing pressures, as evidenced In Table 3,
reported «E activities. Almost 90% of the centers reported some fori
of C«,E goals, listed in Table 4. m.±le similar to earlier reported
goals, it is noteable that two out of the six goals are concerned
exclusively with C&E survival.
Income was a central concern for obvious reasons. The report listed
as one of its chief tasks a number of successful innovations in fee
production by C&E projects. The authors note, however, "that most
of the innovations reported in this study are generating income, if at
all, just sufficient to offset costs" (p. 81). The average C&E budget
was $133,440 with a lowertoedian of $9-2 ,OaO
. Almost one-fifth of
centers reported a drop in budget size from the previous year.
Examining the impact of funding changes, 79% of the centers
surveyed reported changes as a result of shifts in funding and program
priorities
— and more cuts were expected. The cause and consequences of
these changes were strongly supported by surveyed experts on the state
and county level.
The results were surprising if only in the high survival rate of
reported C&E services. While raw survival appeared to be possible, the
researchers note a change in the mission or ideology of continuing
services, as C&E staff:
. . .reconceptualize their roles in the mental health
service process, in order to redefine new areas of
impact that also provide long-term funding viability
and gain community support (p. 82).
Table 3
C&E Staff Activities
N
Providing consultation & support to 47
other professionals and social
service agencies.
Providing information and educa- 47
tional programs regarding
selected populations.
Providing information and educa- 35
tional programs to the general
public
.
Providing technical assistance to 19
and education programs for private
industry and business.
Serving in a public relations 19
capacity.
Providing in-service training 13
for staff.
Serving as a community resource 12
and referral center
Developing and disseminating 10
printed and audio visual materials
Conducting research 1
Agencies not responding 11
% of respondents who
answered item (U=76)
62.0
62.0
46.0
25.0
25.0
17.0
16.0
13.0
1.0
Note: From Final Report: National Survey of Consultation and Educa-
tion Programs by T.E. Backer, I. Levine and W.P. Erchul. Los
Angeles: Consultation Research Program, Human Interaction Research
Institute, 1983.
Table 4
Typical C&E Goals
Lit^Jr-'''' -i^ibilit:y and acceptance of :nentalhealth services in the community.
concept'' ^"'^'^ regarding mental health
3. To increase knowledge and skill level of staff member^and community health service practitioners through
continuing education programs.
n n
4. To encourage and facilitate the establishment of
effective linkages among agencies/organizations and
he^ui
betterment of community mental
5. To continue to offer existing C&E programs and
to establish new ones.
6. To increase revenues by developing fee-for-service
programs, conducting fund-raising activities, anddiscovering new sources of funding.
Note: From: Final Report : National Survey of Consultation
and Education Programs by T.E. Backer, I. Le^nFl^^d
W.P. Erchul. Los Angeles: Consultation Research Program
Human Interactions Research Institute, 1983.
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This reconceptualizatlon required a redefinition of the ^ssion o,
CSE services which, at ti„es. directly contradicts previous C.E values.
Backer and his associates report the distress expressed by „any
respondents
:
There is some movement today, alarming to
many of the observers who contributed to this
study, toward keeping only those services thatproduce service, clearly at variance with some oftne original philosophies of community mentalhealth, prevention and C&E (p. 83).
Without public funding, the finer points of CMHC philosophy were
expendable as centers hustled to maintain their central task of delivery
of direct clinical services.
The prospects appeared sobering and particularly emotionally disturb-
ing for C&E staff who developed a professional identity in the previous
environment of federal funding. As Backer and his associates state,
many of the responses were frustrated and depressed in tone:
The emotional tone of a substantial number of
respondents is bleak: there are fears that C&E
simply won't survive the present set of problems,
and that without increased funding, good ideas
and even exploitable client opportunities simply
can't be realized (p. 81).
Part of the difficulty seemed to be a lack of experience and continued
ambivalence on the part of center administrations about moving whole-
heartedly into the entrepreneurial market of indirect services. Many
directors were understandably hesitant to take the risk of investing the
significant amounts of dollars and time required for product development
and marketing in the private sector. Public mental health service
systems were not structured for or experienced in risk-taking for
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profit enterprises, regardless of ideological conflicts.
The report concludes with a list of promising possibilities for
generating revenue (making money). Although the authors warn against
supposedly low-risk
-'gold mine" innovations in the tradition of no
free lunches, they suggest six areas of opportunity, including:
(1) EAPs; (2) health promotion andwelJness programs; (3) work with the
deinstitutionalized chronic populations; (4) private industry; (5)
consultation to psychosocial rehabilitation programs; and (6) collab-
orative enterprises with health maintenance organizations (HMOs)
.
hospitals and nursing homes. Despite the promising nature of these
areas of opportunity, the authors conclude with the observation that the
fate of C&E remains closely tied to that of prevention as a service
paradigm still struggling for legitimacy in society:
^ recognition that many traditional
C&E efforts are simply not likely to survive
without funding that comes on the basis of a generalpriority in the prevention area... (p. 83).
The report of Backer and his associates generated considerable
comment among C&E professionals, some of which is usefully captured in
the editorials which followed a synopsis of the findings published in
the journal. Consultation (Backer et al
.
, 1983 ). The survey was also
taken as a basis for this present research. Many of the comments about
the HIRI study refer as well to the findings of this current research
and as such, are taken as a starting-point for the discussion of results
in this present work.
CHAPTER II
METHODOLOGY
The purpose of .Ms
.esea.ch is to document the current status of
consultation an. education services in a«Cs. This research follows
that Of Backer and his associates (1983 ) described above and attempts
to address so.e limitations in the methodology of that study. The
low response rate of that survey (5«) and the elite qualifications of
the subject pool left two ,uestlons unanswered: (1) What happened
in the 49% of centers that didnV respond? and (2) How did the status
of C.E services differ in those cmCs which did not receive categorical
CSE grants and, therefore, did not qualify for the subject pool?
More than 8U of all OfflCs never received a C.E grant, yet were required
to provide C.E as a undated service. The focus of this research differs
from that of the HIRI study. Instead of seeking to identify survival
strategies as the HIRI study did somewhat successfully, this research is
primarily concerned with documenting the changes in mission and
activities of C.E services along with the changes in size and funding.
The goal of this study is more descriptive in its attempt to examine both
the raw survival rate and the qualitative differences over time of CSE
services and the causes of such changes. Finally, this research serves
as a follow-up to the HIRI study, with data collected Ih years after
the previous survey and almost 2 years after the expiration of all CSE
grant funds from NIMH. It is hoped that this time difference will allow
some examination of trends hinted at in the HIRI study.
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This research is historical as well as current. I„ an atte.pt to
exa^ne changes over ti„e, a history of C.E services was compile, for
each participating center. The research also exa^nes historical
variables such as the C.E unit structure and size in an atte.pt to
Identity those dimensions which might have predicted the present
survival of CiE services in that center An=i •cn c . Analysis was not expected to
reveal statistically significant causal relationships. Rather, it
"as hoped that certain descriptive trends
.Ight be suggested in the
findings
.
The methodology was selected in an attempt to promote descriptively
detailed data, while allowing for generalizations to be made concerning
a group of centers representative of the CMHC system. As such, a com-
bined case study/survey methodology was developed. A C&E unit with which
the researcher had extensive familiarity was selected for a detailed
historical case study. The case study examines the unit along several
dimensions, including:
1. goals and objectives
2. organizational structure
3. funding patterns
A. project activities
5. staffing
6. impact and outcome of activities
These dimensions were examined along the seven years of the unit's
existence from 1976 to 1982. Trends and details of this case were
examined both to document the precise nature of C&E activities in one
CMHC and to offer some suggestions as to the cause of its demise with the
end of its C&E grant.
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ise was
Relevant variables were then .taken from the case study and
applied to other centers. It was felt that a high rate of respon.
needed In the survey to allow conclusions to be made which pertained
to the CMHC system as a whole. The size of the CMHC system,
however, and the pursuit required for a high response rate necessi-
tated the selection of a small subject pool. Previous research reviewed
above had also predicted that state environments would become
increasingly central to the development of CMHCs after graduation from
federal funding. It was noted that state environments differed widely
in the support available for a CMHC model of mental health services.
Data from national surveys such as the HIRI study necessarily obscured
these differences. In an attempt to limit the subject pool size
and in recognition of these state differences. CMHCs in the state of
Massachusetts were selected for the survey. The survey pool was
defined by the NIMH 1981 "Directory of Federally Funded CMHCs" (NIMH.
1981) which listed all CMHCs in Massachusetts that received federal
NIMH grants during the final grant cycle, 1981-82.
A questionnaire was designed based on the HIRI questionnaire and
on the findings of the case study (see Appendix A for a copy of the
questionnaire). The survey was conducted using the NIMH directory.
All 25 Massachusetts CMHCs were contacted. An attempt was made to
contact more than one person in each center with preferred respondents
being executive directors. C&E directors, or former C&E directors. The
survey was administered by telephone or in-person interviews with mail
survey forms used as a back-up when requested.
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m addition to the survey, several othet sources were used to augment
the data. An archival review was ^de o, the mm grant records of
all CSE grants made In Massachusetts (29 grants over six years)
.
State Depart^nt of Mental Health documents were reviewed to examine
in greater detail the current state environment In which CMHCs operate.
Documents reviewed Included the Dh« "Proposed Budget for Fiscal Year
1986" (July, 1985 to June, 1986), the Dffl "1985 Block Grant Proposal-
submitted to the federal government, and various DMH memos pertaining
to the budgets and services of DMH partnership clinics (a majority of
CMHCs in this state also have DMH "partnership" contracts).
Finally, state and federal experts were interviewed where possible
to gain further clarification of the data and expert opinions as to
trends evident In CSE services. Experts Interviewed by phone or in
person included:
Dr. Leon Nicks, currently Administrator of
Region I (New England) of the Public Health
Service and former Director of ADAMHA for
Region I, representing ADAMHA and the PHS
Institutes, including NIMH, and participant
in the drafting of the 1975 NIMH regulations
encoded in the 1975 CMHC Act amendments.
Brian Flynn, currently with the NIMH Cuban
Refugee Project and formerly a Region I
Administrator and C&E Technical Consultant
for NIMH
Dr. Richard Woy, currently Clinical Director
of the Dorchester Mental Health Program and
former NIMH College Staff member and Acting
Chief of the Program Analysis Branch, Office
of Program Development and Analysis, NIMH
(reported on the NIMH Conference for
Graduating CMHCs)
.
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Elizabeth Punk, Executive Director of theMassachusetts Association of Mental HealthService Providers «=<i-Ltn
John Lichten, Acting Associate CommissionerMassachusetts Department of Mental H^Slth "
Milton Wolk, Assistant Director of HealthEducation Massachusetts Department ofPublic Health
Harry Schulman, President of the MassachusettsAssociation of Mental Health Service Provider!
H^alth^C^ni:: ---^
Dr Thomas Wolff, former Chair of the Councilon Prevention, National Council of CMHCs andformer C&E Director at Franklin/Hampshire CMHC.
A standardized questionnaire was not used for the interviews of experts
listed above. As such, the results are included in the reported case
study, survey results and discussion section where relevant to an under-
standing of the data.
The collected data is reported in four sections. First, the case
study of a C&E unit is presented in detail. Second, six case
histories are presented of those C&E units in Massachusetts which
received NIMH C&E grants. The case histories integrate NIMH archival
data with questionnaire data from this survey. The third section
reviews the survey data for all 25 CMHCs in the state, including the
centers reveiwed as case studies. Comparisons are made between centers
which received C&E grants (6) and those which did not (19). Finally,
the history and current status of mental health services on the state
level in Massachusetts are reviewed as an aide to the interpretation of
data.
In review, the questions this research seeks to address
.ay be
summarized as follows:
m CMHCs xn Massachusetts and what are they
statTslnce ^^^''^^^ ^-^^ -^h-te sin graduation from federal funds?
2. How does the current profile of C&E services
in organization, goal or activity fromthe pre-1981 profile?
3. Did any pre-1981 variables in C&E structurefunding, or service orientation seem to predictlater survival of C&E services in that CMHC?
What consequences do the changes observed carrytor the prevention mission of CMHCs in this
state?
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Section 1:
_A.Cas^jtudy of the Rise and F.ll ofC&E Services in r>n» rm^r
Introduction
The subject of this case study is the C.E unit of the Franklin/
Hampshire Community Mental Health Center (F/H CMHC) located in
Northampton, Massachusetts. The catchment area for the center consists
of two largely rural counties spanning the upper Connecticut River
valley and foothills of the Berkshire mountains in western Massachusetts
The three major towns include the county seats, Northampton and
Greenfield, along with Amherst. The area is known academically for its
four colleges, including Amherst, Hampshire
, Mount Holyoke and Smith,
as well as the University of Massachusetts.
This particular unit was chosen because of its unique reputation
and because of the researcher's familiarity with the center and the
C&E unit, having been employed by the center in various capacities
from 1979-1983. The C&E unit was directed by Tom Wolff, former Chair
of the NCCMHC Council on Prevention and recipient of the 1984 NCCMHC
Award for Distinguished Service in Consultation, Education and Prevention
During its approximately eh years of existence, the C&E unit reached
7.5 FTE specialist staff positions at its peak (1979-80), received
over $438,000 in NIMH C&E grants and $370,000 in federal grants from
other sources, and completed three nationally noted model projects in
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P~,o„. C.E sta„ p.e.e«e. attentively at national ana
.e^lonal
conferences, hosted two regional conferences on prevention, and
published several papers and technical reports (Wolff and Crisci, 1,7,.
Armstrong, 1,81a, 1,81b; Peterson and Hutchinson, 1,82; Wolff, 1982;
Warner, Hutchinson, Shannon and Armstrong, 1,82; Armstrong and Warner,
1982; Snow and Wolff, 1,83; Wolff, 1,84; Todd and Armstrong, 1,84).
The case study is based in large part on an unpublished history
of the unit, "The Rise and Fall of a C.E Unit" written in draft form in
1983 by Tom Wolff. The researcher assisted Dr. Wolff in compilation
of data for the history. This case study represents an edit of Dr.
Wolffs manuscript combined with data from extensive interviews with
Dr. Wolff and review of I/,6CMHC documents and NIMH CSE Grant Proposals
submitted by F/H CMHC.
In 1970. NIMH staffing and construction grants were awarded to a
consortium of mental health agencies representing Franklin and Hampshire
counties. The fiscal conduit or designated recipient was a general
hospital. Funds were used to support the services provided by the
agencies, as well as to build and staff an inpatient psychiatric unit
at the hospital. With the increase in mandated services required by
legislation in 1975, the hospital management decided that the funds
were too costly to administer and withdrew from the consortium.
The remaining agencies, joined by a few others to round out the
list of required services, decided to create an independent administra-
tive office which would function simply as a fiffc^l conduit for the grants
A new CMHC board was formed in 1975 representing the consortium of
app.ox.„ateX,
.
a.encU.. Boa.a
...e. conduce.
. n...^
.3e..e„.
the elae.l,. children, an. victi.. o£ sexual assault and domestic
violence. Board „e....s „.o.e and su.M„ed
.o Nl«.
for operations and C&E pran^oa g ts in the name of the newly-formed
nonprofit corporation, the Franklin/Hampshire CMHC.
Notices of awards for the<?P or-or,*-. • j .r nese grants arrived in October, 1976. An
executive director was hired in December, 1976 to administer the
funds. The only service function to be delivered directly by F/H CMHC
was the new C.E services. A director of C.E, Tom Wolff, was hired in
April, 1977 with four C&E staff (representing 3 PTEs)
,
hired by
May, 1977. The executive director, assistant and secretary all shared
the same basement offices with the C.E unit. The C.E unit actually
shared the same room, making intra-unit communication rather
unavoidable
- everyone knew what everyone else was doing.
One may note that the C&E and administration functions began after
monies were awarded. The executive director used the unspent funds
from the operations grant to hire additional administrative staff. This
was the beginning of a steady expansion which marked F/H CMHC as an
"empire builder" among area service providers. The executive director
steadily brought more and more of the service functions inhouse with
the support of NIMH, which favored a strong administrative structure
with line authority over funded staff positions (permitting greater direct
accountability to NIMH). By 1983, F^H CMHC had approximately 10 service
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programs and four subcontractors. Services included outpatient
Clinics, half-way houses, emergency services. day-treat.ent
. MR
and MH case
.anage.ent
,
alcohol counseling and early childhood
developmental screening programs.
The C&E staff consisted of one man. the director and a clinical
psychologist, and four women, MSWs and master's level human service
workers. Staff were hired based on their expertise with and interest
in working with the three at-risk populations identified by the Board's
needs assessment. These populations remained a focus of C.E throughout
the unit's existence, guiding the specialization of staff and their
development of contacts and reputation. The three major federal grants
awarded later for prevention projects were all within these areas.
The C&E director, Tom Wolff, identifies three phases which
describe the history of the unit, including:
Start
-Up Phase; June, 1977 to March, 1979
Big Boom Phase: April, 1979 to June, 1981
Collapse: July, 1981 to September, 1982
The dates are rough approximations of periods of change, often marked
by the award or expiration of major grants. The curve of these three
phases is evidenced in Figures 1 and 2 , which chart the C&E total
income and FTE staff positions by year. It should be noted, as suggested
by the names, that the phases reflected staff spirits and feelings,
as well as raw dollar and staff hour figures. With the seed funding
process the staff was hired on what amounts to a race against the clock
to become self-sufficient. As such, the Unit was painfully future-
conscious and the changes in feelings, plans and even roles during each
Full-Tlme Equivalent Staff Positions in Specialized
Consultation and Education Services at Franklin/
Hampshire Community Mental Health Center.
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FIG. 2: Yearly Budget and Sources of Income for the Consultation
and Education Unit of Franklin/Hampshire Community
Mental Health Center.
Key
NIMH - National Institute of Mental Health C&E Grant
AoA - Agency on Aging Model Projects Grant
LEAA - Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Grant
NCAAN - National Child Abuse and Neglect Model
Projects Grant
Other - Fees and Smaller Contracts
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Of the .hree phases typically occurred see weeks or
.onths before the
actual Changes in funding or staff positions. As such, the dates
chosen represent a rough compronase between these variables.
Start
-Up Phase; June, 1977 to March. 1979
The Start-Up Phase is re.e.bered fondly by staff
.e.bers as a ti.e
of excitement and close staff unity. This unity was evidenced in
the development of an explicit mission statement which remained
essentially unchanged throughout the unit's history. It can be argued
that it was this unity around mission which both led to the unit's
success (by focusing resources) and to the unit's later demise (by
limiting flexibility)
.
The mission was expressed in four principles
and six goals (see Table 5,F/HCMHC C&E Goals and Objectives). The
four principles of service delivery included:
1. Prevention and health promotion
2. Development of individual and community
competence
3. Reliance on individuals and groups in the
community to be the agents of service delivery
and change in their own communities
4. Promotion of collaboration among area service
agencies
The organization of the C&E unit was to be that of a specialist unit
which pursued its prevention goals as one service of the center. The
C&E director had direct access to the executive director (indeed, he
was half of the administration at first). While apparently well
defined, issues of boundary definition with administration developed
quickly. Throughout the three phases there were pressures placed on C&E
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Table 5
Franklln/Han.pshire Connnunity Mental Health CenterC&E Goals and Objectives
I. Promote Individual Family and Community Competence
A. Objectives
'
' witrnT''?^^
individual and family competence to cope
2 To ^
developmental and transitional periods and stres2. support community strengths by fostering social
= TeZlT: ^^^^-^-^— • - aiding"
II. Broaden the Scope of Caregivers
A. Objectives
1. To educate caregivers (service delivers, teachers, para-professionals) to more effectively learn people's needs
and to Identify and use resources to meet them
^. To increase caregiver's emphasis on preventive
programming
III. Impact Organizational Practices
A. Objectives
1. To help organizations find new ways to solve problems
2. To optimize staff performance
IV. Foster Coalitions of Community Resources
A. Objectives
1. To promote collaborative problem-solving among
community groups
2. To exchange needs and resources within the community
V. Influence Social Policy
A. Objectives
1. To increase awareness of and information about the impact
of social policy on people, with special attention to
policies with a preventive focus
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Table 5 (continued)
uZTol IZTrill Of Me«al Health a„a Know-
A. Objectives
rlTonrcTs'
infonnatlon about
.ental health
2. Increase knowledge and change attitudes about
.ental
IZlTl^^TcT'''^' -^"-^"i^y Of .ental
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rst
ain
to perform center-wide tsQi^o o uasks such as public ralattons (advertising)
ana ..a. „.i.i„,.
,,,,,
^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
extends
.Hrou.Hout the
.Hree phases, resisted s.ongi, durin,
.he U
support ,or C.B sta„ positions. Perhaps the one Une
.hat „as dr^l
-re ahsolutel, „as around case consultation. A request fro. rhe
executive director „as „ade in .he
.irst ,ear to send one of .he C.E
elder specialists to a nursing ho.e .o do rei^ursahle case consultation
The C.E director supported the elder specialist's refusal, pointing out
that it did not fi. .he prevention mandate. While s.aff
.rainings were
later conducted with nursing ho.e staff, case consultation was not.
An Aside on the Limits of NIMH na^a
Boundary definitions were most clearly violated in financial
records and budget figures. CSE never had an identifiable budget or
cost center accounting of income and expenses. One could never tell
much about the CSE budget from the NIMH C4E grant proposals submitted,
despite the extensive reporting requirements (see Table 6
.
E/a.CMHC CSE
Budgets in Grant Proposals)
.
This was the case across centers and is due to problems with the
application process. The budgets submitted were projections of the
future, not statements.of current or past budgets. In the case of
F/HCMHCand many other centers, they were estimations because C&E
was not a distinct budget line in center accounting. As applications for
funds, the proposals tended to be rather optimistic, especially about
future income. This is due in part to the NIMH allocation formula used
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Table 6
Franklin/Hampshire Community Mental Hp.^^K rC.E Grant Proposal BudgLs (•n'dSlars^''^'^^
Year
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Federal
81,866
106,500
106,500
50,000
50,000
20,000
64,000
46,000
14,000
18,000
12,000
15,000
5,000
Other TOTAT.
81,866
106,500
12,000 153,000
163,000 310,000
216,000 329,000
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or i„co„e. wMchevar was lower. Center, resularl, over-e.l„a.ea C.H
income to ,uaUf, for a larger award and penalties were not as a .nla
exercised over such estimations NTMH rr..dL . I was concerned that C&E become
self-sufficient and liked to see increasing C!^v f ^ .&E funds m the C&E budget
columns for "Applicant," "State," "Local," and "Other." This
assumedly meant that C&E was producing income above and beyond the
NIMH grant and that the center was devoting additional resources to
C&E.
In the case of F/H CMHC, these factors combined to create optimistic
or ghost accounting in the grant proposals. A more accurate measure of
the C&E unit could generally be had from the list of personnel salaries
paid for by the grant. In the case of F/H CMHC there was regularly
some padding, but less so than with the budgets. An administrative
assistant was partially supported for many years as a part-time C&E
research and evaluation specialist. This padding reflected a general
plight of administration in CMHCs. Various funding sources, such as
DMH contracts, fee-for-service and insurance were extremely limited
in their use and administration turned frequently to grants,
including the C&E grant, to cover administrative overhead.
Padding was also evident in the grant proposals in the list of
auxilliary C&E staff positions paid for by other sources. This list was
meant to be a back-up for the high projected income figures submitted.
on
core
At one point in the third year (1979-80), the C.E staff consisted
paper of 22 people representing 11 FTE positions. In fact
. the
specialist unit was up to 7 5 FTP w-i oP /o E th some additional funds going to
staff in a prevention agency C.E was supporting, so the figures weren't
so far off. one could never figure out, however, the actual size
and structure of the C&E unit from the NIMH records alone.
Internal organization of the C&E unit during the first phase
was rather flexible. Connnunication between staff was high, due in
part to their all sharing one office. The clarity of the unit's
mission also contributed to a strong sense of team spirit and support.
A regular weekly meeting based on the case conference model was used
to keep staff informed of individual projects. This allowed for
group supervision and a sharing of resources and contacts. It also
permitted a certain flexibility in role as consultants were able to
fill-in for each other based on familiarity with the people and projects
The dense internal organization and clear mission no doubt contributed
to the rapid development of a positive reputation in the community.
Staff activities during the Start-Up Phase were characterized
by diversity and extensive contacts. The C&E unit, during this phase,
was most able to respond quickly to requests for service from diverse
groups and agencies. A needs assessment was conducted in which over
100 groups and agencies were interviewed and familiarized with C&E
services ("dog and pony shows"). Films were distributed, program
consultation was developed, community forums were joined or created
and relationships built. Service could be offered for free and quickly
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«e« use.
. p..„ a
.e,.o„al eo„,e.„ee on so.aX „e.„„.3 an.
ne.wo..
.n.e„enUo„3.
.He con.e.enee ,ea.„e.
„a.,onal an.
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speakers at low co«?f ^r.st to the coMHunity and served to further public
awareness of the unU and Us ,oaU. The C.H director observed
later tHat tHis phase effective!, introduced prevention as a valuable
form of activity to the conmunity:
^oncent'if"' ^^^-^--^^V understood thec p o prevention and was very willing toengage us in project development in that frea
to fund those activities (Wolf, 1983, Note 5).
The rural, scattered population and relative small agency si.e did
not readily offer fee-for-service funding large enough to support C.E
as it was being practiced at F/H CMHC. As the staff noted frequently
in strategy meetings and retreats through the three phases, the demand
for fee-paying or reimbursable services was not prevention-oriented, but
rather clinically-oriented. The C&E staff maintained the perception
that Without public funding, the prevention focus and target populations
would have to be changed in order to generate funds. Negotiations with
the Area Office of the Massachusetts DMH had not yielded any state
monies for C&E and the staff could anticipate their NIMH funding
declining. Grant writing was turned to as a temporary solution to carry
on the growth of C&E services until such time as state and local dollars
were more available. Grant topics were chosen in line with the target
populations. In March, 1979 a two-year, $180,000 Model Projects
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in Sep..,e..
,3-„o„.H ,90.000
suppo. onsoins wc. „UH .ape an. ao„e=«c violence. 3.
.esan
the Big Boom Phase.
Blg_Booin Phase: April iq7q
Activities during this phase were expanded in volume, but
narrowed in scope due to the grant project funding. The expanded
but increasingly specialized staff grew to 7.5 FTE in 1979-80 and "con-
tact hours- in 1980-81 totalled more than 24.000 hours reaching more
than 9,600 people. The estimated budget peaked in 1979-80 at around
$235,000. Despite these increases, staff were unable to continue ongoing
needs assessment interviews and were able to respond.to local
requests for service only when paid and when time allowed.
The AoA project involved 3.5 FTE and was focused on the support
systems of elders in three rural townships. Middle-generation key
support relatives and local natural caregivers were targeted for
consultation and support. Elder forums were held to conduct needs
assessment and community organizing. Education and program consultation
was provided to elder clubs and agencies and community education, including
mass media, was co-sponsored with these groups. Workshops for the
public were provided and mutual help programs, including a support group
for key support relatives, were developed. In all, the project reached
a number of individuals and groups with support and information. Elder
housing was successfully lobbied for and attained by citizen participants.
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An Elder Service Tpclf rv^ask Group of county service providers was forced
Infor^Uo. concerning the „odel project „as dlsse^nated In a
regional conference on prevention and elders, featuring Maggie KuHn
.He ere. Panthers,
.u^erous conference presentations, publications
and manuals were produced (see list above)
.
The LEM grant supported ongoing work with a network of agencies
concerned with rape and domestic violence. Protocols for rape crises
were developed with the police, district attorney's office, local
hospitals and social service agencies. Rape prevention education
was developed for school children, featuring films and materials
on such topics as acquaintance rape. Program consultation was
provided to a women's shelter for domestic violence and a women's
counseling program. Research on domestic violence was conducted
and published in local papers.
Despite the restriction of the grants, or perhaps because of their
focus, several other projects developed. A mutual help directory for
two counties was developed, printed and widely distributed using other
agencies and donations of in-kind services from a printer, a newspaper
and an insurance company. Training and program consultation
contracts were developed with local and state agencies based on
the unit's expertise. There were increasing solid partnerships
established with local agencies and groups, both through the contracts
and through the grant projects (which permitted extensive free service
within the project guidelines)
. The t^nit was increasingly represented
oa co„unity
.cards and co™.Utees ( s™e o( Us creation) „Uh
access to area decision
.akers. While local funds were restricted
during 1980-81, 42 local funding sources
.ade up al.ost one-sixth
'
of the estimated C&E budget.
The prevention activities evidenced in C.E services during the Big
BOO. Phase offer a useful insight into the debate over whether C.E
was ever truely prevention. This unit was explicitly prevention-
oriented in its goals and Mssion. Despite that fact, the prevention
practiced evidenced a typical C&E style of integrating
.any
.odes of
intervention. Connnunity interventions, unlike academic experiments,
are not simply dropped on a captive audience. Access to populations
is negotiated along personal contacts and interests. One rural
town involved in the AoA grant project took a human service worker
(whose time had been donated by the county) and put him to work painting
the fire house. That's what they felt they needed and that's what they
wanted. In some cases the diversity of activities which characterized
the C&E services were not pure primary prevention. This diversity
reflected the realities of community work. Consultants started with
groups or agencies where they were (much as clinicians do with clients)
and attempted through the course of the relationship to foster a shared
definition of the problems. In this case, C&E consultants encouraged
a preventive perspective and sought to empower individuals and groups
through education, training and organizing, based on a systemic outlook.
The complexity of this process was difficult to document or evaluate
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the C,E style of prevention was not conducive eltHer to academic
research style projects or to hard sell marketing.
A second oHservatlon should be .ade concerning prevention and the
reduction In demand for direct service. The services of the CSE unit
frequently Increased demand for clinical service on the center. In
educating populations about the nature of mental health and Illness,
WE services promoted the Identification of persons in need of treat-
-nt. As an outreach service, CSE also provided many of the residents
with their only personal contact with someone from the center. Consul-
tants were often advised by well meaning residents that they shouldn't
even mention that they were from a mental health center. The CSE
services and staff provided Hard to reach populations with a link to
direct services. The generallst role that many of the consultants
adopted, while typical of rural mental health (Flynn, 1978), also
reflected the fact that they were often the only folks getting out
of the office. As a result of CSE prevention projects, the center
eventually Hired an elder mental health clinician and an incest/rape
counselor. Clearly, prevention, CSE style, did not reduce demand for
clinical services.
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Despite the relative prosperity of the Big Boo. Phase, pressure
to find future funding sources continued to build. The Unit was
heavily dependent on ti.e-li.i.ed grants for funding. NIMH site
visitors also expressed concerns. The 1978 site visit notes in
NIMH files expressed cautions that the unit was not integrated enough
with the
-overall service pattern" of the center. No specific
suggestions for change were .ade
,
however, possibly because "one of the
most exciting programs of the center" owed much of its reputation to
its specialized team structure (NIMH C&E Grant Proposal 374-03.
Region 1, 1978-1979).
The following year, 1979, NIMH site visitors elaborated on their
concerns and noted the strengths and weaknesses of the unit. In
particular they recommended a greater emphasis be placed on fee-for-
service case consultation using a mixed model structure to integrate
other CMHC staff time:
This C&E program also differs from others in fund-
ing strategy. Rather than seeking contracts for
individual case or school programs, this group
uses a university type grant seeking approach.
While this may develop a much more in-depth project
type approach with a concomitant development of
staff expertise in specialized subject areas, it
is vulnerable since the funding is soft and
time-limited. The unanswered question is whether
the center could benefit even more from an equal
emphasis on case and program consultation on a
contract or fee-for-service basis utilizing other
staff members in a coordinated, center-wide balanced
C&E service system. This approach should emphasize
not only prevention, but selected, reimbursable
consultation activities (Site Visit Report, NIMH C&E
Grant Proposal 374-04, 1979-1980).
ange
arac-
It is slg„i«.ant that officers feU compelled to suggest ch
in the goals,
.isslon and structure of what the report itself ch
teri.ed as,
..one of the cou„tr,.s
.ost notahle prevention programs.
Prevention did not appear to be a fiscally vl.hl.d i ii iab e service for CMHCs.
Attempts to respond to these reco^endations produced little
to a grant project and was able, as a result, to develop a number of
service contracts with .any schools. Despite this work, and other
existing state and local contracts for program consultation and
training, a saturation point seemed to exist. Locally-generated
income reached its plateau and began to drop. A marketing survey
commissioned by the center indicated that the general public in the
area would only support workshop services at about $2 per hour, far
below cost. An attempt to offer a series of training workshops for
the public produced extremely low attendance ("workshops for empty
chairs"). A significant gap still existed with the state DMH, which
would not fund C&E.
Internal organizational issues began to arise. The C&E unit was
simultaneously very busy (with ongoing projects) and very worried.
Consultants were hired and staff retreats were arranged to facilitate
team building and planning around survival strategies. Despite these
efforts, the director and staff began to show signs of "burn out."
Staff evidenced an increasing ability to aggressively seek fees and
negotiate contracts, but reported considerable conflict over their
mixed roles in refusing service to former clients, and being forced
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into more case consultation qtaff . ,. Staff were rightly concerned about job
security and began to loo. elsewhere for employment. The unit too.
on an embattled feeling with regard to the center at large. Programs
throughout the center were facing the thr*..^ ^eat of severe cutbacks as the
NIMH funds began to diminish. Financi^,! rw.i-inancial crises occurred regularly
as the center administration struggled with little success to develop
a long range plan. The experience within the C.E unit reflected on
a small scale the stress within the center at large.
As the Big Boom Phase approached an end. the unit learned that it
had been awarded a grant from the National Center for Child Abuse
and Neglect (NCCAN) to develop and disseminate a prevention curriculum
to be used in elementary and junior high school classes. The grant
was for $100,000 for a period of about one and one-half years. While
the money would support the child expert and an assistant, much of
the award would go towards purchasing the materials and expertise
needed to develop and produce the curriculum, and to part-time auxilliary
staff in the field used to disseminate the material and train school
teachers. The grant in itself would certainly not support the C&E
unit.
Funding sources dried up quickly. The AoA and LEAA grants expired
in the spring of 1981 and the last NIMH C&E award was made on a
diminished scale ($43,170, down from a peak of $106,500). The NIMH
Prevention Center, created by the Mental Health Systems Act of
1980 and spared by the block grants of 1981, was being approached for
grants, but looked like it was going to be more research than service
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oriented. On the state level TitlP Yv ^ . .i, e XX training funds had been so
.is„.„aged m the cene.al o„U.
.Hat e.e ,ov.™e„. f„.e the account
in 198.. cu«aiU„, the o„X, Hope^ by C.E ata» of
.evelopin,
.o.e con-
tracts. Other state funding sources were feeling budget crunches as
well. The Department of Elder Affairs, which had awarded the unit
contracts worth $20,000. and thought highly of the wor. done, expressed
reservations that the services should „ore properly be funded by the
State DMH.
Collapse Phase: July
, 1981 to June. IQfl-^
The clear impetus for the crises faced by theC&E unit was not just the decline in the NIMHC&E grant, but a much more pervasive assault
on all levels of prevention funding in mentalhealth (Wolff, 1983, Note 6 )
.
Within six months of President Reagan taking office, the C&E unit
received four refusals of grant applications from major federal
agencies which had funded prevention. These results were surprising
and disappointing, considering the previous high rate of success the
unit had enjoyed with similar applications. The NIMH Prevention
Center "went research," with little apparent opportunity for prevention
service funding at that time. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981 sent all ADAMHA funds (reduced by 25%) to the state. The
Massachusetts DMH refused to fund C&E despite some desperate
lobbying made by C&E directors (through the Massachusetts Coalition on
Consultation, Education and Prevention) in an attempt to have an
Office for Prevention created. Cuts in federal dollars were felt
widely on the local level by agencies which had previously contracted
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budgets. The state also co«itted so.e of Its bud.at t .-LL D ge owards support-
in. essential to™ se„,ees. Xn general, state f.n..„,
The „oney for C.E dried up faster than spit on a griddle.
The NCAAN project supported some C.E staff during 1981-82. A
prevention curriculum was developed and eventually dlsseMnated. often
"Uh teacher training, to 40 sites In schools and organization. The
funding was limited, however, and C.E staff PTEs dropped to four In
the summer of 1981 and down to one by the summer of 1982.
A variety of strategies were used In an attempt to keep C.E staff,
with their resources of knowledge and co^uilty contacts. In the employ
of the center. The CSE director became the adult outpatient cUnlc
director, and C.E was merged with the clinic. C6E staff worked with
case managers to develop resources for the chronic client and perform
community education about deinstitutionalization. Public relations
for the center was performed under the auspices of the administration
budget. CiE staff provided consultation and direct clinical
supervision to clinic staff. An EAP was attempted but developed far too
late and with no long-term backing, with little success. Eventually,
the few remaining C6,E staff were placed in clinic positions as fee-for-
servlce or salaried staff. From September. 1982 until June. 1983 there
was a quarter-time CS.E coordinator position. By June of 1983, all
previous CSE staff had left the center and there was no service designated
as "CSE."
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canter-Wide the CMHC Had experienced a 20. reduction in staff
necessitated by budget crises. The executive H-in director, who had been
there five years and was general!
v
ly supportive of C&E and the CMHC
and ol. ones siven
.p o. lost
.„ other agencies as 0^« pressed fo. a
consolidation of servicec: in m,^ices m the area. Most changes were toward the
development of services fm- ru^ „kl or the chronic, deinstitutionalized client
Staff morale plummeted and a unionization campaign was successfully
organized. The new executive director promised Improved management
and planning functions that would streamline the services and marshal
the resources of F/H_CMHC.
Current Status of C&E at F/H CMHC
A follow-up interview was conducted in the fall of 198A with
Mike Murphy, a newly hired director of training for the center. He
reported that there was "no C&E." Historically, he reported that the
agency had "scraznbled. - cut back on non-chargeable services and
revampedits pricing and fee collection process. The center's budget
was stable at over three million dollars, with a staff of 108 FTE
positions. Many of the previous services remained, including outpatient
clinics, developmental screening, family services, and daycare
run-away shelters for adolescents. Emergency services (screening state
hospital admissions), deinstitutionalized client case management, and
protective services had all grown. A forensic team had been added for
court consultations.
While no C&E unit existed, some C&E-like functions continued. The
forensic team and child clinic staff did case consultations. Mr. Murphy
performs inhouse training and develops manpower through volunteer and
student programs. Some public soeaknn., -,•P p king is performed by staff and
administration when requested.
There was no immediate infPT-oe«- ^terest expressed in redeveloping C&E
services, unless was interested in funding something like public
relations. There was no plan or apparent resources to develop
prevention programming.
.
M^cusslcn o f Implications of the C;,^^
A number of variables contributed to the rise and fall of C.E at
F/H CMHC. This unit was unique in its focus on discrete prevention
projects and the associated grant funding mechanism. It is possible,
however, that the case reveals issues and themes co»on to the history
of other C&E units.
Tom Wolff (1983, Note 7) points to society-wide and systemic issues of
prevention. The problem, he suggests, rests in the failure of "main-
stream" society to place a lasting and durable emphasis on prevention,
as opposed to remediation. This failure in priority filters down through
the agencies of government and is evident in the meager support for
prevention units when placed in a remediation/treatment service agency.
Local communities can be educated and convinced as to the usefulness
of prevention, but often do not have the resources to support such
a service (much as they don't have the resources to support outpatient
services without state funding). Dr. Wolff also notes a frustrating
split between academic and mental health professionals on the
one hand and prevention practitioners on the other. Closely involved
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in the nattonal and state lobbying efforts around the Mental Health
system and 0»lbus Budget Reconciliation Acts, he expressed frustra-
tion with the silence by academes and the American Psychological
Association in the face of dismantling of the CMHC Act. Their
concerns seeded to be .ore with research and training dollars than
with service.
Funding is clearly a central, if not the central issue. Dr. Wolff
suggested that without public protection and funding, C.E can
continue but prevention will not. m the case of this C&E unit, the rol.
of their perceived prevention mission was central. The mission
guided the staff and director in their pursuit of funding. Fee-for-
service consultation and contracts were pursued half-heartedly and
too late in large part because it was seen as violating the goals
and mission of C&E. Basically, it would have been a different job
with a different philosophy. The mission did not seem very conducive
to survival. While a variety of events contributed to the lack of
funding, in large part the C&E unit depended on federal grants because
no one else wanted or could afford to pay for major prevention programs
to disempowered or unorganized constituencies. Most of the services
were proactive and sought to create demand where there was none. Often
the communities resisted focusing attention on topics such as isolated
elders, incest, rape and domestic violence. Certainly from the per-
spective of this C&E unit, sophisticated mental health promotion and
prevention projects targeted at high-risk, needy populations in the
community at large could only be supported by state or federal funding.
C.E couU continue, but not th. s™. prevention pMlosophy
A ^ior sMft m populations was needed,
.ovln, away f.o. the hard
to reach se^en.s of .he eo„„Uy who are rarel, seen in
..ea..en.
settings. instead, a population had to he
.arreted which was already
seen in and preferred by existing clinical services, na.ely. the
employed, insured, and less disabled population.
The organizational structure of the specialized tea. contributed
to the strengths and weaknesses of the unit. The tea. approach
allowed specialized staff to develop expertise with targeted high-risk
populations. It greatly facilitated co^^unity reputation and the
development of contacts. It allowed for group planning and develop-
ment of resources. The structure protected the prevention projects
"
from encroachment by demand for direct service. It also prohibited
the integration of C.E techniques or prevention philosophy into the rest
of the center. A currency of exchange was never established by the
center which allowed for rotation of staff or services on a formal
level, although the C&E staff worked at the center before- anyone else
and were well known personally throughout the center. The structure
left the unit vulnerable to being jetisoned just as it promoted the
sophistication of its product.
As a result, the enduring impact of the C&E services may be found
more in the community served than in the host center. Themes of
social support, organizing and natural helping resources are more
commonly addressed in planning and training by area agencies. In the
case of the LEAA grant project on rape and domestic violence, the
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grant ended, but "anll the pieces" continued Independently. Rape
crises p.otocols
.e.ain in place, a ,ene„l hospital continues
-ainin, and runs a batterers group, a shelter exists and puhlie
awareness and concern Has continued to focus on the issue. Elder
service agencies continue to collaborate in a tasU force and
advocate
.utual support prevention approaches. A Mayor's Tas.
.orce
on Deinstitutionalization, facilitated hy the C.E director durln,
a to™ crises over a flood of former state hospital patients,
continued long after the C.H unit was dissolved
.
.
The sexual abuse
curriculum „as disseminated to numerous schools and was purchased by at
least one child guidance clinic in Springfield, which reported through the
survey that it is even now looking for public funding to start up a
prevention project based on the curriculum. In all, the impacts of the
C«,E services endured, but were not to be found in the host CMHC.
A question unanswered by this case study is that of mixed or gener-
alist CSE services. It is possible that prevention and CSE might
have survived in the center if it had been more thoroughly Integrated.
It is possible that the prevention so delivered would have had less
of a developed, primary prevention technology, but it might have survived.
Whether this would fulfill a "prevention mission" Is unclear. For this
to have taken place, the center administrator would have had to have
more power and control over the CiE unit and would have had to promote
the prevention mission himself rather than leaving this up to the
specialist team. In general, better management, long-range planning,
and control of programs might have helped to control the effect of
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budge, cises. Whether or no. he.er ad.inisC.at.on f.o.
.he
execuuve ad..n.s..a.o.
.o... have preserved a preven.on
..ss.on o.
any noUceahXe i.p.e.
.3 unclear, h. douh..ul
. .he
.e.e.rche.,
Grant-Funded UnT7^J£^Z^Z^^^^^-^
The data in this study is organized into three subsets of CMHCs
in Massachusetts. As of 1981, there were 25 federally designated
CMHCs in the state, receiving different forms of NIMH grant
of a C.E unit (F/H C>^C)
.
The second level, reported in this section,
is that of brief case studies of the other five C.E grant recipients
in the state. The third subset is that of all CMHCs in the state,
including those 19 centers that did not receive C.E grants as part of
their NIMH funding packages. Data for all three subsets was
gathered in the C&E survey conducted for this study. Additional, more
detailed data was collected for the case studies based on NIMH
records, interviews, and additional reports submitted to the
researcher by the centers.
Response Rate and Limits of the Data
While the overall response rate (80%) of the C&E survey will be
discussed in the third section of this chapter, some comment is
necessary here pertaining to the case studies. Of the six C&E grant
recipients, representatives from five of the centers responded to the
survey, offering some measure of current functioning. NIMH records
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of 29 separate grants over six years (1976-1981) „ere reviewed
providing so.e historical data for aU si. of the case studies'
the Solomon Carter Fuller Mental Health Center (SCF)
. While records
suggest that six C.E grants had been awarded, records fro. only the
two „ost recent years were available. Apparently the four earlier
years had been awarded to a different source (a change was frequently
made as NIMH encouraged statp DNfH o>-^o cc-a e j;mh area offices which received CMHC
grants to fonn private non-profit corporations to administer the
grants). Additionally, SCF was unique in using its full operations
grant to fund C.E services, creating a huge G&E unit of .ore than 30
FTEs, only a fraction of which was described in the C&E grant data.
Finally, SCF has yet to respond to the survey, although a large C&E
unit continues and a response is "in the mail." As a result, data on
what may be (historically and currently) the largest C&E unit in the
state has been excluded from the case studies and survey data.
A comment is relevant here also on the conditions of access
to NIMH grant data. A thorough search was not conducted for the SCF
operations grant data and missing C&E files in large part due to the
transitional phase of NIMH district office functions. All NIMH district
offices have been functionally cl6sed, with some former NIMH personnel
continuing in Public Health Service district office positions. NIMH
and PHS officials on both the federal and district level were extremely
helpful in providing the fullest access possible to data. Unfortunately,
all NIMH records were in the process of being packed up and sent to
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regional warehouses for storaea t^o • .rage.. The timing wasn't the greatest for
a leisurely review of records - the final C.E grant record to
be reviewed h. this researcher
.as placed in a cardhoard hox and shipped
out right then and there.
Other limits to the data have been illustrated above in the
WHCMHC case study, financial and organisational descriptions of the
CE units contained in Uim files appeared to suffer the sa.e problems
of "ghost data." While roughly reliable, accurate measures of C.E
operating budgets were impossible. Review of the grant proposals was
often a process of interpretation and detective work, reading lists
of specific personnel salaries and attempting to identify the actual
C&E staff from descriptions of unit activity. Generally, a fairly
accurate measure of specialist C&E FTEs was reflected in the list of
personnel. The overall projected budget figures and ascribed sources
of funding did not, however, appear to be very reliable.
A final significant difficulty involved the reality of CMHC
structure. While this dilemma will be illustrated more clearly in the
case studies, in general the problem was that CMHCs were not always
discrete, identifiable entities. NIMH preferred to fund private,
non-profit corporations. There were generally two structures for these,
including: (1) a fiscal conduit office which was basically an office
established to administer CMHC funds for six or seven semi-autonomous
service agencies; and (2) a non-profit corporation that provided half
or more of the services inhouse, with direct line control. This second
structure was the one promoted by NIMH. Additionally, however, the
Ill
state DMH service structure 1^IS and was very dominant in the state.
It is also extremely complex.
originally established to administer Inpatient services for the
-tail. 111 ana retarded (state hospitals and schools). B^„
_d
.nto outpatient services In the 1930s with the hlrth cl partnership
contracts with child ^Idance clinics. Partnership contracts allowed
=tate employees to be placed In private, non-profit clinics, which
ware supported by local
.ental health associations. Currently.
remains split between being a direct provider of services and a funder
of services to be delivered by vendor organizations. DMH Is divided
organizationally Into a central office and 40 area offices. (Regional
offices were abolished as unnecessary and replaced the sa-e year.
1978 With district offices, which vary in authority and function.)
Funding for direct services comes both from central office and area
office accounts, but much of the control is exerted by area offices.
As a result, the structure and profile of DMH services varies widely
from area to area dependent in large part on the outlook of the area
director. This variance in service profile was actually measured in
1984 by DMH in its "Mental Health Resources" survey (DMH, 1985).
At the moment, DMH administers seven operating state hospitals,
seven state schools or developmental centers, and two state-wide
Inpatient specialty units. In addition, the state fully owns and
operates ten "CMHCs" of its own which were often related to, but not
the same as, federally funded CMHCs. The state administers approxi-
mately 50 partnership clinic contracts for child and adult outpatient
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services and has innumerable vendor contracts for a wide^ range of mentalheaUh and
.en.al
.eta..aUo„ services (especUU. case
_.,e„e„t
rasiaencas. aa.-.ea..„ a„a e.e.,e„c. 3e„.caa) „HU. a.a pa.. ,L
a servica-cost, lump-sum, or unit-cost basis.
Returning to the ,uestion of the definition of federal CMHCs. the
centers can be categorized roughl, by their affiliation to .m.
Of 25 CMHCs: eight recipients were state-o^ed C^O,Cs (which included
the D«H area office, making the area director also the center's
executive director); one was an area office; and 16 were private non-
profit corporations of some form.
Currently, looking at the agencies which made up the former federal
CMHCs, of the 25 "CMHC groups" in 1984:
15 received federal block grant awards
administered and awarded by DMH
14 have partnership clinic contracts
(at a minimum)
8 are wholly state-owned CMHCs
1 is an area office
The numbers total to more than 25 because they overlap, m one case, a
federal CMHC also included a wholly state-owned CMHC/area office, two
partnership clinics with associated private non-profit corporations and
mental health associations, numerous separate agencies, and the
department of psychiatry from a city hospital. Such an overlap is not
uncommon
.
Whatever organizing- influence the CMHC grants had in fostering
a particular structure has now dissolved as agencies are organized
line with current sources of income, in large part from DMH. As
ch, the question arises as to how to measure current C&E in a center
m
su
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tha. is not now and to so.e deg.ee never was a discrete entity
CE units
.i,.. exist in agencies
.onnerly associated witH tHe CHHC
Civen the complexity of the service structures, However, it is very
did not hear of the.. The problem was both one of surveying the
homeless and of surveying a population which had moved several times
in the past few years. People sometimes remembered that C.E had been
around, but weren't ,uite sure where they had moved to. This situation,
in itself, represents a major finding of this research,
NIMH Funding S tructure and the C&E Grant Fm^r.^.
The case studies begin with an examination of the environment
which they shared in common. NIMH funding policies. All CMHC grant
packages were awarded and monitored by the District I, New England Office
of NIMH, located in Boston. CMHC funds were allocated to the district
offices in lump sums. It was then left up to district administrators,
using federal guidelines and formulas, to approve applications, set
dollar amounts for awards and specify any conditions or demands to be
made of the recipient center. Annual site visits and grant application
reviews were held for each grant. Review boards typically included
representatives of federal and state health service planning commissions,
the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health (which had "minimal influence,"
Note 8). and NIMH. Representatives from city planning offices and other
key agencies were included as appropriate. Despite the wide represen-
tation involved, the central policy decisions and opinions were made
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Lgna-
Lr
^ees. AS such, the Massachusetts OfflC grant awards („ith thei.
conditions of approval) very
.uch represented a co.pro^se between
the current realities of the state's
.entai health s.ste. and the Nm
district office
-s philosophy about how ^ntal health services should
be delivered. While involving DMH officials very little in the actual
decisions, the grant syste. can be seen as a lobbying
„echa„is„
designed to bring about enduring changes on the state and local level.
The 25 federally-designated CMHCs in Massachusetts received one of
four grant packages In 1980. Including: (1) basic suEEort (an
operations or staffing grant); (2) specialized su^ (for centers which
had completed their basic grant support cycle and were receiving conver-
sion, children's, financial distress, or C.E grants); (3) construction
(for centers that received funds only for construction of physical
plants)
;
and (4) no funding (for centers currently qualified but with-
out funding)
.
There were often not enough funds sent to the district level to
fund all centers which had qualified. NIMH ranked centers according to
different priorities and low-priority centers might have to wait
several years before funds were actually sent to the center. Of the
25 CMHCs, the frequency of grant packages awarded in 1980 were as
follows
:
13 Basic Support
7 Specialized Support
3 Const ruction
-Only
2 Not Currently Funded
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age
Of the seven specialized suppo« recipients, six a«Cs receive.
«E grants as part of their package. The selection
„f those centers
that were approved for funding of C.E grants „as based first on the
Of the cmc in its grant cycle. ^ described above. C.E grants were
considered in part to be specialized support for those centers which
had or were close to exhausting their basic grant supports. The C.E
categorical grant could provide a base for a service which Mght be the
.est endangered by the expiration of general operations or staffing
grants. As such, the older CMHCs tended to get the C.E grants and,
m this state, the older CMHCs tended to be the state owned QBC/area
offices. Out of six CM grant recipients, five were state-owned QfflC/
area offices and only one was created originally as a private non-profit
corporation (F/HCMHC)
.
This means that the CiE grant projects were
hosted by generally larger centers that were direct extensions of the
DMH area office.
This is particularly relevant when considering the income sources
tracked by NIMH for C&E services in the six centers. Total dollar sums
are listed below for C&E grants awarded to Massachusetts CMHCs:
Grants received: 29
Awarded over 6 years: 1976-1981
Total dollar sum: $2,175,612
Grant award: (ave.)
^75 Q21
Total reported C&E budget revenue :$6, 015,944
Annual C&E budget: (ave.) $207,446
The reliability of total budget revenues reported is questionable as
discussed above. The identified sources of revenue are divided by
categories which probably overlap. Categories of revenue were
reported as: (1) federal; (2) state; (3) applicant; (4) local;
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the center administrations uiTdcion , with subtotals switchinan g from one column
a„o.H»
.ep.„..„,
^^^^ „^ ^^^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^
an. "appuc...
^
^^^^^^^^^^^
ana ope..e. a«C/a.a o.^ce.
,,,,^^„
^^^^
Clear as to definition. Mereinc i-u.iiergi g these categories ^^,ju to Improve reliability
so„.ce3 o,
.epo„e. C«
.v.u. can „^ , ^^^^^ ^^^^ZOf di„i„,.Hi„,
,..e.a. p„een.a,es of
..ppo„
^^^^
the addUion of
.atchin, ,^,3 put up
,y state, center other
sources. The reality o, these resources is challensed so.e„hat
the case studies which follow and the precipitous disappearance o,
C5E units Which characterized the C.E grant projects.
Ma_ssachusetts Mental He.Uh r»..
. r/Vinfen rorr„„..„„
Mass Mental" («HC) is a state CMHC/area office with a large
budget and staff of indeter^inant size. While staff and budget are meas-
ured, they can be added up ten different ways depending on how one
defines the organization and the CMHC part of it
. This is true of all
state-owned centers. GustaBaggis, Area Director of the West-Ros-Park
CMHC/area office, offered an exa,nple. The Uest-Ros-Park CMHC/area
office has a budget line for 54.6 million with 222 state employees
and 80 contract employees. State contracts are not included in this
t, although vendors receiving state dollars through the area office
accoun
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Table 7
Sources of Reported C&E Revenue
1976-1981
Percentages
NIMH C&E Grants
„
State/Applicant Sources
Local/Other Sources
36
41
24
1981 alone
29
45
26
101 100
may have been considered part of th^ n . t,^ the West-Ros-Park CMHC. A total
of over $13 million in state budeet f„nHoc g u ds may go to servicing people
currently residents of or recently from (as with state hospital
inpatients) the W-R-P catchment area. While more will be said of
W-R-P in the third section of this chapter it i" n , is mentioned here as
an example of how budget and .taf£ measurements posed a bit of a
dilemma when looking at NIMH Q«Cs. As MM, reviewers co»e„ted on
the Mass Mental 1979 «E grant proposal: "The organizational chart Is
the one document In an otherwise excellently prepared application
that is illegible."
The record of C&E at Mass Mental picks up in 1978 with the award
of the third C&E grant. Records for the first two years were not
located for review, but the third year grant (#608-03) suggests
that C&E was attempting to formalize and strengthen its position in
the organization. The unit was structured as a mixed model with a
specialist core and some responsibility for generalist C&E conducted
throughout the rest of the center. The long range goals, summarized
below, offer a good example of a specialist C&E orientation:
1
.
To sustain and expand community helping
networks and provide C&E to informal
helpers
.
2. To provide continuing education and
inservices to promote professional skill
levels in areas of high need, including:
elder issues, rape crises, domestic
violence and systems and families in
crises
.
3. To provide mental health education to
the general public.
4. To move the unit into a more central position
within MMHC and promote C&E services to the
center.
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"a.e a. a ,oal
.He o.sa„i..„,
.
^^^^^^^
the sa.e orsa„,.,„,
.ecHni,ues
.o sai„ en.., HuUa
.„ppo„
.He
cen.er as .hey did In tHe communl.y. Most of .h.y. iios He big specialized
CSE units were better at thfs uirt, ,-ui w h the community than they were
With their ca„.ers. The m.C C.E unit was unusual In spelling out
their objectives for cen.er relations early on and clearly. They are
summarized below:
1. To identify and prioritize populations forC&E services in MMHC catchment.
2. To identify the scope, range and type ofexisting C&E activities within MMHC
J. To strengthen the organization of C&E
activities within MMHC.
These objectives highlight an important point about C&E services
in centers. Most centers reported (usually without measurements,
but with reasonable evidence) that their staff routinely did C&E-like
things as part of the clinical role. This generalist C&E was
usually unmonitored and uncoordinated. It was usually controlled by
program directors of other services and not the C&E unit. Centers
would point this out when they submitted proposals which showed
matching state or dollars twice as large as the C&E grant. What they
were saying basically was, "Hey, we fund a baseline of C&E throughout
the center as part of our daily clinical operations. If you want to fund
a specialist unit, great, but consider some rough percentage of our
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""""
-
^^^^
^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^
even a„
.„a.„e.. o, „Ha.
.,e„e.Us.. C.C
cente..
..eH as Mass Men.al a„a Ca....ase/So.e„.ne. ev. c™....
-JO. s„„e.s in an a.^p. ana ou. how ™.eh ane „,a.
.,na of
generalist C&E was done. Generaiist r/iF •^ C&E is discussed more at the end
of this section.
The ^^C C.K unU con^ucea a va.U.. o. acUvUies. „UH a aive.se
staff ana innovative p.og.a™. I.ey p.oviaea bilingual cental health
education ana networking wi.H »ino.i.,-language populations. Co™,uni.,
organising ana aeveloping was a .a,o. orientation, a 'helping network
philosophy" which was con„entea on hy NIMH reviewers of the 1979 grant
proposal. The reviewers were, "i^ressea with the philosophical base
Which supported other groups ana organizations as the primary proviaers
of C&E."
Mental health courses were provided (including sex education in
Catholic schools) and in-services were given with many human service
agencies and the police department. Public housing initiations for the
elderly were organized, a babysitting collaborative was established
and C&E staff helped facilitate school desegregation parent councils
(at a time and in a city where mandated racial desegregation of schools
was an explosive issue). Mental health fairs were promoted, libraries
supported in developing mental health resources. C&E open houses given
and a media project organized with the Spanish-speaking community.
Also, an EAP was begun with Beth-Israel Hospital, a major contract
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and an early success In the state for rsp •C5E units moving Into EAP
In all, though, there were difficulties of „
, ,
i money and staff similarto that of F/H' CMHC. Table 8 .Illustrates the specialized PTEs In CiE
units funded with NIMH catesor<^»i
-"gorlcal grants. While MMHC enjoyed a large
specialist CSE core until the end <r ^ ,. It shrank from 9.1 FTEs to 6.1 FTEsin four years, despite their successes with EAP Income. HIKH. m its
^Hat mixed state and private employees. With an increased tightening in
the enforcement and control over the use of state staff positions, the
integration of state and private staff in one center was often
c-lfficult. A dual salary structure existed between state slots and
contracted slots or private non-profit staff. c.E was not a state
priority and even In state owned CMHCs, C.E staff were often contract or
private positions which could be eliminated or switched to other
programs. In the case of miO, under NIMH pressure, the center finally
formed a private non-profit corporation to administer the CMHC funds.
The C.E staff positions were transferred to this corporation, Vlnfen. In
the last year of the grant, 1981-1982.
The staff reported other difflcultes. With the press for survival
dollars they noted that they lacked the development time to enter
systems and develop and market income-producing services. In a way, the
time ran short on them, before they could switch gears to the survivalist
C&E service profile. From the perspective of a prevention, needs-
assessment oriented service, they noted that with developing projects
and reputation a demand developed very quickly. They found themselves
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being asked for C&E services and reacting ^to requests, with little
time left to develop contact TH^^,
-^"F <-uucac s with new erouD«; tk,-^^P^- ^^^s experience mirrors
that of F/a CMHC in discovering that th..ere is a need and demand for
publicly
- supported C&E services.
Finally, they reported problems moving into the system
Clinical staff reported that they had less and less time for C.E as
well as a felt lack of skill, resources or experience. The very
extensive and highly reputed psychiatric and psychological training
program at MMHC did not include consultation as a topic. There was
a general lack of integration into the center.
During the last year of existence, the C&E unit made a striking
effort to shift into work with business and industry. The staff
positions were reorganized into market and program managers in an
attempt to develop new paying markets while not sacrificing ongoing
community goals. One community education project, the Fenway Players,
became semi-autonomous
.
The Fenway Players used theatre to perform
community education around various issues in a powerful, often moving
medium. At least two other C&E units around Boston supported similar
"Players" theatres. EAPs continued to be important for income, along
with new programs such as an industrial human resource management
program.
In the end, it was clear that the C&E unit would be closed. Vinfen
had become truely independent, but was largely reliant on state
contracts. C&E was not supporting itself. As Dr. Nicks, author of
the NIMH grant closeout report, reported in September, 1982:
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Of all of the federally funded Ci^v .state, this is the onlv un^TL """^'^ ^he
survive beyond the Z/ ? ^^^^ ""^^^
state has adoptl^ a 0011" ^he
services fro/^DM Blo'ck^GLn^ T^H^''"^though such services, whLh Ire :;it:f'/"'"prevention and health J
to be supported by ees oT M^d ''''' ^^^^^^
ments. third-party reimburse-
In follow-up calls to MMHC and Vinfen Corporation th.•--i^Hwracio
,
e researcher
was told that there wpr^ ie e no longer any Identifiable CSE staff and
that there were no records to indicate where the staff was•-lie c tr now. One
person thought the former rav ^^6 i-iic i o&E director mieht Hp "oh ngn be still working somewhere
in Boston with kids."
The MMHC received a total of ,403.003 fro. NIMH for four years for
C.E services, with a total C.E budget estimated by the center
adminstration (in grant applications) at Just under $1,000,000.
Cambridge/Somerville CommnnUy Mental HP.^^h r....^
The Cambridge/Somerville CMHC is. or was. another one of those
CMHCs Which defied definition, much to the frustration of both NIMH and
the C&E director. A site visitor from NIMH described the center in a
March, 1979 report with a mixture of frustration and awe as an:
...indeterminant mixture of a government
bureaucracy, a consortium of non-profit agencies
a lead agency model, an employment program, an
'
extended training program, a citizen's advocacy
organization, and. to perhaps the smallest
degree, a private, non-profit human service
delivery business.
The center received numerous refusals for increases in C&E grant size
and was placed on conditional status several times, probably suffering
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NIMH
in the end with smaller eranrcg ts than they might have received.
critics wanted the center services to
,
,
' '° ""^^-^ direct line authority
ot the executive director T>,^. The executive director, as area director,
did control some services h.,^ ^-u. but others were delivered by vendor or
partnership contracts rr-in^^ ^. Critxcs also wanted C&E generalist activities
to be under direct control of a C&E director Thi
c
uj.rec . s was another center
where considerable soecialicsfp iali t C&E energies went into just trying to
document and influence generalist C.E. The C.E director, at one point
lamented all of the different boards, directors and program heads
she had to negotiate with to develop some overall plan. NIMH critics
were probably irritated somewhat by the C/S proposals which were a
bit too honest. The proposals indicated
-grant" and "non grant" C.E.
"Grant" C&E were specialist positions supported by NIMH monies. "Non
grant" C&E was a breakdown of the center's overall sources of revenue.
The argument was that administration figured roughly 5% of staff
time went to C&E-like services. So they multiplied the center
resources by
.05 and listed those as in-kind center support for C&E,
a mathematical exercise which was noted with little humor by grant
reviewers
.
The C&E unit here was labelled as mixed, with generalist and
specialist C&E. A large segment of the specialist core was represen-
ted by Community Training Resources (CTR) . CTR, begun in 1972,
had provided inservice, continuing education, and workshop trainings
for area human service professionals in a variety of areas. The
organization was small and efficient
-v.
and tuition fromthe start which covered a good fraction of operating
. .costs. It had
and still enjoys, a fine reputation for th. i •P x e quality of trainings put
on h. its
..faenlt... of experts who wor. on a per-training hasis. Xhe
-del is univalent to that of an adult education center designed ..
especially for professional helpers and focused on topical needs and
state and seems to have staying power as one «E service that
survives, if on a shoestring budget.
The C4E director was separate from CTR and faced the issues of
internal organizational concerns as the director sought to document and
organize generallst C.E resources across 17 discrete programs. Perse-
verence on her part, combined with NIMH pressure, produced some results.
Although never given line authority, she was able to successfully organ-
ize a C4E committee with 13 members from 9 programs. A C.E plan was
written with six C4E goals: (1) agency support (case consultation);
(2) networking; (3) service development (training); (4) community
education; (5) prevention; and (6) self/mutual help promotion. Target
populations and agencies were identified, including: children and
adolescents, elders, the retarded, chronic deinstitutionalized, alcohol
prevention, and work with school, legal systems and health delivery
agencies. In all. this committee offered an excellent example of a
mixed model. The specialist CSE director could pursue a variety of
community development projects while at the same time facilitating a
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team of generalist C&E practitioners rh. .. The team met to set goals
, re-
view projects, and promote their own levels of skill Th.ui K ii. i e generalist
model also reflected the reali>i»= „rn t es of the center's structure and Its
direct service priorities. Ihe C.E tea. acted as an Influece within
system, purposeful!, promoting an Indirect approach and setting a goal
Of encouraging more diverse «E activities than Just case consultation
Resource surveys conducted by the C.E director indicate some success
with an expansion in new kinds of activities reported hy clinical staff.
Percentages of generalist hours by activity were compared between 1977
and 1981 as listed in Table 9. The results suggest a trend in gener-
alist style toward more training, public education, and Interagency
coordination.
As withF/HXMHC and mUC, the specialist C.E director position did
not survive the end of NIMH funds. From a peak of five FTE specialized
CSE positions, there are now two, found in the enduring OTR program.
The C&E committee no loneer exi<?f<5 ar>A r.^ t,i ^„ j-xuug xsts nd no plan coordinating goals or
setting target populations exists in a formal way. Generalist C&E
has reverted to the programs and seems to be varied and diverse. Along
with CTR, C/S agencies include services such as medical liaison
consulting, child and adolescent case consulting, a geriatric team for
consulting to nursing homes, a court clinic, and education programs
for families of inpatients. Alcohol education is supported by an
alcohol outpatient clinic and networking continues with many collaborative
interagency committees focusing on school children, abuses and neglected
children, elders and the mentally retarded. An active inservice
Table 9
Types of Generalist C.E Activity in the Cambridge/Somerville CMHC, by percentage*
Type of Generalist C&E Activity
Case consultation
Program consultation
Training
Public education^
Interagency coordination^
Percent
1977
ages
54
30
16
1980
43
21
20
7
10
100 100
^hese activities were not identified separately as cate-gories when the data was collected in 1977, in partbecause they were rare
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and training programs also ll„ks many of the agencies.
AS the area director explained.
,ro. the center's perspective the
C.E coordination and documentation were haslcaUy
"eaRewor." forced
on the center by federal regulations. If „E „as done In an enduring
manner. It was only In the context of the ongoing direct service of
various agencies and programs. Ihls see^s to continue and even prosper
If anything is lacking It would be the Influence toward diverse styles
of indirect service and a .ore primary prevention focus encouraged by
the former C&E director.
The Ca.bridge/Somerville area office also felt the impacts of federal
cuts for prevention monies. The C&E director collaborated with a
nationally recognized alcoholism prevention project, CASPAR, which
specialized in educational curriculums and peer training models for
school-aged children. NIAAA model project funds were cut and CASPAR
was unable to maintain itself on the income from sales of its curriculum,
widely praised as it was. CASPAR remains in existence, but at a
considerably smaller size than before.
Harry C. Solomon Community Mental Health Center
Based in Lowell, the Harry C. Solomon CMHC is also a state-owned
CMHC/area office. It, like the other state-owned CMHCs
, serves an
urban, ethnically mixed, predominantly working class population. The
center received its first C&E grant in 1976 for $154,930. During the
next six years, a specialist C&E unit pursued a variety of activities
serving at-risk and target populations. The specialized FTE staff
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positions peaked In iq7«P K a m 1978 at approximately 10 375 Ar-r. .^ iu.j/i, dropping quickly
thereafter to 2 FTEs in 1981.
Sta.
.ere assigned to specific activities and target pop.l...
and included the following C&E services:
Outreach to Hispanic population
Consultation, training with policeConsultation, education with elderlyConsultation and organizing around Lusingand resource development for the
deinstitutionalized
Community education to groups and agenciesProgram development with business/indust^
Ch^Jd^Ln^::^?^^^^^^^^^^-^ volunteer'training
Client advocacy
Rape prevention and treatment
in all, the activities reflected a diversity typical of active specialized
C&E units, with a wide range of target groups.
The course of development over time was one of direct correlation
to the size of the C&E grant. The grant dollars peaked in 1979 at
$117,730 and the C.E FTEs peaked at 10.375. The grant dollars dropped
the next year to $63,322 and the C&E FTEs dropped to 5.7. NIMH
comments on applications criticized the center for not allocating
shared funds to C&E and the C&E unit for not providing income. Actually,
the unit did report income ranging from $6,000 to $9,000 a year. The
center also did report putting up matching funds, doubling the total
federal grant of $513,531 with a reported total C&E budget of $1,067,827. '
The C&E unit was not integrated into the ongoing task of the center,
however, probably did not receive that much in matching funds, and
preferred to continue serving the populations it had as long as possible.
131
over v„.„>,3 spe.UZU,
^^^^^
consultation (which „ay have gone private or at least end., udL ed when that
staff person left,, and the Hispanic liaison service. The rape
prevention prosra. „as spnn-off to a local co^unlt, ,ro.p that continued
the „or. hased on Its co^lt^nt to the Issues,
.ear the end there was
a C&E director, a part-time educator a oart t^r.. i, p - ime volunteer coordinator,
and a part-time trainer as C&E staff.
The last year of the grant there were only two PTEs and the
stated goal was to establish an information and referral network that
would survive the end of the federal dollars.
A follow-up interview with the current C&E coordinator ( a former
C&E staff member) indicated that he continues services such as
public relations and speaking, volunteer development and staff
inservices. Able to devote only 20% of his time to C&E, his chief
role involves administrative duties and grant writing. The respondent
identified several crucial variables that he felt accounted for the
disappearance of C&E. He pointed out the lack of a mandate from DMH
for indirect services or prevention. The center, itself, is restricted
in its flexibility in the use of staff by rigidly defined and allocated
"state" slots.
Cuts in the total DMH staff size statewide had filtered down to the
service level, with increased service demand and fewer staff. He felt
there were real possibilities in the future for C&E-like work with the
Hispanic and Indochinese populations, case management of chronic
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deinstitutionalized and w-n-u u ,
•
„Uh schools and nursing ho.es. The opp„„u„-ities required money, however ..r,^, and support fron, the center adminlstra-
tion.
Bay Cove /Tuft s New En.1.„H m...-,
„I ,_lJn_^j_^
The C.E unu at Bay Cove was si.Uar to tHat of Ca..ridge/So.ervUle
in doing a lot with very United specialist resources. They received
their first grant In 1,76 for 555,284 and over the next six years re-
ceived the smallest average grant amounts ($53,000) of any of the six
grant projects. The shortfall resulted fro„ their receiving basi-
cally even funding across the years, instead of large early grants of
over 5100,000 that would then shrink ,ulcKly. m all likelihood, this
contributed to a more stable condition.
The center received much of the same criticisms from NIMH as did
the Cambridge/Somerville CMHC; namely, that it was an organizational
blur of DMH area office, partnership clinics, agencies and a hospital/
university. NIMH critics also were concerned, as with C/SCMHC, that
the C&E director did not have enough authority over generalist activities
and did not have a high enough standing in the organization.
The C&E unit was based on a somewhat unique vendor model where a
C&E specialist team of two PTEs supervised vendor contracts. For the
first three years, C&E funded four vendor agencies outside the CMHC
to deliver C&E services. During the last three years, actual funds
were not given out, but the C&E director signed detailed contracts with
programs within the CMHC for generalist C&E services. It is probable
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that this system reflected NIMH., concern „Uh authority over gener
alist C.E. The syste. o, detailed intemaily-si^ea contracts is
probably the .ost sophisticated and for.ali.ed coordination of
generalist C.E revealed in this survey and offers an ideal for the
successful generalist model.
The external vendor agencies represented organizations that already
specialized in some for. of C.E or prevention and were closely linked
to target populations. The agencies received peak funding the first
year with $28,290 going to four agencies to fund prevention in alco-
holism, particularly with the fetal alcohol syndrome and C.E services to
elderly and Chinese populations. These monies shrank with the C&E
budget and were no longer contracted out after the third year.
Simultaneously, however, the C&E specialist team extended control
over generalist inhouse C&E resources. A needs assessment and resource
identification survey was conducted internally to identify the ongoing
generalist activities. A C&E seminar, similar to the C/SCMHC C&E
committee, served to coordinate goals and received the praise of NIMH
reviewers for promoting effective collaboration between CMHC programs
and other agencies. With continued NIMH pressure to increase direct
C&E authority, however, the C&E director drew up and signed annual
contracts for specific personnel to do specific projects part-time
out of 15 different programs. While it seems that this moment was
fleeting (1980-1981) with the C&E director soon leaving and the
contract system dropped, it offers an ideal of coordinating authority
over generalist C&E. The programs each had a representative in the
134
supervision. The C.E director was able, on the other hand to
,
--"-ucr n , promote
the Planned and purposeful u.e of indirect services center-wide
in addition to generalist C.E coordination, the specialist te-
pursued a variety of activities, including co^unity and
.inorit,
population education, contracted case consultation and training to
agencies, outreach and organising of
.utual help groups.
. hilingual
rape prevention brochure was produced, along with organised educational
events and brochures (including a calendar) for the Chinese population
Alcohol education and prevention activities were continued with C.E
staff. The unit .ade money (up to $15,000 annually) fro. EAPs, consult-
ing and training contracts, and a series of successful conferences for
professionals on topics such as battered children, elder needs and
teenage delinquents. Finally, a prevention/education periodical
for the parents of newborn children, 'Pierre the. Pelican," was distrib-
uted by CSE through various health clinics.
In the last year, the CiE director noted that survival issues
threatened the goals of the unit. While there were some EAJ? contracts,
the CiE director of the past five years had left and taken many connections
with her. This happens often, as consultation relationships often take
years to build and are as tied to the person as they are to the insti-
tution, regardless of whether in business or community consultation. The
current director explained that the mission of CSE was to acquaint
community caregivers and residents with resources and educate them about
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there
more
sion
^en.a.
.aU.
.sues
.Hro.,. services. She reported
...
^^.^
was a .rea. Xocal
...res. c.. services,
..ere
.a.
.eve.opea a hesi-
tancy to call on C&E services because agencies h.da no money and were
not used to paying for C&E services. Dr. Nicks for™. . •iNx tcs, mer administrative
head Of NIMH in New England, co^ented that C.E in Massachusetts
barrier to survival when pressures to charge increased, m any case
the pressure to charge was perceived as contradictory to the C.E mis
^
when onl^ for-fee services could be offered.
Survival strategies in the last year included interest in prevention
funds from the Department of Public Health, along with plans for seminars
in stress management, decision making, and time management. EAP and
conference projects were also viewed hopefully.
In follow-up attempts, the researcher was unable to locate anyone
who could or would comment on C&E. Phone calls weren't returned,
nor was the questionnaire, which wasn't surprising because there was
no one to address it to. It is possible that C&E continues, certainly
probably that C&E-like services exist. Mental Health conferences are
still sponsored by Tufts University and the Medical Center. The Medical
Center has an occupational health program and is looking into entrepre-
neural investments into health promotion/illness prevention services
with business and industry. There was no identifiable C&E unit
reported, however.
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Solomon Carter Fullpr r^r™-
As noted above, data on c ithe Solomon Carter Fuller (SCF) OMC is
extremely limited. It is a vlarge urban, state-o«,ed CMHC/area officeIn the past, the center is reported to have used its full o .ICS t i operations
grant (often ten times laro^^ *-uger than average CiE grants) to fund a large
specialist CSE team, with PTir
-
F E positions in excess of 30. The CSE grant
was used to fund one CSE proiect th» r„j , e Community Programs Against Sexual
Assault. With approximately six FTE positions (five full time) the
CPASA developed extensive clinical and preventive expertise In Issues
Of sexual assault. Staff conducted co^unity research to document
related Issues and provided extensive training for clinical staff
Community organizing, networking and education was used to mobilize
forces for both prevention and treatment. The full CSE unit also
included a clergy project. Hispanic consultation project, and smaller
prevention and education projects placed throughout the center's
programs. The NIMH reviewers were generally pleased with the center's
CSE. though they wanted it to bill more for CSE services. During
closeout they comment with pleasure on the cenro, ==. •K n ter assuming responsibility
for continuing their C&E unit and its services. There is currently a
full time C&E director and some specialist unit of unreported size.
Brief Summary of Survey Data on Case Studies
A review of the data indicates that of six CMHCs with C&E grant-
funded projects, three now have some identifiable person or unit called
(or associated with) C&E. This is a raw survival ratio of 50%.
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devotes 10-20% of his time to C&F t>,E. The organizational levels
clear, and are probably not comparable given thp . if 'lux e complex structures
of the CMHCs.
The real change Is found In tha. of speclaU.ed
.TE staff positions
-
C.E. The PTES all peaked between 1978 and 1980. Taking the peak
PTE number for the five C.H units where complete data Is available, the
total number of specialized CiE FTEs was approximately 34. There was
an average specialized CSE tea. of 6.8 FTE positions InflveMCs.
currently, for the five CMHCs. the total reported FTEs for specialized
CiE is approximately 2.2, for an average of 1.1 BTE positions In two
CMHCs.
In the past, there were five C&E units based on a mixed model of a
specialist team and some level of authority over generalist activities.
One unit appeared to be chiefly specialist, with little reported involve-
ment in generalist resources. Currently, there is little clear data. In
one center a specialist team continues as a discrete program, without a
mandate to coordinate generalist C&E. In another, one person does part
time C&E work. In the third, there is a specialist unit with an
indeterminate relationship to the rest of the center.
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Discussion of Results of r,.. c.^jr-
A discussion of the results of the case studies Is useful here to
highlight so.e tentative conclusions „hlch can then be exa^ned in
light of the full survey data.
The first observation is that the recipients of cmc grants were
often not coherent organizations. It was hard to "find" the CMHC even
when they were designated as such and expected to at least try to look
like one. In follow-up contacts, the agencies have changed, the
collaborative networks have shifted, and the constellations of the
programs have realligned along different funding sources, in large
part DMH. NIMH tended to encourage discrete, private non-profit
corporations which had direct line authority over services. With
the larger, older, s t ate
-dominated CMHCs which received C&E grants,
this was not the case. If anything, the younger centers reviewed in
the next section were more likely to fit the NIMH model. It is not
surprising that unreliable data was reported to NIMH given the reality
of CMHC structures and their priorities. This is especially the case
with reported matching revenues.
The C&E grant projects did not assume a very survivable form. Most
of the specialist C&E vanished quickly. In general, it seems that the
major vulnerability was that specialist C&E services were not considered
the chief task of the agency. As a result, C&E specialist teams were
largely separate programs
,
unintegrated in the ongoing work of the other
center services. When C&E funding disappeared, the C&E units were unable
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to generate survival Income. This f>n„™in ailure seeiis to reflect a lack of
bis .oney market for the C.E services. Units that .Id pursue EAPs or
training Institutes enjoyed modest results at hest
. Ko one „as going
to get rich. Also, the training Institute that did survive does so on
a cost basis v^th some modest help from the center. The activity does
not f>„d other «E activities. Specialist C.E that endures does so
in extremely modest form. One can only speculate that If a
significant CS.E unit remains at Solomon Carter Fuller, It Is only
through an act of the area director, who had decided that it does repre-
sent a task central to the agency.
Generalist C&E. however, poses an intriguMg mystery. Many of the
centers argued that program staff routinely did C&E-like activities as
part of their direct service jobs. Three of the C&E units even tried to
measure generalist C&E. The Camb ridge /Somervi lie C&E unit estimated
that their center of approximately 435 FTE staff positions produced
about 12,630 hours of generalist C&E in 1977 . The Bay Cove unit estima-
ted their center (approximately 400 FTE positions) produced 18.000 hours
of generalist C&E in 1977. The "Mass Mental" C&E unit reported that
in 1977 their center (somewhere between 350 and 400 FTE positions) pro-
duced 37,864 hours of generalist C&E. These are significant resources
if the measurements are correct.
There are two trends relevant to generalist C&E; type and amount.
The sur^/ey by both C/S and Bay Cove indicated that 50% or more of these
services took the form of case consutlation
. The survey at C/S seemed to
document that active specialist coordination promoted a more diverse
range in types of generalist C&E, away from case consultation and toward
training, education and networking ^r-n-uit^tworicm with agencies. Many of the
specialist C.E units participated in or created coordinating co^ittees
for collaborative agencies. These con^ittees see. to continue in
many cases. It is possible, though, that without the specialist
influence, most generalist C&E is case-oriented.
In terms of amount, though widespread, the Mass Mental C.E unit
documented a 77% drop in generalist C.E hours between 1977 and 1978
(from 3,147 hours/sample month to 722 hours/sample month). The figure
seemed to then remain stable through 1980 at around 8,700 hours per
year. The drop coincides with a time when many financial pressures
were increasing on centers in general. By 1982, many centers reported
staff cuts and an increased reliance on fee-for-service hourly staff
and measured production quotas (factory mental health). It seems likely
that generalist C&E activities by clinical staff were significantly
reduced by these pressures. It also seems likely that some level of
generalist C&E will endure and return when and if time permits. While
somewhat of a luxury, some generalist C&E activities appear to be
inherently associated with direct service delivery, i.e., unavoidable.
Partnership clinics, through their organization, the Massachusetts
Association of Mental Health Providers have in fact reported that
current funding mechanisms do not cover the cost of unavoidable indirect
and non-reimburseable hours provided by clinical staff (Note 9) . As
such, some indirect service and C&E-like activities appear to maintain
a baseline.
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A second observation is relevant- •evant concerning clinical consultation
While usually pursued by specialist C.E staff least f.e.uently in
.heir activities, case consultation regains a viable and rei.burseable
service in clinical programs. The birrh of^6 !>. in t of many new geriatric
-dlcal Uaison, cou. and cMla consuUln,
.ea.s or ™Us s.^i.st .ha.
case consulting „ay even be becoMng „ore specialize, and f„„all.ed
D«H has, m fact. Instructed all Area Offices to provide case consulta-
tion to nursing homes and courts in ,^ovt- -,-a , part m response to public and
political pressure produced by the inrre;,Q*. .t, • .y cn crease m chronic deinstitutionalized
state patients seen in their systems.
A final area of discussion is that of the nature of services lost.
While some generalist C&E service endures in case consultation and
clinical programs, many would argue that these services were never the
thrust of specialist C&E. Clearly the diverse community development,
education and prevention services pursued with at-risk and hard-to-reach
populations have largely disappeared. As one interviewee explained,
"Now, we just pay lip service to community organizing and prevention."
C&E, as evidenced in the larger specialist units funded by C&E
grants
,
seemed to represent a general commitment to indirect service
more than prevention, per se
. Activities often focused on promoting
a collaboration, coordination and sharing of resources between agencies
and community groups. C&E specialists helped to improve professional
helper skill levels and generally multiply the resources available in an
area through efficiency of coordination.
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resources they may have
"prevented" .nn,osome experiences of distress by
promoting a sense of empowerment ^nH .a d community. They could not be
expec...
„
^^^^^^^^^^
giving then, a link to the formal service syste,„.
AS a result, it is probable that specialist C.E helped keep clinical
services in touch with minority populations.
..Direct service., as
defined by fifty ^„utes in a stranger.s office across to™ is
surprisingly uninviting to a number of populations who nonetheless
-y experience considerable handicaps. As such, specialist outreach
C.E activities often translated
..direct service', for both the residents
and for the professionals in the Cmc. This kind of active co^nity
involvenent allowed professionals to stay in touch with, be alerted to
and trained in issues relevant to the populations. It doesn't see. to
be a coincidence that CM specialists often focused on issues long
neglected by clinical services such as alcoholism, sexual assault,
domestic violence, and racism issues which are now receiving considerable
attention as major causes of psychological disorder and distress.
Many of these efforts were considered explicitly preventive in goal
by specialist CSE staff. Few of the projects reached the sophistication
of a formal research-oriented prevention program. If anything, CSE
represented a king of practitioner. s prevention theory which integrated
preventive goals with other goals, such as service coordination,
empowerment and the translation of direct service issues between residents
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and the community mental health center.
In all, specialist C&E seemed to represent ^n^hbot an invaluable bridge
to the community and a forcp nf -tr^r,t e o innovation in mental health services
innovations which included, but weren't restricted to, primary preven-
tion projects. These are the services lost with the demise of
specialist C&E as practiced in the case examples.
Section 3: Survey of C&E Sp..h... y,^^^.
Massachusetts CMHCs "
Response Rate
The overall response rate for the survey of C.E services in former
CMHCS is 80% (20 of 25), or 83% of those centers that received C.E grants
(5 of 6) and 79% of those centers that received only basic operations
or construction grants or a "non-funded" status (15 of 19). As Table
10 illustrates, the issue of how to define the respondent CMHC was
best resolved by referring to "constellations" rather than centers.
(Throughout this text the term "center" refers generally to various
agency constellations, as discussed below.) Most
, if not all, of
the CMHCs acted as a vendor in subcontracting out funds for some of
the 12 mandated services to other agencies. Applications to NIMH
routinely included a stack of collaborative contracts with those
agencies which would fill out the service gaps and comprise the CMHC
constellation.
The recipient of the NIMH grants, the designated CMHC, was held
responsible for meeting the conditions of the grants and, just as
importantly, the reporting of requirements to NIMH. These recipient
office /vendor constellations- and •
non-profit corporations.AS can be seen in Table 10 trh-fi^10, w Ue private non-profit corporations
were the numerically
.ost ,re,ue„t CMHC for. (16 of 25) the
DMH-owned CMHC/area offices received categorical CSEc i-cgoricai & grants most
f^eouentl,. Hesponse rates range fro. 62.3. of
.^«-o^ed CMHC/area
ofHces. to 8..5, of private non-profit corporations, to 100, of area
office constellations (n=l)
.
The private non-profit corporations could have also heen divided
into two different
.odels. Including: (1, consortium models and (2)
key agency models. Ihe consortium model, which was fairly rare
consists o, an administrative office or fiscal conduit which silply
meets the monitoring reauirp^^1Pn^o <-ug quirements of the grants while sending all
monies out to subcontracted agencies. The only services likely to be
provided by the corporate fiscal conduit were C.E services, all others
being delivered by the constellation agencies that formed the
consortium umbrella corporation in the first place. In the key agency
model, a majority of services would be delivered in-house by a single
agency whose corporate administration would receive the NIMH funds.
The case history of the Franklin /Hampshire CMHC is that of a transition
from a consortium model to a key agency model. The data collected did
not permit a reliable identification between these two forms in past
CMHC structure, although the key agency seemed to have been the most
frequent by far.
145
CO
H
U
a
c
CO
U
(U
C
01
u
<4-l
o
0)
H
>^
rO
CU
t-l
•H
CO
fl
C
o
M
(U
3C
(U
CO
o
CO
(U
CO
a
o
a
CO
I
J-- c
0) o
B cn 0)
2
I
U T3
OJ
3
4-1
o 00 u
c C
•H an
> )-i
•H GO
0)
s O w
3 (U
to
oo
o
o 00
cn
o
>
0 U-l 0) (1)
1 4-1 bO
C O CO CO
tn
CO V-i
0) o
U X)
< c
w >
4-1
•H o
*W CO
O c CO
!^ o u
(2 a o
1 O TJ
•H >j GO •u o
CO >
(-1 >^
(U O O
4-1 a c s
CO (U 3
> o 00 •H
•H o CO 4-1
o
00
o
CN
CN
h-J
<:
HO
H
(-1
146
Source of Data
The i.sue. of cu..en. OBC
.ea„Uio„ Have
.eco.e
.o.e complex
„.tH
".e. a. .He ,or^. a«C con.eUaUon Ha. cHan.ea „UH sources
The Hloc. g.a„ts that replaced Cmc funding we.e mandated to continue
'
sole-source g.ant award, to fot„e. CMHCs througH their re.alnl„,
,eat.
of ellglHlUty. only 9 o, the f„„er 25 CMHCs ate Usted DMH as
eligible for sole-source awards past September, 1984 and of these, at
least one consortium
.odel Is known to have dissolved In July of 1984
the block grant system may be seen aq ha.Hr,„ ^y D s ving terminated any generally
meaningful previous definition of the CMHC.
The question became one, then, of whom to contact for the survey
interview or questionnaire. The interviewer typically contacted the
agency listed in the mm 1981 Directory of QfflCs and introduced
himself as doing a survey on C.E services in that state. The responses
were highly diagnostic, rather like a projective test. The person on
the phone might immediately recognize the term "C&E" and refer the
researcher to the C&E director or related staff. A referral to a clinic
director usually meant that the C&E unit had only recently been
dissolved and/or merged into an outpatient clinic. An opposite, but
equally well-informed, first response was sometimes, "Oh, yes, we used
to have a C&E unit but it's gone now!" This may or may not have been
entirely true as further questioning often revealed specialized case
consulting teams or generalist C&E. A final response was that of,
"Oh, what is that?" This was usually followed by a detailed inquiry
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into who the researcher was and .rh.fwhat agency he represented, along with
a referral to administration, m all cases thP-LJ- , e responses gave some
impression of a system memory of C&F Th.-E. This memory was found to have
completely faded in only four of the systems contacted.
References were accepted through multiple persons and/or agencies
until a "system nominated" respondent was identified, i. all cases
attempts were made to interview more than one respondent per system
With a 50% success rate. The number of sources used to compile the
by multiple sources. Contacts were made with currently employed staff
in all the systems for which data is reported.
Table 11 illustrates the breakdown of survey respondents by role
and current employment. As indicated, almost half (48%) of the
respondents were current or former C&E directors or coordinators of
C&E-like specialities. The use of past employees was necessary to fill
in gaps in the system memory where possible
. The respondents represented
a range of years employed by the agency of one to fifteen years, with an
average of 5.3 years of professional history with the agency. In many
cases, however, even where there was a current C&E director, there was
only a faint memory of what the C&E activities and staff size had been
three or four years ago.
The respondents listed do not represent individually completed
questionnaires. A completed questionnaire from one source was
extremely rare. People answered what they could, estimating many vari-
ables. Some variables, such as the number of generalist C&E hours
148
Table 11
Interviewees by Occupational Posit ion
Executive Director of
center or agency
C&E Director or
coordinator
Business Manager or
personnel office staff
Clinic Director
DMH Area Director
DMH Area Office Staff
Total
10
2
2
1
26
16
2
2
1
33
21
48
15
6
6
3
99
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provided by staff, are frequently
„ot measured. Others s Hucn , uch as theCMHC budget and number of FTE Dn=!^^-(^positions, were either reported as a
definite measure, estimated, or difficult m aa tt to define given the CMHC
constellation.
Four case examples Illustrate the harriers to measuring
certain variables for former Omc constellations. One example is that of
a D>«-o™ed CMHC/area office/vendor constellation which includes one
agency that speciali.es in prevention-oriented parent education.
If one takes that particular agency as the CMHC, then one gets a very
^all center that is
.00. specialised in C.E. if. on the other hand,
one wants to take the full constenp^^nnellatio as representative of the
CMHC, then a full research project is Itself necessary to define and
measure the appropriate operating budget and FTE staff size of the
constellation.
A second example is that of another DMH-owned CMHC/area office/
vendor constellation which does not have C&E. but has a specialist
C&E-like unit which is so large it skews the data for the survey.
The area director is committed to indirect services as the preferred
mode of intervention and a "key to managing resources for the
chronic deinstitutionalized client." The community service office
of this center maintains a staff of 15 FTE positions, who conduct
case management via a variety of C&E-like activities such as train-
ing, networking, case and program consultation and organizational
and community development. While outstanding, the unit is large
enough and unique enough in case management services to skew the
A third example Is
.Hat of a private non-proHt fo^er CMHC
(^e. a«e„c.
.odel) „Hlch op.,
.o cHanse Us service profUe „he„
CMHC
..„ds endea. KatHer than sact.ace
.he center to the
.nHUere.
influence of the OMH area office hy sl^m^ a partnership contract
(" puppetshlp.. was .he ter„ used,, the ad^nlstrators decided to
rely on fees, third-party payors and „ora directly defined DMH service
contracts (07 .onles) which It could chose to compete for or not
as It liked. The D^« area office subsequently set up its own CMHC
and sponsors
.any C.E services such as training of professionals.
The former Cmc agency was designated here as the survey respondent
even though it represents a smaller proportion of the area services
than it once did, including C&E.
A final example is offered by a consortium model private non-
profit corporation. The CMHC in this case consisted of an executive
director and office staff and a C&E director. After the last sole
source block grant award was received in the Spring of 1984, the CMHC
office was dissolved. Three out of four former vendor agencies were
contacted, along with the former executive director. Interviews
revealed that the former specialist C&E services were gone, but one
agency has a C&E coordinator who works in a traditional style. The
other two agencies have extensive generalist C&E and speciality
case consulting teams. One also has a primary prevention program for
sexual abuse and incest, temporarily held in limbo while a financial
sponsor can be found. The other is launching a specialist, semi-
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autonomous EAP program which was cloaked in^-Lo i^e m secrecy because of
area competition, in^peding a measure of FTE staff nrit positions or
activities.
in all, It is very
.uch UUe comparing apples, oranges an,
recalled with varying degrees of vividness.
Definition of "Specialist C.!,F"
In the past, the definition of C.E was varied and diverse, if
measure. As might he imagined, the loss of a mandate for something
called has contributed to a greater blurring of definitional
boundaries. The question of how to define "specialist C.E" services
in the present and the rules adopted to answer that question
represent some of the major findings of the survey.
In a number of systems the C&E label is gone, but staff specialize
in C&E-like work under a different label. A "Consulting Center-
offers consultation and training to business and industry. "EAP"
programs coordinate clinical referral and treatment with supervisor
training and health education. A "community services team" provides
"C&E-like" case management. Training institutes and prevention programs
continue under their own names.
The major roles adopted refer to what specialist C&E is not.
Current specialty case consulting teams (i.e., nursing home/geriatric,
court clinic and child teams) are considered here to be an extension
of developments in direct clinic services. They frequently began
before C&E units were dissolved and tend to have a much more restricted.
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explicitly clinical mandate. As surh ^Kc , they are not defined as
specialist C&E, but arp no^^^noted as a new and significant development
relating to C&E.
specialist «H also could not be „,olly defined i„-House
-aff teaming or research and evaluation activities. A specialty
in center public relations was accepted because Interviews revealed
the use of CSE-Uke con»unlty education techniques.
A specialist In C.E had to devote a discrete and measureable
portion of their time (more than 50% in most cases) to indirect
activities (other than case consultation) focused in the co^nlty.
Such specialists typically also performed case consultation, in-house
training, public relations, and other activities frequently argued to
be outside of the proper definition of CM. These actlvlMas are
noted below
.
Generalist C&E activities also were found to frequently include
similarities to specialist C&E activities. Generalist C&E also
reached a diverse range of populations traditionally served by C&E.
Generalist C&E is reported here as a separate service, however, from
specialist C&E.
Amplification of Changes Over Time
This survey is designed to offer an indication of change over
time in C&E services, comparing pre-1981 federally funded services
with current, 1984, services. The changes reported in various
centers followed similar trends over this time, but had different
schedules. While a general shrinkage in specialist C&E staff time
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is reported, centers oeakpH -fr, •
' " '""'^ positions atdifferent times. C&E actUr-{i--itxvxtxes began shifting in type and target
populations as early as 1979 in some centers althn H, ough not as frequently
as a.te.
.s:. „UH cHan^es ,oUo^„, t.. sa. ,e„e.a. ai.ctions.
It IS the conclusion of the researcher based nni-^ne , o coimnents solicited
during interviews, that C&E services began to reflect . •^ emerging issues
Of cente. sponsorship an. f^,i„,
,,3, ^„
^^^^^
«he.. the
.ported hlstor, allocs this chanse to .e discussed, the
"before" data reported here reflects the earlier traditional C.E
data. This technique serves to a.pll£, to so^e degree the changes
reported In the service of clarifying a trend. While this technique
does act somewhat as a preconceived conclusion In shaping the data,
a clear and powerful trend would he observed If reported strictly on
the basis of two chronological dates. The Ideal technique, that of
reporting all variables for each of the past ten years, would have been
too lengthy and beyond the accuracy of the frequently estimated data
which was reported. An appropriate "before" and "after" orientation
is used and more detailed changes over time are noted where they
seemed particularly powerful or were readily measureable in a reliable
fashion
,
Data is reported for C&E grant projects and non-C&E grant recipients
separately where the data revealed differing trends between these two
groups
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Specialized C.^v r-j rr
Table 12 illustrates the raw survival rate of s
C&F ^ .
"""^ specializedE service (either a unit or a c,incisingle person) in CMHCs
. While
the respondent pool is generally li.i.ed to 20 centers in th.i-ence m is survey
(a«). The average
.a„ survival rate is 63.. or 50. ot the C.E gran,
projects and 69. of the non-C.E grant recipients.
Organizational Standlnp
of_;j;^^^^^^^^^^^_ClE
organisational standing was measured by the presence „ithin the
-nter of a full-ti.e director of C.E (see Table 13) and by the
organizational standing of the director (see Table U,
. The frequency
of full-time (80% or mnrp^ rnvo e) C&E directors dropped from 100% to 58% in
those centers with a specialist staff Th^ ^ ^ ip «ixisL rt. e total number dropped from
19 full-time directors to 7 full-time directors. It is also note-
worthy that many of the currently measured directors are directors of
a unit of one person, making them more of a coordinator or service
representative than a director, as changes in title sometimes indicate.
Organizational standing of directors was measured for 16 centers.
The variable examined whether or not the specialist director or sole
staff person had equal organizational standing with other CMHC
program directors and/or direct line access to the center executive
director. The data reported indicates a clear slip down the organi-
zational tree by specialist C&E staff (see Table 14). In those centers
with specialist C&E staff, 88% of the directors formerly had equal
standing, while currently only 45% have equivalency with program
directors of other services.
Table 12
Specialist C&E Service in Massachusetts
C&E Grant Projects
Pre-1981
1984
% Surviving
Non-C&E Grant Projects
Pre-1981
1984
% Surviving
Totals for all CMHCs
Pre-1981
1984
% Surviving
6
3
50%
13
9
69%
19
12
63%
Table 13
Full-Time C&E Director Positions in Those CMHCswxth Specialist C&E Services
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C&E Grant Projects
Full-Tlme Director
Yes No % Yes
Pre-1981
1984
Non-C&E Grant Project?
6 0
2 1
100
67
Pre-1981
1984
Totals for All CMHCs
13 0
5 4
100
55
13
9
Pre-1981
1984
19 0
7 5
100
58
10
12
Table 14
Organizational Level of r^ir n,-
With Speciauft'cfEl:^^:: "^'^
C&E Grant Pro-jects
Pre-1981
1984
Non-C&E Grant Pro jects
Pre-1981
1984
Totals for Combined CMHCs
program directors and/or hasdirect access to executive direc-tor
10
4
80
50
91
44
11
9
Pre-1981
1984
14
5
88
45
16
9
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Peak-Year
^P^cA ali^t_CS,E_Sta^^
The measure of peak-year specialist C.E PTE staff positions is
perhaps the
.ost revealing numerical measure of change. Table 13
reports the changes over ti.e separately for C.E grant projects
and non-recipients of C.E grants; while Table 16 illustrates the
changes for the respondent pool as a whole.
The C.E unit size of C.E grant projects (n=5) has collapsed fro.
an average of 6.8 to an average of .4 PTEs, or an average of 1.1 ptes
between the 2 centers that currently report specialist C.E.
Specialist C.E staff ti.e in non-grant recipients was smaller to
begin With and shows less change. The average specialist C.E PTE
expanded fro. 3.2 to 3.4 staff positions, although the total number
dropped. When averaged across all 15 centers in this category, the
average dropped from 2.8 to 2.1 PTE staff positions. The data is
also skewed by one center which has recently created a C&E-like team
of more than 15 PTE positions. Exclusion of the data from that
center amplifies the shrinkage over time and condenses the variance,
with the overall average for 14 centers shrinking from 2.8 to 1.1 PTE
specialist C&E staff positions.
The total for combined groups (see Table 16) indicates a smaller
average C&E unit in centers with specialist staff, dropping from 4.2
to 3.0 PTEs. Taken across all 20 respondents, the total number
of specialist staff dropped 56%, with the average specialist PTEs
dropping from 3.8 to 1.7. When this data is again corrected by exclu-
sion of the one unique current C&E unit, the drop in average number
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Table 16
Totals for Peak-Year Number of FTE Staff p • .for Specialist C&E Se^^ce
'^^^^^^^^^
Pre-1981 1984
Number of Centers
Sum FTE
Mean FTE per Center
Standard Deviation
18.0
75.5
4.2
3.0
11.0
33.2
3.0
4.2
j
1984.
I
10.0
j
18.2
1
1.8
i
^-^
Mean FTE for all Centers
(including those without
C&E)
contacted
specialist
3.8
(n=20)
1.7
j
1.0
i
(n=19)
of specialist staff across all center. =s is even greater, showing a
decline fro. 3.8 to 1.0 specialist «E PTE positions.
The data reveals that there has been a significant decrease In
the unit sue and fre„ of specialist C.E staff throughout the
centers. The drop Is „ost significant In former C.E grant projects
Which declined £ro„ an average unit sUe of «re than twice that of
other centers to less than a third the average of specialist staff
positions currently found In non-grant recipient centers. It appears
that the receipt of a CM categorical grant was associated with a
highly unstable CiE structure or orientation over tl.e and ™ay even
have mitigated against survival.
The peak years selected for these comparisons reflect a general
growth curve in the number of C&E specialist positions. For 16
systems where accurate data was available, 75% (12) either reached
or were at their peak in specialist staff size in the three years
between 1978 and 1980. Another 12.5% peaked in 1981. while the remain-
ing centers (12.5%) peaked before 1978.
Organizational Model of Specialist C&E
Three types of specialist C&E units were indicated by the data.
The "specialist core with authority over generalist" type represented
a specialist team whose director had some level of authority over
C&E services center-wide, including the part-time C&E services delivered
by clinical staff in other programs (generalist C&E). This authority
ranged from written contracts to in-name-only authority. A second
type, or "separate specialist core", featured a specialist team with
no authority over or responsibility for generalist C&E. A third type.
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o. "specaus.
_
^ ^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^
out to other agencies fnr rx.17o CSE projects. Table 17 reports the standings
by organizational model for onall 20 respondents. A trend is evident
toward a separate specialist core (827 nf .CB ^ o current specialist C&E units)
and away from some authority over generalise ckfJ 1- ciierai t C&E services (72% of
specialist C&E units in the past).
Goal Orientation
Specific goals of C&E units are too complex and/or poorly
recalled to analyze in detail. A general orientation or type of goal
structure was suggested, however, by the data. Four types of orien-
tation for specialist C&E services were identified, based on key
phrases or words reported. The first evn*. tu^^ ^f xat: r type, that of needs assessment/
at-risk populations, was based on the goal of delivering services
that were most needed to the populations most underserved and/or at
risk of developing disorders.
The second type, that of marketing C&E products, seeks to develop
C&E-like service products and related target audiences with the
primary goal of making money. A third type, the mixed type,
incorporates needs assessment and marketing goals in a kind of
compromise, often structurally established in different sub-units or
projects. Finally, in some systems (different over time), C&E was
used primarily as a public relations arm of the center.
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Table 17
Organizational Models of SpecialiSt C&E Units
Model __Pre-198l 1984
Specialist team with authority
over generalist C&E activities
(mixed)
13 72 0
Specialist team with no connec- 3tion to generalist C&E ^ 82
activities
Specialist Core/Vendor o
^ 11 n
A growing diversity o£ goal orlencatlons Is apparent In Table 18
Where S3. specialist nnlts (,or .Hie. data Is available, W a ne^.s
assess.ent/at-rlsk population orientation In the past, only 27'/
tamtam that goal as a sole orientation. A
.ajcrlty of C.E specialist
units (36%) currently have marketing ooy n as a primary goal, while 27%
have a mixed orientation.
Activities of Specialist C&E Staff: Tr.H.- -.1
Past and current activities were reported in narrative form by
respondents. Activity categories were then developed using key words
and phrases in the responses. In a majority of cases, responses
reflected a common language of activity labels similar to that
reported by Ketterer and Bader (1977) and reviewed above. This
technique of data collection (narrative) and coding (retrospectively
constructed categories) serves to highlight the focus in perceptions
by respondents. All data, including NIMH files and reports, were
used. The data is often limited, however, by the lack of accurate
memory within the respondent system. As such, the results do not
offer a completely accurate record of past activities. The results,
instead, serve to illustrate general past concerns and activity priori-
ties, as contrasted with current activity priorities.
A trend was apparent in changes in activity over time. A group
of activities emerged over time and were typically not present in
the first years of the C&E unit's existence. The results have been
divided into two activity groups to reflect this trend. Traditional
C&E activities (the earlier focus of C&E units) are reported in
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Table 18
Goal Orientation of Special! St C&E Units
Goal Orientatinn
Needs assessment /high-risk
populations
Marketing of C&E products
Mixed needs assessment and
marketing
Center-wide public relations
Pre-1981
Number Perrpnt
10 83
_
1984
Number Perrpnt
3 27
36
27
Table 19. Contemporary C&E activities are U.r.A .LL listed in Table 20. in
some cases the activities actually overlan .nH u-Liy p a d where appropriate
are tabulated in both tables.
A difference typically exists, hcweve.. 1„ perspective. Mental
health education and training serves as a useful Illustration
Traditional C.E In Massachusetts Included ^ntal health education to
the general public and to specific at-risk target populations.
Training was offered to area professionals in various topics. Modes
of intervention in these areas included pamphlets and publications,
newspaper articles, radio, and cable and broadcast television, public
speaking, workshops, seminars, film showings, educational fairs and
events, to mention a few. One particular for™ of education/training
developed over time, that of health promotion/mental health education
workshops. These workshops often focus on behavioral approaches to
weight, stress or general lifestyle managen,ent. including active
planning for predictable life transitions. These workshops were
developed as more clearly defined packages than many of the other
education/training activities. They represent a developed form of
CiE project which Integrates prevention education with a marketing
strategy. The workshops are typically sold, not given away, and may
be marketed to business and industry, human service professionals and
agencies, and to segments of the general population. This activity
is reported below as a "contemporary" (rather than "traditional")
CSE activity because it represents a developing form which has become
increasingly more common with time.
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Table 19
Traditional Activities of ^r.^ . -
Activity'
Mental health educatioTiT^:;;:;::;:^
Community
organizing/development
Trainings, inservices, continuing educa-tion for mental health workers
'''sr?^ice°''''°r''°"se vice providers
Focused mental health education forhigh-risk target populations
Case consultation (unspecified)
Program consultation (unspecified)
Sexual assault prevention/early
intervention
Substance abuse prevention
Domestic violence prevention/early
intervention
Mutual help/support groups
Conferences
Publications
CMHC public relations
Client advocacy
Volunteer coordination for CMHC
rre-1981
_(n=18)
1984
(n=:^ 1 N
V. 11— 11)
67% 45%
61% 9%
-)U% 55%
50% 18%
50%
XO/o
44% 36%
33% 27%
50% 18%
39% 18%
11% 0%
33% 17%
28% 9%
28% 9%
11% 45%
6% 0%
6% 9%
Table 20
New Areas of Speciall<?f rnv ^ ^- .
CmCs litt T ^^^/'^t^^ity by Percent ofW h Specialist Service
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Health promotion/mental health education
workshops and seminars (i.e stress
weight, habit, or life transition
'
management)
Organizational consulting to
business and industry (B/I)
Management training for B/I
CMHC inhouse staff training
Medical liaison with hospitals
CMHC board training
Case management
64%
64%
27%
27%
36%
18%
9%
9%
A review of t.adUional C.E activities liste. in TaMe 1.
reveals a decease in t.e f.e.uenc. of offe.in.s in U of t.e .
categories reported. Outstanding drops occurr.H •6 u ed in community
organizing and development (617 ^n Q''/^P CbU to 9^), networking (50% to 18%),
focused education for at-T-icU -ir sk populations (50% to 18%), and in
prevention projects. c&E units evidenced
. .
a a surprising similarity
in prevention/earlv identi f -fo^t-,-y x i ication projects focused on sexual assault
domestic violence and substance abuse reflectnn.riectmg common concerns
across the state.
Increases were rp^)nr^aH • .eported in training to human service professionals
(50% to 55%) and particularly in public relations activities for
the CMHC (11% to 45%).
Developments in contemporary C&E activities have replaced
those traditional activities which are seen to have diminished in
frequency. In general, contemporary activities reflect a growth in
services oriented to the private sector of business, industry and
the paying individual as well as services to the host CMHC system.
Health promotion/mental health education workshops and employee
assistance programs are offered by 64% of those CMHC systems which
have surviving specialist C&E services. More than a quarter of the
systems with specialist C&E staff offer organizational consulting,
development and management training services to business and industry.
More than a third function as a component of the internal staff
training unit within the host CMHC system. A speciality in liaison
consultation to psychiatric and medical hospital settings was
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reported infrequently (18.). but
.ay represent a new developing trend
The tables of activities (Tables 19 and 20) report the percentage
of C.E specialist units that routinely participated in each activity.
The total number drops with the number of existing C« specialist staff
and units in the state. As <s„rhS suc , 102 responses were coded under the
"pre-1981" colu™, in Table 19, while only 66 responses are coded in
the "currenf colu^s of Tables 19 and 20 co,nbined. The percentages
reported serve to illustrate what specialist CSE staff do as a group.
Populations Served
The changes in populations served reflect the same trends apparent
in changes in C&E activity. Table 21 lists past and current popula-
tions served by three groups of general audiences, target populations
and frequent organizations. There is a decrease in the frequency of
services to the general public (67% to 45%) and to most target
populations. Increases are evident in services to business and
industry (6% to 64%)
,
human service agencies and professionals
(61% to 73%), and to the host CMHC system (11% to 55%). This latter
increase may reflect a greater comfort and honesty with reporting
services to the host center, services which were criticized in the
past as inappropriate to C&E. It also probably reflects a greater
integration of C&E within the CMHC system.
Sources of Financial Support
The change in percentage of free services offered is one of the
most powerful measures of change in C&E activities and should have
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Table 21
Populations Served by Specialist C&E By Percentof CMHCs with Specialist Service
General Categories
General public
Human service agencies and professionalsBusiness and industry
CMHC internal staff and needs
Target Populat ions
Children
Elders
Women
Minorities
Clergy
Adolescents
Police
Physicians
Mentally retarded
Chronic deinstitutionalized patients
Unemployed
Frequent Agencies
Schools
Elder service providers
Hospitals
Nursing homes
Housing authority or residence managers
Legal system
Pre-1981
(n=18)
67%
61%
6%
11%
44%
39%
39%
28%
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%
11%
0%
44%
28%
17%
17%
11%
11%
1984
(n=ll)
45%
73%
64%
55%
27%
18%
18%
27%
0%
9%
9%
0%
0%
9%
9%
36%
18%
27%
27%
9%
0%
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in percent
been „ore explicitly measured by the survey. Ihe change 1.
Of service, delivered at to.en cr no charge has ejected the^ changes
in types of services and DODu1flHr^r.oa populations served. Many, if not all, of the
changes reflect the pursuit of inr^^o j ^.P income and financial stability. Free
services offered currently often are done so on a ^ar.eting ti.etahle
wxth the generation of fees or paying clientele for the Cmc syste.
a specific, measured objective.
The ^ior sources of financial support for specialist CM are
difficult to measure because accurate CM budgets often were not and
are not kept
.
Many respondents and data sources (such as NIMH
records) were unable to provide reliable data pertaining to sources
of income. The researcher ic aKi^^ t-^ ^ccn s able to offer some estimates which do,
however, possibly suepest a frpnH -iff gg t e d, if not a precise measure, of
change in sources of financial support.
A majority of CMHC systems with specialist C&E in the past
relied on NIMH operations and C&E grants as major sources of support
for the activities (at least 83%). In the years prior to 1981, fees
were a major source of support for only about 20% of the CMHC systems
in funding their specialist C&E.
Currently, NIMH grants are gone. Fees provide a major source of
support in around 64% of the CMHC systems for the specialist C&E which
is sponsored. Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contracts provide a
major source of support of specialist C&E in about 36% of the CMHC
systems with such services. Support from the general operating budgets
of CMHCs is more apparent now because C&E simply would not exist as a
specialist service in many cases w-f ^ludii (_ase xthout it. DiffPT•^.T1^rrerent forms of DMH
support comprise a „aJ.rU, o, the incce sources £or
.ental health
services in general In this state and ahout 45. of the specialist
«H staff Identified In the survey drew Indirect support fro. « m
the for. of state slots or contract
.onles. other sources of
support include block grants, hospital budget lines, third-party
billings, and general operating budgets of the sponsor agency.
Despite a focus on self-supporting fees, specialist ME services
remain significantly dependent on multiple sources of income.
Including limited amounts of public funding.
Significant Chanpes
Respondents were asked to identify significant changes which had
occurred in specialist C&E services over the past three years. The
results reported below (see Table 22) illustrate those changes which
caught the respondents' attention. Often, other measures suggest
that changes were more frequent than reported in this section.
Examining all CMHC systems which formerly sponsored specialist
C&E services (n=21)
,
a total demise of specialist C&E (the most extreme
of changes) occurred in 37% of the cases.
Examining the CMHC systems which continue to sponsor specialist
C&E (n=ll), changes range from shrinkage in staff FTEs (55%) to a
temporary demise of specialist services (18%). Frequently reported
changes include a change in activities in response to demand on the
CMHC to provide direct clinical services (45%)
,
changes in populations
served in pursuit of fiscal stability for C&E (36%), and changes in
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Table 22
Types of Changes in Specialist r^F c;. .
and 1984, a/^epoltld
'.y'lllT^n^lT'''
A. By percentage of all former C5E specialist units-
Total demise of service
B. By percentage of CMHCs which continue to offerspecialist serviceb ne
Shrinkage in FTE positions
Change in activities in response to press
ot direct service needs of CMIiC
Change in population served in pursuit offinancial stability for C&E service
Limitations or curtailment of free service
Changes in activities in pursuit of income for C&E
Temporary demise
Loss of organizational standing
Collapse of established human service consulting network
Little or no community development or prevention serviceoffered now (had been before)
Percent
37%
55%
45%
36%
36%
27%
18%
18%
18%
18%
activities in order to generate Cf^v ,L&E income ^277^ a i • .^^//.). A limitation or
curtailment of free <?e.r-.T-!o^s rv.ce
„as
.entlcned In 36% of the OfflC system
still sponsoring specialist CSE.
Crucial Variables Afferr.-n„ r..^^
Responaents were asUed to Identify those
"crucial varlaMes"
„Mch
caused or significantly affected the changes In specialist C.E
While these responses do not represent causal proof, they do offer
a sun^ary of the perceptions and conclusions of persons Involved with
C.E services. These responses captured so.e of the
.ore open and
revealing statements offered during Interviews. The cedents are
presented, therefore, both numerically (see Table 23) and In
.elected
narrative format.
Categories of identified crucial variables, as listed in Table 23,
include a wide range of issues. Responses were taken from multiple
sources, but grouped by CMHC system, with 18 respondent systems. Of
these systems which formerly sponsored specialist C&E, the loss of NBIH
dollars was a reported crucial variable for the fate of C&E in 94% of
the cases. The press of the DMH service and funding priorities was
identified as a significant force in relation to 61% of the C&E
specialist services. Other crucial variables included a general fail-
ure in attempts to generate fees for services (44%), the support, or
lack thereof, from the executive director (39%), and the timing of
cuts in NIMH dollars with cuts on the local level in agency and school
budgets (28%). Conflicts with direct service staff impaired the
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Table 23
Crucxal Variables Effecting Changes in C&E Specialist
Tf^'c^r "I Interviewees by Percentof CMHCs Formerly Offering Specialist Se^Jcea
Crucial Variable
Loss of NIMH dollars
Press of DMH service and funding priorities
General failure of attempts by unit to generate
ree-for-service income
Support or lack thereof from executive director
of center
Timing of cuts in NIMH dollars with cuts on locallevel to agencies and schools (including
Proposition 2^ and federal cuts)
Conflict with direct service staff
Late entry into market, lack of proper facilities
and/or lack of adequate investment of CMHC
money and staff time for EAP development
Cuts in center staff as a whole because of block
grants or state budget
Percent
94%
61%
44%
39%
28%
22%
22%
17%
n=18
smooth integration of specialist r/^K =^ •P i C&E services with direct service
programs in 22% of respondent systems that h.Hi^te n ad specialist C&E. The
conflicts took the form of Qt^f^t staff resistance to shared roles and
cross referrals based on a lar> ^ck of experience or training in C&E,
feelings of resentment toward C&E as a program that did not pay its
way or as a program that had sold-out to commercialism (l.age problems
either way), and general power struggles over lifted resources.
Comments are reported below in the belief that the respondents'
own words provide the richest source of data the survey produced.
Identifying references to the centers or programs have been removed
where possible to protect anonymity.
Narrative Comments on Crucial Variables
"There was a balance of power when federal and state officials
were both involved. The state didn't have absolute control - feds
encouraged more of a CMHC perspective with emphasis on a full range
of services, whereas the state sees itself as concerned with,
responsible for chronic care. Speaking whollistically
, C&E is not
a very high priority. The state is the largest funding source and
was required by federal block grant guidelines to give C&E dollars
as one of five service categories. I'd be surprised if they give
any dollars to C&E. There is no emphasis from the top /jDMH central
officej and within the centers, it has varied depending on whether
you've got someone center directorj who was enthusiastic about
C&E—that's rare! Generally they hire someone to be a provider of
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reason
C&E."
•Ve didn't have the internal e«.a doUars to support «E. „e
were one of the earlier centers to lose our OfflC dollars -
„e had
to fill the grant-gap earlier.
. .Oh, there „as so.a resentment of
the other centers
..
.Vet the other centers all got cut at the sa.e
time. Ours was more of a gradual Droceq^ t7«5 du d_ p ss. We were out of the feds
before 2H proposition 2H J . „e cut back on the hours of aE...„e
found different ways to work C.E into a meaningful financial situa-
not to be too competitive Twith other EAPsJ and we had an executive
director experienced with EAPs who released staff time and worked
together with us to develop it. ..Also, we've had less staff turnover,
more consistency within ME... The consultation is based on our
reputation, known staff, people continue with the same consultant."
"The rOMHj area director decided that C5E was a luxury."
"We decided to go on our own /fas a center J, rather than become
a DMH 'puppetship' ."
"The state wasn't interested Tin C4eJ. DMH is half the center
now.
"Our role was narrowed with DMH.'
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"The area director in »<;o68 was very much Into C5E. He took
positions to other agencies as consultants.
„e worke. to infuse
^no„Xe.,e and expertise with co^unity caregivers, physicians, ciersy
The staff .i.
.roups, networking, education to the co^unity. training
organizational development.
.
.A new director cane in '74. With the
hiring freeze, cutbacks, people were called in from agencies,
community boards
.. .nurses went from doing things like se. ed'in catholic
schools to staff positions on inpatient units - back into the
hospitals...The community infusion began to wither away.
. .issues of
^strust Cof CiE by administrationJ . 'what were they doing out
therer Finally, after more hiring cutbacks
. more cuts through
attrition, the director resigns.
Now we're climbing out of the pit. The new director sees C&E as
fundamental to our work, with some additions. Consultation is the
key to resource management, especially with the chronic... If the
director himself goes out and says things are going to change,
editorials get written about it... But the wounds Tin the community_7
will take years to heal. We left them short - there's a legacy of
abandonment. Now, we 're off on a new foot . But you can't say what
would have happened if we hadn't cut back Zfon C&eJ in the first place."
"C&E is a focus of conflicts that plague the center in general."
"There was a tension with the direct service staff over demand for
service and limited center resources."
"There was a value conflict among center staff, in an atmosphere
of limited resources, over the 'center as business '.. .C&E represented
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this new
.euuae C of .He ce„.e. as a „en.al HeaUH
..sinessj
"The.e was a „isc.us. ad^„...,aUon o,
,„.,.ec. se^.ce an.
out-of
-center work hours."
Vorkshops weren't attended as well as we had hoped - Ulnd of
like giving a party and no one coiKs... Referrals to th. ..ixci.t; rai e outpatient
clinic didn't rise Tthrough C&E eff^r^« "7gn o tsJ, so we have to reassess."
"Money fro. our innovations went to other programs - Uke EAP
went to the outpatient clinic."
-Prevention changed around the block grants, graduating from
operations grants. We were active with the state group of C.E
directors. No one would have asked this question in the mid-'70s.
By fiscal year '82, there was C.E goal displacement, we were
covering our rear ends. NIMH changed its position too. We were
conflicted. They wanted C&E to be the marketing arm, to bring in
the middle class through clinical ed groups, seduce the affluent
into the center and then refer for clinical services to outpatient.
It was clinical education, rather than prevention - there's more
to primary prevention than stress management
.. .Also , the federal
system kept the state system on its toes - it influenced the
quality and orientation of other ZT service J vendors. The state-level
bureaucracy is not ideologically committed to prevention. This state
is gutted with clinically oriented professionals. To be competitive
with EAPs you have to compete against private practitioners and
clinical programs .. .The EAPs around here tend to be more clinical.
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C&E
on
is to sell it. There arpn'^ ^ea t many professionals sophisticated in
prevention."
A majority of cmc systems contacted reported generalist
activities. It is li.ely that they occur in .ost systems, as illus-
trated in the case studies presented in Sections 1 and 2 of this
chapter. There is Uttle accurate knowledge of the frequency or
type of generalist C.E activities which occur. Estimates by respond-
ents suggest that at least 60% of generalist C.E is case consultati
which is so.eti.es rei.burseable through Medicaid, DMH contracts, and
some insurance policies. Other activites include education,
program consultation, training, public speaking and lobbying and
community organizing for mental health services. Generalist C&E
activities may be conducted by a wide variety of staff, including
executive directors, program heads, and clinical staff.
Populations targetted by generalist C&E include a wide range of
groups. Children and schools seem to be the focus of 50% to 60%
of generalist activities. Other groups include police, visiting nurse
associations, hospitals, senior centers, nursing homes, physicians,
mentally retarded clients, housing managers, courts and the state's ^
Department of Social Service (often around protective services to
children)
.
While an estimation of the percentage of frequency in
contact is impossible on the basis of this survey, generalist C&E
appears to reach many of the same populations as specialist C&E (with
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perhaps the exception of business and industry)
.
While a measure of th^ f>-^^e frequency of generalist CSE hours was
not possible, 4 of 20 sv<?^<:.n,oystems reported evidence of a decline in the
number of C&E hours delivered Fv-f^«. E idence reviewed in the next
section illustrates sources of pressure on . .mental health centers
which might be expected to force a decllnpi e m generalist indirect
service time
Specialty case consulting units seem to be on the rise. They
represent an efficient packaging of direct clinical services for
human service organizations that do not specialize in mental health
services often include psychiatric assessment and diagnosis, treat-
ment Plan recon^endation and referral, case management consultation,
and some training and program consultation. The most common team
appears to be the school/child service agency consultation team.
These teams often represent ongoing collaborative agency committees
as well as specialty case consulting units within a mental health
center. Geriatric (or nursing home) teams and court clinics (or
consulting teams) appear to be second in frequency. These units
have evolved in part as a direct priority from DMH
. The discharge
from state hospitals of large numbers of chronic patients has
contributed to the sharp rise in the number of such patients now
found in nursing homes. Geriatric/nursing home consultation units
are, in part, an attempt by DMH to maintain services and housing for
DMH clients out of state hospitals. Court clinics were mandated by
DMH on the requests of legal systems throughout the state for more
assistance in assessing psychiatmV •g hiatric issues in criminal cases
involving juveniles and adults Th. ^clult . ere have also been some train-ings for police in areas such as suicide risk and nK prevention for
-.nee.
„U.o..„e
_,e.e„.
.e.een e„e.se„c. se^.es
ana .He poUce
.e.„..u„,,_,,,,,
_ ^^^^^^^^
on the street.
A few discrete specieU. u„Us provide C.E-Xi.e services sucH
.s
s.cre,ro„. eo.seUns for
.He u„e.pio,ed and :.„.el HeaUH
.rainin,
for ^norit, indigenous helpers (HotH bonded H. federal
,.„ds
.Hro.,H
DMH)
.
^
Summary of RpsnH-.
The results indicate thata , on the average, specialist C&E has
continued to survive, albeit on a much smaller scale. C.E services
were least disrupted in those centers which never received C.E
grants and, hence, did not develop large specialist units. C.E
specialty staff are much less frequent throughout the systems, with
units often comprised of a single specialist. There are fewer full-
time C&E directors and C&E usually holds a lower organizational
standing than it once did. Specialist C&E has shifted its foci of
activities and populations in an attempt to generate greater financial
stability. Business and industry, fee-paying service providers, and
middle and upper class clientele have been cultivated, along with the
host CMHC systems themselves. Services have shifted away from
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conmunity development and prevention projects which typically hadPocly defined and financially poor constituencies Services have
Shifted
.ore toward pac.a.es which are attractive as
.ar.etahle
products to the ahove
-mentioned audiences. Crucial variables
affecting these changes included the demise of federal funding
service priorities from DMH which overwhelmingly emphasise the
chronic deinstitutionalized client varl.hlo^x , iab e success of C&E units
in successfully selling their services and the .i x support of center
executive directors.
GeneraUst C.E and speciality case consulting tea^ continna
.o„e si„ilat activities, though largely ao-inated by clinical concerns
for specific cases.
Section 4: Current State Environment of CMur.
and its Affects on'T&E
"C&E is a focus of conflicts that plague the
center in general."
- Survey respondent
The statement above summarizes the results of this section. Many
of the current changes in specialist C&E services reflect changes
made in the host centers as they adapted to a changed financial
environment. The history of the Massachusetts Department of Mental
Health demonstrates that DMH has always had a different mission than
that of the CMHCs. DMH is the provider of last resort for the most
chronically disabled, destitute and homeless. The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981 cut the amount of federal support available
and placed that money undPr a-y e the direction of DhB. The smaller blockgrants caused a significant fiscal crisis In , n ki a number of centers.
Programs were streamlined ande , in some cases, staff were laid off
-
Significant numbers. became the overwhelmingly dominant
source,-of support for mental health services, with a coinciding
dominance of its service priorities. Outpatient services to the
working poor are threatened with significant cutbacks. Centers
have not only had to adapt to D« priorities on services to the
chronic delnstitutionalUed, but are under pressure because
reimbursement rates by DMH, Medicaid and insurance companies often
do not cover the cost of service delivery. Block grant funds are
not used Significantly for ME and DMH does not, as a rule, fund
CSE. Specialist and generalist ME services are lucky to have
survived at all in a direct service system. They probably do so by
making some Income and by demonstrating the Importance of a base-
line of indirect services in supporting the Center, its reputation
and connections and its direct services.
The Department of Ment al Health Mission and Budget
The history of state-funded mental health services in Massachusetts
Is relevant to this study, but beyond the scope of this work. Briefly,
it enjoyed an illustrious beginning with Dorthea Dix and moral treat-
ment, the first state hospital (Worcester, 1833) and the first
inpatient state school for the mentally retarded (Femald, 1848).
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The Department of Mental Health h.rr •n i began in 1919 a«? th^ n
M« . -. ...
s e Department ofMental Diseases and was created tn
' '° ^"^^^^^^ ^he 13 state hospitals
;
—
•
-
Sharing of state f.ds
mental retardation. Local
-star»te cooperative clinics were begun In
1939 to provide outpatient services to the poor. XhrousHout Us
hxstory. however, the vast majority of the OMH hudget has gone to
state schools, state hospitals and the co^nlt. services needed
to support fonner patients of these Institutions.
The service profile has shifted significantly toward co„unity
services In the past thirty years. The state hospital Inpatient
census peaked in the 1950s with ahout 23.000 patients, dropping
steadily to the low of about 2.000 in 1981. This trend reflects the
impact of anti-psychotic medications; the rising costs of inpatient
services; the leadership of DM, Co™„issioner Robert Okin (1975 to 1979).
who believed in normalization and deinstitutionalization; and at least
'
6 Class action suits brought on the behalf of DMH patients, leading
to at least two consent decrees (mental regardatlon cases statewide
and mental health clients in District 1) . «,ile this is an extremely
simplified history, it is reflected in the "DM Fiscal Year 1986
Budget Narrative" and supported by interviews conducted in this
survey.
A variety of factors favorably affected the financial base of
CMHCs during this time, not the least of which was the CMHC Act which
established a second mental health system in the state. Other events
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entailed
.He inclusion o£ 3^,^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^^
Medic..
,„„,i„,.„,
,
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
policies to include at least !5snn f^
""^ outpatient services (both in
i-y/b)
. Following the cut<! -ir, f j8 ts in funds with block grants, however
several other events oeeurre..
^^^3^^ ^^^^^^
Placing a statewide li.,t on the real estate tax hase of local
governments. Another state law, M G L 372 •
,
u.b. . J , the Hospital Cost
containment
.cf (,,81) placed a ceiling fot all Hospitals on tHe
total dollar figure tHey could bill to insurance companies. IHis
llMt forced tHe elimination or cutback of many auxiliary mental
healtH services. DMH was also targeted by the legislature for
mismanagement and level funding was cut or frozen tor many Dm
accounts. Approximately 1 000 DMW o™r,i-Ly i,uuu m employees were laid off in 1982,
including many state slot direct ^PT^r-tooax service personnel out of area
offices
.
At the moment DMH annually serves approximately 8,000 mental
health inpatients, 3,700 mentally retarded inpatients, 16,000
residents in community housing and/or day treatment, and 80,000
clients through emergency, outpatient or case management services.
It's mission is to act as the provider of last resort for the
destitute and the most severely disabled. The budget for fiscal year
1985 was approximately 602 million dollars (the federal block grant,
by contrast, was only 9 million dollars). It is extremely difficult
to break down the budget by accounts to identify where money goes
precisely. With the assistance of expert interviewees, the researcher
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suggests that approximate!, 90 MlUon
.oUats goes to . ,
he.iri, . . * '° ^'^"1'^ mentalalth services In the co»unlty (that Is. excludtn.i g inpatient
-tt.ngs). The block grant makes up about ,07 of th,-
, , ^ .
p UL iu/o O is figure. Thebudget
.cluaes about
,.00.000 for
..special population., services
I.8e for cultural/llngulstlc
minorities, the sight an. hearing
impaired and a self-help center for- fP r former clients. Most of this
-ney goes to training of service providers. There is no b d .
for C&E.
'^"^
Block Grants Brine Ctita -ir, c
""^-^"S t^u s m Service Dnn;:iT-Q
The comptroller General Issued a
..Report to the Congress.. In
193. (GAO. 1,8.) „hlch evaluated the Implementation by states of
grants appears to be debatable. Backer and his associates (1983).
along With many others, refer to a 25% cut. The GAG Indicates a
2U cut from 1981 to 1982. It also Indicates a total cut In federal
dollars for mental health and substance abuse services from 1980 to
198. of 26%. or 37X when corrected for inflation. Interviews with
state experts suggest that the funds in Massachusetts dropped from
15 million dollars in categorical grants to a 10 million dollar
block grant in mental health. The GAG report notes that few changes
m services were caused by block grants, but it also notes that
half of all centers surveyed had cut their staff size. John Lichten.
Acting Associate Commissioner of DMH. reports that many centers
across
... 3..
.spon.e. . ...
,,,, ^^^^^^
^^^^^
Placing 3.a„ f.e-,o.-se„,.e posU.ons. Xhe ,„,ac.
.He
cues is nius„ate.
,y .He Hu.,e.
„f .He Sou.H SHce Men.al „eaUH
Cen.er, a former CMHC and cu„e„. Hlock gran, reclpten.. Pede.al
to
.66 MlUon dollars. IHey los. approxi„a.ely 5430,000. Hu.
.He
opera.l„g budge, dropped fro. 4.7 .UUon dollars In fiscal ,ear
1«2 (.nly. ,982
.0 .une
.
,982) .0 3.9 :^Uio„ dollars in fiscal ,ear
1983. THis is because
.Hey no. only los.
.He federal funds, bu.
also .he addl.lonal Income whicH was genera.ed by s.aff suppor.ed
by those funds. A 40% cut in feder;,! f„n^or eral funds produced a 17% cut in
the total operating budget line of the center.
DMH Becomes the Major Funder of Mental He.lM.
..^^^^
The GAO report (1984) indicates that the state share of total
dollars spent in Massachusetts for mental health and substance abuse
services rose from 64% to 75% between 1981 and 1983. The influence
of state agencies rose even more in assuming control of the federal
block grants (22% of the 1983 total according to GAO)
.
Surveys of 43 DMH partnership clinics for fiscal year 1982 and
48 partnership clinics for fiscal year 1983 indicate that the DMH
share of these clinics' budgets rose from 47% to 61%, even with
the block grants (Note 10). A similar trend is reported by survey
respondents for those centers which are not partnership clinics.
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Block Grant and DMH Missions Differ from CMHC Mission
The DMH service mission, reviewed above, differs from the CMHC
mission in placing most of its emphasis on treatment of the chroni-
cally 111. The mission of the block grants and Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, as described in the GAP report (1984)
is similar to that of DMH. While a provision is made in the legis-
lation that all funded CMHCs must provide five services, including
C&E, the mental health goal of the Act focuses first, in all cases,
on the "chronically mentally ill." This stands in sharp contrast
to the goal for substance abuse monies, which lists prevention
as the first service. A provision is made that at least 20% of
block grant substance abuse funds go to prevention. No such provision
is made for mental health.
Concerns of Mental Health Centers Currently
The trends described above threaten to produce major changes in
mental health services. A number of interviewees in this survey
expressed concerns regarding the plight of mental health service in
general. A major concern is that services for the "working poor" will
disappear. The unfunded middle ground appears to be widening
between the destitute or chronically disabled and the person who can
afford private treatment. (This is the very condition that the
CMHC mission addressed.) Competition with health maintenance organi-
zations, along with new limits on insurance coverage and the hospital
cost ceilings have hastened a trend in public mental health agencies
-
see a
^^^^
note.
.He
„a=.a....e.s As.oCat.on of Hen.al HeaU. Se„,.e
Providers and by DMH employees (Note U ) .
-
too limited. It is arsued that services contracted for and
provided for by DMH are
"undercosted Tf • ,a . It is claimed that contracts
do not provide enough money. CMH staff slots are cut and rates of
reimbursement by the state Kate Setting Co^lsslon are too lo>, to
'
cover the actual costs of service dellverv Th,- • ^u ii y. is is due In part
to the considerable amount of Indrect ssrv,-.»i c e vices and case management
required to treat a severely disturbed population.
It is estimated by the Massachusetts Association of Mental
Health service Providers that less than U of the population Is
"tragically disabled" (Note 12 ) . The focus on chronlcity drains
funds from the previous base services, "tearing apart" the former
service profile, it was noted in Interviews that the previous
baseline of services provided prevention of chronlcity through early
identification and treatment, as in child and family clinics.
Community Issues known to be associated with psychological disorders
such as alcoholism, drug abuse. Incest and rape go unaddressed.
One interviewee concluded:
Chronicity can be defined, measured and
documented.
. .Prevention of chronicity can
not be defined.
. .The major focus / of DMH /
on the chronic patient pours its dollars into
a great pit.
areas
s
.
rs
ess
ces
This is a conclusion which may be hintPH .^ • ^ •y ed at indirectly by initial
DMH findings that increasing the ovPr.n-Lng n erall service dollars to
may simply seem to increase demand for more service
Little Money for C&E in the St;,fP
The end result of such concerns is that mental health provide
are in little shape to support indirect or prevention services unl
a general change in thinking occurs which reframes indirect servi
as a "key to resource management." This is unlikely
in the 1984 DMH block grant budget for mental health. 2.6. of the
9.965 million dollars is noted as going to C.E. This C.E total of
$263,284 is divided aaong only three centers. Interviews with
representatives of one of these centers suggest that much of this
money goes to general administration.
A 1984 statewide mental health resource inventory, conducted by
DMH and reported in the "Block Grant Proposal for Fiscal Year 1985"
indicates that there are 52 C&E FTE staff positions statewide
receiving $956,000 from various sources. This represents only .49%
of the total dollars listed for mental health services and only
.46% of the total mental health FTE positions statewide. Given the
current level of data analysis used for this resource survey, there
is no available data on what these 52 positions actually represent
in the way of services.
The surveys of partnership clinics reported in DMH memos (Note 13)
indicate that C&E services represented 2% of the partnership clinic
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in .est cases). The su^eys indicate that the C.E h.dget 1 ^38
Million dollars for these 43 centers was supported
,y federal (45^)
state (29%). and fee and third-party (12,) ,o„„,.
available for C.E for fiscal year 1,83 for these centers. The
surveys indicated, hoover, the rise in the state share of fnndin, that
next year (47% in 1982 to 6U in 1983, as federal grants to centers
disappeared.
The data reviewed, in suMnary, documents that the block grants
in Massachusetts only minimally fund C.E. The resource Inventory
highlights the low status of C.E in mental health service across
the state. The surveys of partnership clinic budgets again illus-
trate the low status of CM, even in 1981-82, and explain why that
status would have dropped even more given the changes In funding.
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
co«u„i.,
.en,.ee. C.H has
.i.,„,3Hea eno^ousl, a. a special..
Within CMHCs, While qfin fx stxll found xn about half of the fonner CMHC
systems, C&E is a barely measureable service r.i ^•, elative to other mental
health services. The artUrii--t^ctiv ties and orientation of surviving C&E
specialists has, b. necessity, changed significantly from that found
during the days of federal sponsorship. This process of change is
likely to continue and even arrPi«>-o^^ .ccelerate with time as current service
and funding forces reshape the struct.,rp<= • •H <-ne ructures and missions of the host
CMHC systems.
I^e crucial variables which have affected this change are
illustrated with a descriptive vividness by the data. While
causality could not be tested within the limits of the data collected,
certain issues demonstrate a weight of evidence merely by their
constant re-emergence in the data. Well developed specialty C&E
teams that delivered prevention and health promotion services to
at-risk populations were clearly dependent on public financing. The
very process of developing a stable financial base for C&E appears
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to, of necessity reHf»-FTn<= ^y- ede„ e that service toward marketing oriented
goals
or
s
Within the context of the C^fflC system, the pres. o. demands ,
direct clmicai service, is an Irreslstable force. This 1
especially true of services, such as C.B. which have lost their
categorical funding source. C&E was not ru. -^cn the major task of these
direct service organizations and certain!
v
a ly became extremely vulnerable
the moment funding stopped, placing C.E in the
.'overhead costs-'
category. After advising numerous C.E units to diversify in search
of income, and after chastizing the C.E units of Massachusetts, in
particular, for "giving away services," Dr. Leon Nicks co^ents,
himself, that C.E by definition required public funding. This fact
was recognized by NIMH officials as early as 1975 when Dr. Nicks
and other administrators drafted NIMH recommendations adopted in the
CMHC ammendments which created the categorical C&E grants.
In this situation, where specialist C&E services continue,
the services either enjoy a rare and unique support by an executive
director or the services pay for themselves, either directly or
by promoting the clinical services of the center.
Predictive variables such as unit structure, types of activities,
or size of the specialized team appear to be generally subservient
to variables affecting CMHC systems as a whole. Money is tight and
center directors are not in the position to promote a service or a
philosophy they are not paid to promote.
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The survival of gen.rallst «E and the
.rowth ,
, .
g of specialty
consulting teains Is not evidence of ^Kthe success of one type of C4Emodel over another. Rather th.
'"^'^ "o^"
'0 ^he dominanceOf d.rect Clinical services within the clinical
.odel Se •
cling as close as possible
rvices which
,
.
"
- direct Clinical
service are more likelv ^^y to survive. The Issue o, what C.E is and
IS not becomes central Hpt-o in, • .here. Whxle always plagued by a lack of
definition, probably as a result of -,the placement of C&E within a
system with a different central task th. ^i , e claim that generalist C&E
-
a .ore serviceable for» stretches the issue beyond recognition
Along the continuum of services between Indirect prevention and
health promotion and direct clinical services, generalist «E has
always tended to be „ore clinical and less C.E. The few studies
conducted by specialist tea^ in the state suggest that specialist
C« services could Influence the type and amount of generalist
service, moving It .ore toward a specialist
.odel of service. The
sa„e forces which have diminished specialist C.E services can be
assumed to have affected generalist services, di,ninishlng the. in
quantity and promoting a clinical orientation.
The question of what defined "true" C&E remains central to,
yet rather elusive in the findings of this study. The specialty
units which developed with CiE and operations grants demonstrated
some uniformity of goal orientation and activities, despite a wide
diversity of projects. CiE services were based on a goal of identi-
fying at-risk or underserved and needy populations. Activities were
indirect in nature and syste. oriented, either to agencies
co«„„it, groups, or the public at large. I„ the case o£ training
professionals (one of the .ore enduring activities), C.E activities
often introduced both cliniral ar,^cn C c and preventive needs of the under-
served populations to the professional service system.
This was true, as well, of the outreach functions of C.E which
developed as a natural consequence of C.E specialists gaining entry
into coinmunities. When exa^ned as a speciality, C&E services were
preventive and more. Arguments that C.E units did not "do primary
prevention" miss the unique approach which typified C&E services.
Through their role, C&E specialists were more likely than other CMHC
staff to be aware of both the needs and the style of living of
local residents. As such, C&E intervention technology tended to
reflect local patterns of helping and local patterns of concern and
interest. If clinical interventions were needed and acceptable,
C&E specialists functioned as one of the CMHCs'more efficient
outreach referral services, much to the dismay of prevention theorists
who argued that prevention should lower service utilization. Just as
often, C&E services translated the professional resources of the
CMHC system into forms of intervention more acceptable to and in
keeping with the lifestyles of hard-to-reach populations. In the
translation, many of these resources were delivered in indirect modes,
such as education, coalition development, and organizational
consulting
.
Discrete p...... p_n.o. p.o.ee.s were sponsor.
^peCaUs.CE units and .He t.au.as addressed such p.o.ects showed a sur-
prising unifonnity. Kape
.
sexual assault, incest, domestic violence
and substance abuse were con^only addressed, both through developed
^
educational curriculi and through co::.unity organizing and aware-
ness campaigns. While not sophisticated by
.edical standards of
primary prevention research, it see.s a bit ironic that these sa.e
issues appear to be receiving ever increasing clinical attention as
major factors in the cause and treatment of psychopathology
. While
some of these projects continue to be supported by C.E specialists,
many have been either significantly scaled-back in size or trans-
ferred to community groups willing and able to continue the work as
a personal cause. Such transfers may be a hint as to the future
home of some primary prevention in this state.
C&E specialty services also delivered considerable case
consulting services. Often these services were offered in keeping with
the targeted at-risk populations. Perhaps just as often these
services were provided on a request basis to area agencies. Case
consulting, as a needed function of C&E services, appears to have
dropped off quickly. The general constriction over time of the ability
to offer case or program consultation to local agencies reflected,
if anything, the potential size of demand for such services and
the restricted C&E staff numbers which limited specialist services
even at the peak of prosperity. Some of these services continue in
specialty case consulting and generalist C&E, but it is argueable
wh.cH
..vo.e.
.o. eaucat.o„., an. p.o,._Uc Usues even „.e„
focused on specific groups.
Implications for the orevonn™ • .n p evention mission of the CMHC movement
suggested hy the fate of specialist C.E services are some„hat
limited. The prevention mission of OHCs has been debatable from
the start and certainly the modest size of C.E, even at Us peak
suggests that prevention really „as never much of a mission for CMHCs
at least as far as money and staff resources. Editorial comments
on the study of C&E bv Backer anr^ h-j ^oy d his associates, written by such C&E
experts as Marshal Swift and NIMH officials James Stockdill and
Risa Pomerantz, focus on the shift in goals evidenced by C&E. While
by no .eans absolute, C&E increasingly serves the routine needs of
the CMHC system for indirect services such as public relations and
m-house training (Swift, 1983). In serving the public, many C&E
services have been reoriented away from needy populations and toward
better functioning ("worried well") populations either in the general
public or in business and industry (Stockdill and Pomerantz, 1983).
While arguments that the workplace has been too long ignored as a
setting ripe for primary prevention are logically valid and even
somewhat consoling, the rationalization is apparent. Services are
not being marketed to industry because the science of mental health
service delivery (if there is one) has identified work as the major
cause of psychopathology or the best intervention point for prevention.
In the limited areas where workplace settings are the optimal
points of intervention (as in alcoholism)
,
organizations have existed
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for so.e ttoe to service
.hose needs (such as A.L.H.A.C.A.
.
This surve, of C.B se^lces, „ an.thln,, offers so.e dis.urhlng
indications of a shift in the CMHC ^ssion in general, prevention
aside. The loss threatened bv currenft changes is not so much the loss
Of prevention services as it is a loss of comprehensive direct
services. The review of HMH grant co»entary, as well as survey
interviews, suggest that NIMH officials hoped, through cmc grants
to promote a particular profile and structure of service delivery.
Private, nonprofit corporations were to take responsihility for
promoting a coordinated, efficient service network. This network
was to offer a comprehensive range of services as defined by the
five mandated services (and in contrast to the previous split between
state hospitals and expensive private practice). In providing
comprehensive service that also reflected local lifestyles, this
network was designed to reach populations previously excluded from
mental health services, either through their lack of money, their
lack of servere chronic disability, or through their being a member
of an ethnic or racial minority. The current situation of service
priorities and funding sources in Massachusetts runs the risk of
redesigning CMHC systems so that these populations will no longer
be served. Such an event would historically carry a far more
powerful Impact on the CMHC mission than would the demise of specialist
C&E services (even if CSE represented "the best" of the CMHC mission,
as some have argued)
.
the f..„e Of speciaUst C.H „ni p.„..,i, 3o.a„Ha.
.,„e.e„t
.He f.t„e Of p.i.„. p.eve«.o„ se„.ees in
.en.al HeaUh
is survivias a„a „iU continue
.o su„i.e as a
.i„i„al specialty
Within direct service asencie., mv •g cies. C&E specialists typically have
needed skills in coinmunity relations ^nH ^ • •y a d training, and will also
continue to weave
.ore "traditional.. C.E values into their roles as
opportunities per.it. (The one exception to this Mght he found in
the high turnover of C.E specialists as C.E staff with .ore exper-
ience and
.e.ory of past values leave positions because of the
frustrations associated with the forced changes in goal orientations
"You can only dance so long,', one interviewee explained.)
Opportunities exist, first, for C.E specialists to function as
marketing and public relations experts for the center (.'the face of
the CMHC to the connnunity;- as it was described). This role will
become increasingly more necessary as centers search for referred
individuals who have insurance to keep outpatient clinics afloat.
Service coordination will also remain a basic foundation of quality
service (something still protected as an explicit goal by many
administrators interviewed)
. C&E will remain useful in its
networking capacity to the degree that direct service staff don't
have the time to assume such responsibilities.
A second avenue appears to be that of entrepreneural marketing
of training and consultative services. C&E specialists are well
equipped to provide such services to human service agencies. As long
as such agencies have money to train st.ff .y a and send staff to confer-
.„eve.. „UH
, .U-.no™
...... 3.00..
a= Ha^a...
.Ho„.„, an
^^^^^
'
conference market H<=ai.-k«. Health prcotloa and life transition training
for the well-off general ^, u^ •public also regains a staple for C.E income
Interviews sueeest ^}^a^ r>^ ^- .gg that competition is growing in this field also
wUh adnlt education and co-unit, colleges offering more classes'
-
topics ranging fro. stress management to parenting to nutrition a.
exercise
The Business and industry market is. of course, a highl, touted
target for C.E growth. Xhis potential remains, in large part, to be
realized. Employee assistance programs offer this potential to
.ar.et both direct clinical services (through referrals)
. as well as
training and health promotion/prevention education. Many surviving
C.E specialist units in this survey offer EAP services as one product
Research by the National Council of Co^unity Mental Health Centers
(1984) suggests that more than a quarter of Cf«Cs currently offer
EAP services. The same research documents that most of these
programs do well to cover their costs. In their survey of key
informants, Sodano and Woy (1983) came to a similar conclusion and
warn of the potential shift in goal orientation associated with such
endeavors. EAP services may well become a fairly co^on. self-support
ing program with a discrete standing like that of other programs, such
as outpatient clinics or day rehabilitation programs. EAPs will.
issues
as such, support EAPs
, not C&E.
Consulting to business and industry around organizational i<
and
.anage.ent training is another potential field of growth for
C&E. It is likely that the successful C.E units in such a .arket
Will increasingly co.e to rese.hle other business consulting fi^s
A
.aster's degree in business administration
.ay well become the most
desirable credential for such a C&E expert.
A major problem with C.E moving into most entreprenural fields
is presented by the lack of experience most mental health administrators
have in entreprenural projects. Very few directors are experienced
in designing and managing such high-risk enterprises. If anything,
CMHC systems are woefully unequipped to undertake high-risk invest-
ments. Many specialist C.E units suffer, as a consequence, a lack
of the investment capital and management support to successfully
pull off projects which might well succeed. It is likely, however,
that C&E specialists will maintain some role as the marketing
entrepreneurs of CMHC systems.
Other possibilities include working with health maintenance
organizations to provide education and prevention services on a
subcontract basis. This may be a limited market, as many HMOs are
developing in-house mental health services and, when subcontracts are
brought in, it is usually to provide strictly controlled clinical
service. If indirect services are threatened in CMHCs
,
they are
almost antithetical to mental health services as provided by some of
the larger HMOs in this state. Alcoholism prevention may be one
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-epuon
.His situation. But it is iconic that „a„, c.E
specialists have not
.eveiope.
„o..i„, relationships with the „eii
established alcoholism treatment-iireatment and prevention network which
already exists in this state.
So^e interviewees suggested that the competition for clinical
'
cases .ay force ad^nistrators to try to elevate the agencies'
reputations by seeking fl^PT-crI-^y K accreditation as a Community Mental Health
Service Provider by the Joint Con^ission on Accreditation of
Hospitals (JCAH). The JCAH model for con^unity mental health
providers (JCAH. 1981) includes several provisions which might
promote C.E specialty services. Prevention (through public information,
education, consultation, and somatic intervention and ecological
change) is listed as a service required for accreditation, along with
citizen participation requirements of community development and
planning. While providing one of the more precisely defined models
of community mental health, the JCAH guidelines do little or nothing
to enforce these particular C&E-like requirements, as noted
previously by Snow and Wolff (1983). The cost of meeting these require-
ments is high in general and interviewees suggest that Medicaid
licensing is likely to remain the top priority for most agencies.
This is particularly true of DMH facilities, many of which have had
their Medicaid accrediations revoked.
The area of medical consulting offers one more potential market
for C&E. Some C&E specialists in the state currently provide
medical liaison and case consulting services to general medical
205
again
,
hospitals and state psychiatrin •f o_yi_uiacrxc hospitals Th<,«
^ ^ ,
F-Ltai . These are likely e-to be limited fields. dmH ar.. ...
doll .
'^^^
^ ^^°-andars for consulting in fho
-spual
...
^^^^^^^^^^
a sen.., Ho.pUal a..e. aU o.
.Ha o.He. p....e consuUan.
-r^in..,. She „o„.e.e. „Ha. „oul. Happen „He„ sHe Ha. sta.
b^lllns fo. services HerseU. THe Ue,
.o
.a.icaU.-.elate. C.H
-y wen He .He aHUU. of HospUaU
.o HUl sucH services to
third-party payors. s.cH as Medicaid an. private insurance companies
If SUCH services
.o <,naUfy, C.H units .a. He aHU to o«er inexpensive
services. witHout tHe cost to Hospitals of Having to maintain in-
house HeHavioral
.edicine or psycHiatric liaison units.
All Of these future possibilities carry clear lapUcatlons for a
continued drift away fro. traditional C.E goals. It see.s likely,
also. tHat witH this drift. tHe fate of primary prevention in
.ental
health Will become increasingly separated fro. that of specialist
C.E services and of OfflCs in general. Primary prevention in .ental
health Has long carried the signs of a paradigm without a home.
Carolyn Swift, in Her comments in the Backer study (C. Swift. 1983)
.
points out that preventively oriented consultation and education
services have long been provided by agencies other than CMHCs. THe
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question she identifie<? to ^ ,xs not Whether
.uch services will continue
to exist, "but whether thev win ^y W ll continue to exist in CMHC" (c. Swift
1983, p. 24).
The
..jor barrier to prevention as hosted by CMHCs Is that
Identified by Snow and Newton (1976) and co^ented on at length
hare; namely, that the ^in task of CMHCs has always been that o,
direct service delivery, not prevention. With the rise in influence
of service priorities fro. this condition will certainly not
change
.
Prevention is supported by the state government, but not by
DMH. The Massachusetts Department of Public Health funds primary
prevention projects in alcoholism, drug abuse and sexual assault,
along With a developmental screening and early identification program
for infants which delivers significant secondary prevention services
to parents and families. These services are noteable for their
efficient use of funds and expert staff. Alcoholism prevention is a
particularly good example. DPH funds eight regional alcoholism
prevention centers across the state which host teams of specialist
staff who use many C&E-style techniques. It is probable that
primary prevention enjoys a more supportive environment in DPH
because the department is, by design, prevention oriented. DPH
prevention services are often established as discrete offices or
projects and thus do not suffer in competition with direct service
mandates
.
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In the mental health field DMh -f
.
r i , H is an extension of the stateSove_. U «ae.s
.He ex.ec..Uo„.
.He ,ove„o.
and the legislature. These 1„.1.,,,.,3
.espona to the defends of
their constituencies. Without an active cltl.en-hased constituency
no amount of agency-based lobbying will produce „ore dollars for
primary prevention. The senerpfinnn g at o of an energized constituency
re,ulres several conditions. A truely alarming event „ust be sho>™
to he Widespread and people „ust believe that such tragedies can and
should have been prevented. John Uchten, Acting Associate
CoHMlssloner of Mental Health Services, pointed out the barriers In
mental health to achieving these conditions. Taking the example of
severe child abuse of Incest, he pointed out that people have a
strong aversion to either acknowledging that It's common or to
accepting that they, or their friends, or even people like the., could
even be remotely associated with such actions. He summarizes:
"It's hard to get people to come out for something like that" (Note
14 ) . Until CiE specialists, or other advocates in the field
are able to use their skills to effectively break down such barriers
and generate a citizen-based constituency, primary prevention in
mental health will remain a minor paradigm in mental health services.
REFERENCE NOTES
Information concerning DMH partnership clinics their hu^..r
rxscai Year 1986 Narrative Budget ("DMH 1qRA^broad information on overall spe^dinf' i!o DM m!mL'°"particularly useful. ^ ^ ''^^^
The first memo, dated May 4, 1983, was directed to the
nfnSJT ^T''' ^^^^g^- Area Directo^S"of DMH from Donna Mauch, Assistant Commissioner for Mental
yeJi 1 l2"anr;98f' ^^^'^^^^ staS fScal
Ind costs!
partnership clinic services, staffing
The second memo was directed to Frank Keefe, Secretary of the
IctSr^L" 1 Administration and Finance and John Mudd!Acting Secretary of the Executive Office of Human Servicesfrom the Commissioner of Mental Health, James J. Callahan, Jr.,Ph.D Dated January 31, 1984, the memo reviewed the data
compiled from the attached "Partnership Corporation RevenueSurvey conducted by Elizabeth L. Funk, Executive Director ofthe Association of Community Mental Health Service ProvidersInc., of Massachusetts. '
Personal interviews conducted in the course of this research
with Elizabeth Funk and John Lichten
,
Acting Associate
Commissioner for Mental Health Services provided explanatory
background for the reading of the DMH memos and budgets.
Van der Koke, Bessel. Post-traumatic stress syndrome and
endogenous opiates: A psychopharmacological theory of
dependence. Department of Psychiatry, Cambridge Hospital,
Cambridge, MA: Unpublished paper.
Information was gathered from a personal interview conducted in
the course of this research with Harry Schulman, President of
the Association of Community Mental Health Providers, Inc., of
Massachusetts, and Executive Director of theSouth Shore Mental
Health Center, Quincy, MA.
Wolff, T. The rise and fall of a C&E Unit. Franklin /Hampshire
Community Mental Health Center, Northampton, MA: Unpublished paper
This paper was prepared in draft form with the assistance of the
researcher. Much of the data for the case study presented in Sec-
tion 1 of the Results Chapter of this work was collected by
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Dr. Wolff and the researrh<.^ a
paper. Every attempt ^3 ^^'"^^^^ Preparation of this
conclusions in the discussion of the
^^^^^^^^
' Wolffs
discussion of the case sJtiHv n
""^^^ The
not be taken as a staLLnt'orDr^w'ff ^''^ ^^^^^
except when indicated. The rfseI;chP ' ^^^^^lusions
,
for the discussion of impUcIJiSnr? k^'!""'^" responsibilitystudy and any errors w^ich mSit L ^'^^ '^^^ ^^^^discussion, and in the se^l' ' .1°?^^^^^^^-i^
.
— axen igh be confax x
ca e sLy Useu!
Wolff, T., o£ cit., unpublished paper.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Co™,lssloner of Ment" HeaUh^, " '^'=""8 Associate
Health, Co^onwealt^lf^MLLchu^It":?- °'
Ibid.
Jhf°™is:"orthfs"^::eircr:i?rrr\ ^-r-^^^ ^--'--^Funk (see Reference Note O. *
'""^ Elizabeth
m! fsirU^eleTeLlce^ltn^'
Sfh™„"j™ei:ff::s::iof:™)!
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APPENDIX A
Survey Questionnaire
Revised 10/84
SURVEY OF CONSULTATION & EDUCATION SERVICES IN MASSACHUSETTS
NOTE: The following list is provided as an example of some staff
services or activities commonly grouped under consultation
and/or education:
- case consultation to school or other agencies
- program consultation
- mental health education for the general public
- mental health education for target populations (i.e.
,
families of clients, highrisk populations)
- public .relations/information on center services
- training, inservices and workshops (internal or external
to center)
- primary prevention projects
- community organizing and development
- consultation to business or industry
Respondent
:
Name & Address of Center:
Phone Number:
Date
:
Respondent's position & number of years at center:
I. Current Description of Consultation, Education or Prevention
Services
:
1. Do center staff engage in any form of consultation, education
or prevention services?
(If not, please advance to section II.)
If so, briefly describe those services:
SURVEY OF C&E
IV. Description of Type and Size of Mental Health Center:
..
What (financial/organizational) type of mentalcenter is this? health
2.
you^ce^Je"'^^
'-^^ ""^^ °' '^^'"^ currently offered by
sJots'anS^ I'^i^'^'^T f^^^^^le'^t staff size (including stateSl ts under the center's authority)?
^'
!!5^5v,^^
^^^^ year's approximate annual ooerating budgetof the center overall (a total dollar figure)?
What are the main sources of income for the center overall
and the approximate proportion of the budget accounted forby each source? (For example: Mass. DMH
, 55%; local qover
ments, 10%; Mass DSS
, 10%; fee-for-service
, 15%; medicaid/third-oarty, 10%)
6. What towns are i a your catchment and what is the total population
of the catchment area?
SURVEY OF C&E
2. What is the approximate number of fulltime equivalent (FTE)
staff positions or staff hours devoted to C&E services?
3. Do any staff do C&E activities as (close to) 100% of their
work time? If so, what positions are specialized in this way?
Is there an organizational unit, coordinator or director
responsible for any of these C&E services? If so, please
describe briefly the position or unit.
If there is a director or coordinator of one of the C&E services,
at what level of authority is this position within the center's
organization? (i.e., are they on the same level as program
directors, do they have direct access to the center director,
are they on the management team?)
6. Is there a budget line in the center's budget for any of the
C&E services? If so, what is it? (are they?)
223
SURVEY OF C&E
7. Is there a written goals statement for any of the C&E services?
"b" "It'?S„^!„'rs".L"?r"'' financially „Uhi„ the center,
9.
II. History of C&E Services in the Center:
1. Briefly describe the history of development of each of the C&Eservices mentioned above and/or services that were offered at
(and J^a^s oTtZ"r^°' T'" services, please note the changesa ye r f he change) over the past 8 to ] 0 years of:
A. Type of service
B. Approximate FTE staff positions or staff hours involvedC. Structure of staff (a unit? specialized staff positions?)
u. Budget line
E. Goals
C&E Service (If none, please advance to section III.)
1.
2.
SURVEY OF C&E
3.
4.
(Please continue on back as necessary.
wh.c. years, a? approxi^ftlT^ T.l J^vfxfofrs%^?.%
cou^!rof"?rE'2?;icef °^ '"^^^ influenced
years?
services in your center over the past 8 to 1
SURVEY OF C&E
5. Wer. financial or funding i„ues a.o„, these ^i^r factors?
ffni°cia^i^^?L^:?=r^^ i:i n-L^iraT- ^r^°"" "contracts, shifts in activitv on ^! (i.e., fee for service
to more
'•mar.etabla%rod;«s^,°spe?SL:t?or"' '"''^field, etc..) ^t'eciaiization in one
7. How successful were these strategies?
III. Future of CSE in Center
1 Do you anticipate any changes in the quantity or type of
pL\srj^j:riL"Lle^?^/°^^ the^next^^Helears
2. What factors do you anticipate effecting the futureprofile of C&E services offered by your center?
How would you describe the possible future of consultation,
education and prevention services in mental health centersin this state?
SURVEY OF C&E
8.
What Massachusetts Department of Mental Health Area is this
center in?
Is the area office officially part of the center's organ-ization? (For example, in some centers, an area director
may also function as the executive center director.)
Please describe the center's financial relationship to
Mass DMH. For example, a partnership clinic; private vendor
for multiple DMH contracts; vendor "for single DMH contract,
etc. .
.
r
Thankyou very much for your time and attention in completing this
questionnaire. Please add any additional information and attach
descriptive pamphlets, etc..., as you think appropriate. Please
return this questionnaire in the enclosed envelope to:
David Armstrong
South Shore Mental Health Center
46 0 Quincy Avenue
Quincy, MA 02169
Also, please check to make sure that your name and address are
correctly filled in on the first page of this survey so that
I can return the summarized results to you.
I

